The cross-country spillover effects of macro-prudential policies has an important impact on policy effectiveness and financial stability,and is one of the hot spots in the field of macro-finance.Based on the actual background of cross-country spillover effects of macro-prudential policies,this paper reviews and summarizes the representative literatures from three aspects:influencing factors,transmission mechanisms and policy responses.First,macro-prudential policies spill across borders through financial channels,trade channels and other channels,among which bank credit channels in financial channels are the main overflow channels.Second,the characteristics of commercial banks,the types of macro-prudential policy tools and the timing of macro-prudential policy implementation in the cycle affect the spillover effects.Finally,under the spillover effects of macro-prudential policies,policy coordination is deemed necessary,but its practice still faces challenges.This paper argues that we should refine the discussion of different macroprudential policies,continue the statistical work of macroprudential policy-related data,broaden the research objects of policy spillover,and improve the existing research methods.Under the"Two-Pillar"regulation framework,it is also imperative to incorporate monetary policy into the consideration,exploring its role in cross-border policy spillovers.
Based on the unbalanced panel data of 33 listed commercial banks in China from the first quarter of 2007 to the fourth quarter of 2021,this paper empirically examines the impact of asset securitization on bank systemic risk.We find that asset securitization by commercial banks reduces bank systemic risk;for banks with poor profitability and high credit risk levels,asset securitization has a stronger effect on systemic risk reduction.Further analysis finds that the risk reduction effect of corporate asset securitization is more pronounced compared to credit asset securitization.This paper enriches the related research on the economic consequences of asset securitization and the influencing factors of systemic risk,which has important insights for commercial banks to promote asset securitization business and for regulators to prevent the systemic risk that may be triggered by these activities.
Various economic entities hope to incorporate insurance companies into their self-centered enterprise networks,utilizing the investment and financing functions of insurance companies for internal capital transactions.This paper theoretically analyzes how the ultimate controlling shareholders influence the internal capital transaction activities of life insurance companies and provides empirical evidence based on data of 73 life insurance companies in China from 2013 to 2021.We find that the better the operating performance of a life insurance company,the larger the scale of capital outflow to its ultimate controlling shareholders or related enterprises of the ultimate controlling shareholders;only when the solvency of the life insurance company is poor will the ultimate controlling shareholders net inject capital into the life insurance company.Moderating effects tests show that compared to financial institution controllers,non-financial institution controllers extract more funds from life insurance companies;with increasing shareholding ratio,controllers reduce the scale of capital outflow from life insurance companies and net inject capital into them.Therefore,this paper proposes intensive supervision and information disclosure for the ultimate controlling shareholders of life insurance companies.
The Central Financial Work Conference in 2023 clearly pointed out that the access standards and regulatory requirements of small and medium-sized financial institutions should be strict,and the channels for bank capital replenishment should be broadened.In recent years,Chinese financial management departments have made many attempts in the capital risk regulation of small and medium-sized banks and the improvement of capital replenishment channels,and have achieved certain results.However,from the perspective of risk examples such as Baoshang Bank,many small and medium-sized banks have insufficient capital quality due to governance defects,which makes them unable to effectively absorb losses in a risk environment even if they have a high level of book capital adequacy,potentially leading to an underestimation of actual risks.On the basis of recent research and theoretical analysis,this paper uses two indicators to measure the quality of bank capital,which include dividend distribution and profit correlation(degree of"fake equity,real debt")and credit scale of related parties(degree of"equity tunneling").Based on the financial data of 1,586 urban commercial banks and rural commercial banks from 2010 to 2021,this paper empirically tests the correlation between capital quality indicators and risk preference of small and medium-sized banks,and deeply analyzes the possible impact of external economic environment and governance efficiency on this relationship.The results show that banks with lower capital quality will have a strong risk preference and choose lower capital buffer scale,which is more obvious in the downward economic environment,that is,insufficient capital quality will amplify the pro-cyclicality of bank's capital buffer.On the other hand,for small and medium-sized banks in the central and western regions with more severe external policy intervention and lower governance efficiency,the impact of declining capital quality on their risk preference is more significant compared to those in other regions,and this structural feature will be more obvious in the downward cycle.Based on the results of empirical research and some policies that have been issued by the regulatory authorities,I put forward the policy implementation ideas that can be further paid attention to and improved in the next stage.
Once CBDC cross-border use is granted policy permission and legal authorization,and has a more relaxed market environment and mature technical conditions,the scope of CBDC cross-border testing is expected to gradually expand and shift towards substantive applications.The risks of CBDC cross-border application will pose new challenges to the traditional international financial regulatory network.Therefore,it is necessary to put CBDC international regulatory coordination research on the agenda.This paper discusses the cutting-edge research results on international competition and regulation of CBDC from three aspects based on existing literature,policy trends,and international agendas.Firstly,based on the latest literature on the international agenda of CBDC at home and abroad,it summarizes and sorts out the potential risks of cross-border application of CBDC,including international competition and potential conflicts,legal and regulatory risks,and global governance risks.The second is to comprehensively analyze the regulatory exploration practices of CBDC cross-border application projects promoted or studied by important international financial organizations from three dimensions:fundamental principles,design selection,and cross-border application testing of CBDC.Thirdly,in response to the potential risks of cross-border use of CBDC and international regulatory shortcomings,four key issues were discussed:CBDC will introduce uncertainty to the traditional international monetary system;The fragmentation risk of CBDC will increase the difficulty of financial governance;CBDC will pose new threats to financial security and stability;Cross-border applications of CBDC will face conflicts of jurisdiction.This paper believes that the development of CBDC needs to be based on a deep international consensus foundation,relatively complete technical standards,and a relatively complete international regulatory environment.At present,research and discussions on international coordination of CBDC should be strengthened to prevent new financial governance risks caused by the cross-border use of CBDC,and even cause significant damage to the existing international monetary system,international financial markets,and international financial regulation.
