
This paper discusses the four main elements of a theory of manipulation which I call the Mistake Account, and which I defend in my 2025 book on manipulation. This theory claims that manipulation is influence that operates by inducing a mistake into the target’s psychological states or processes. It is often effective due to imperfections in human reasoning, including the shortcuts we use to make good decisions rapidly most of the time. It is often bad because it harms or undermines the autonomy of the target, but it is always bad because it induces mistakes, and mistakes are bad.
This is a critical discussion of Noggle's "Mistake Account" of manipulation. I first raise doubts as to whether all manipulations are indeed cases of intentionally inducing mistakes. Secondly, I argue that even if all manipulations are cases of intentionally inducing mistakes, this does not necessarily show that manipulations are as such pro tanto wrong. Finally, I raise the question of whether my disagreement with Noggle regarding the pro tanto wrongness of manipulation rests ultimately on different conceptions in philosophical anthropology.
Promises create a duty to act as promised in the future. Equally, morally valid consent to some acts, such as sex, requires that one consent when the act occurs. A promise to perform an act that requires contemporaneous consent-for example, a sexual promise-intuitively seems morally problematic. Hallie Liberto argues that promisees have a moral duty to reject sexual promises. I argue, however, that it is morally permissible to accept a promise from another to perform an act that requires contemporaneous consent because the promise is conditional on consent. Accordingly, a sexual promise, for example, does not authorize nonconsensual sex. Furthermore, the promissory duty created by such promises is not rendered meaningless by its being conditional on consent.
This article is a protest against the trend toward ever greater online contact at the cost of, or as a replacement for, in-person interaction. Increasingly, meetings and events are 'hybrid' or take place entirely online. Even when physically near others in shared spaces like streets, parks, and cafes, we are often glued to our screens. But I argue that we lose something of value when online contact comes to dominate and crowds out in-person interaction. Our offline interactions are valuable in ways that, for the most part, our online encounters are not. I begin by defending the social value of our encounters with one another, drawing from literature in democratic theory, architecture, and urban theory. I then tackle the strongest argument in favor of online forms of encounter, on the grounds that they are a less costly and more inclusive alternative to their offline equivalents. I argue that enabling online participation is both an insufficient amendment to an ableist and patriarchal society and a far from all-purpose one. The article then makes the case for putting down our screens, going in-person to meetings and events, and refusing to distract ourselves with our virtual lives when in parks, public squares, cafes, and the like. First, I argue that physical encounters are distinct in the proximity that they force and the subtlety of gesture they permit. Second, I argue that, by contrast to in-person encounters, online encounters permit only an attenuated form of the connection that we need with fellow citizens. Indeed, with the rise of AI-generated content, online platforms may fail to offer any connection to another human at all. Third, I draw attention to the ways in which the commercial nature of these online platforms threatens to subvert our online encounters far more systematically than the selling-off of public spaces that has often troubled democratic theorists.
Many species seem to have much smaller welfare ranges than we do. Which importance should we assign to the welfare of these low-welfare species when we have to decide whether to benefit members of these species or other humans? In particular, should we ever prioritize low-welfare species when some of the most significant human goods are at stake? It could be argued that benefits for lowwelfare species are irrelevant to significant human benefits because they are much smaller in comparison. I begin by developing this argument but subsequently reject it based on the consideration of a hypothetical high-welfare species whose welfare range vastly exceeds the human welfare range. Arguments from empathy and fairness are given to support the opposite view on which some benefits for lowwelfare species can outweigh even significant human benefits. Finally, I propose a principle that reconciles this view with the intuition that human headaches cannot outweigh human lives.