
Abstract The central argument of this article is not that competitive auction mechanisms neatly circumvent the risks posed by international investment agreements (IIAs), but rather that they relocate the tension between governance objectives and treaty obligations—shifting it from ‘command-and-control’ type performance requirements into the design details of auction frameworks. In offshore wind energy (OWE), performance requirements (PRs) are commonly expressed through local content requirements and joint venture obligations. They serve important governance functions in developing domestic industrial capacity, strengthening system resilience, and preserving sovereign rights over maritime resources. However, their use is increasingly constrained under IIAs, particularly through PR prohibitions and national treatment obligations. These obligations may operate cumulatively and extend to effects-based assessment. Against this backdrop, competitive auction mechanisms have emerged as the dominant governance model in OWE development, increasingly incorporating non-price evaluation criteria to pursue PR-related objectives. This article examines how PR functions may be reconfigured within auction procedures, through pre-qualification requirements, non-price criteria, and compliance oversight mechanisms, rather than through explicit PR obligations. It demonstrates that, while offering an alternative governance framework, auction mechanisms may nevertheless induce conduct falling within the scope of prohibited PRs in different ways. Auction mechanisms therefore do not eliminate the tensions between OWE governance goals and IIA obligations, but instead relocate these tensions to the design and implementation of auction-based governance frameworks.
Abstract In May 2026 Iran established what it calls the Persian Gulf Strait Authority (PGSA) in respect of the historically international and neutral waterway referred to herein as ‘the Gulf’. The PGSA asserts licensing, fee-collection, and security-screening powers over the Strait of Hormuz. This brief argues that, unlike earlier ad hoc unilateral measures, the PGSA purports to convert residual coastal-state competence into a permission-based gateway incompatible with the non-suspendable transit passage regime under United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) Articles 38, 42, and 44. It considers the commercial, insurance, and dispute-settlement consequences of this ‘institutional regulatory extension’, and the limited avenues open to affected states and the International Maritime Organization.
Abstract This article examines how risk allocation can be complemented by strategic de-risking in cross-border energy infrastructure exposed to third-state interference. Using the Great Sea Interconnector (GSI) as its principal case, it distinguishes conventional political and project risk from geopolitical disruption generated by a state external to the ordinary investor–host state relationship. The article argues that the Greece–Cyprus arrangements for sharing the financial consequences of such disruption constitute an unusual model of institutional allocation of third-state geopolitical risk. It then considers whether wider strategic embedding could affect the political environment in which interference may occur. The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) is examined not as a source of legal protection or a security guarantee, but as a prospective framework through which stakeholder multiplication, institutional escalation, investment signalling and reputational costs may operate. Since the GSI–IMEC association has not been institutionalized, these mechanisms are assessed as hypotheses through a limited comparison with the Southern Gas Corridor and the Baltic Synchronization Project. The comparison provides stronger support for institutional coordination, investment signalling and, under more demanding conditions, resilience effects than for the proposition that strategic association itself deters third-state interference. The article therefore advances a limited proposition: legal and institutional arrangements can allocate the financial consequences of geopolitical disruption, while strategic connectivity may complement such arrangements where political association is translated into sustained institutional, financial, and technical engagement.
Abstract Artificial intelligence (AI) is becoming part of the infrastructure through which upstream petroleum operations are planned, monitored, and justified. Operators may rely on predictive systems when preparing production forecasts, assessing maintenance needs, evaluating tenders, estimating expenditure, and explaining schedule or cost variance. Joint operating agreements (JOAs), however, continue to allocate authority and responsibility through concepts developed for human and organizational decision-making. They rarely distinguish between operational data, trained models, and algorithmic outputs, or specify what Non-Operators may inspect when a material recommendation is generated by proprietary software. This article examines how AI-assisted administration affects the Operator’s standard of performance, data rights, the chargeability of AI-related costs, and the treatment of algorithmic material in claims and arbitration. It advances non-delegable Operator accountability as a contract-design principle, rather than as a universal rule already recognized by every governing law. Drawing on JOA practice, commercial authorities, and comparative AI governance standards, the article identifies design elements for a risk-based AI Governance Addendum. Cost chargeability is distinguished from damages liability as a more workable contractual response to failures of AI governance. The proposed framework links approval thresholds, human oversight, validation, record preservation, audit rights, and cost consequences to the materiality of the relevant AI use.
The expansion of artificial intelligence (AI) data centres has intensified interest in co-located electricity supply arrangements that pair large computing loads with adjacent generation. These structures are often described as behind-the-meter, islanded, private-wire or self-supply models, but those labels are legally incomplete where the data centre remains dependent on the wider electricity system for balancing, voltage and frequency support, emergency import capability, curtailment management, transmission planning, or ancillary services. This article develops the concept of grid-reliant private power to identify privately structured supply arrangements that remain materially system-dependent. Using US federal electricity law as the principal case study, and testing the analysis against European Union balancing law and Great Britain (GB) connection and use-of-system materials, it argues that the decisive legal issue is not meter position but residual reliance on public-network functions. The article then examines the private-law consequences for tariff exposure, transmission-service classification, cost allocation, change in law, curtailment, outage risk, nuclear licensing, renewable-plus-storage dispatch, bankability, and dispute design. It concludes that co-located AI power contracts should price and allocate grid reliance expressly rather than treating it as a remote contingency.