In this article we seek to relate two epistemic values present in both the construction and evaluation of scientific theories. These are logical consistency and simplicity. We devote the first part of the text to this. In the second part we focus on simplicity based on two 19th century philosophers-physicists, Ernest Mach and Heinrich Hertz. To what extent is simplicity taken on as a methodological principle or criterion for choosing between theories by these scientists? Can simplicity also be thought of as a metaphysical presupposition? These are the questions that guide the second half of this text. In summary, in the first part we present the concepts of (a) consistency and (b) simplicity as epistemic values, and in the second part we explore the methodological and metaphysical dimension of (b). To this end, we will draw on literature primarily from 'philosopher scientists', ultimately demonstrating that simplicity is an epistemic value that serves both as a methodological principle and a metaphysical assumption in the physical sciences.
The computationalist paradigm in cognitive science, currently known as cognitivism, has exerted a philosophical and empirical dominance that has hindered the visibility and contemplation of contemporary alternative paradigms such as those proposed by the Cognition 4E school. To encourage the exploration of these new theoretical currents, this work aims to analyze the conceptual assumptions of cognitivism and to criticize two of its central tenets (representationalism and functionalism). In this way we hope to obtain a philosophical justification of enactivism, its theoretical foundations and methodological implications as a promising path within the cognitive sciences.
This work aims to highlight the relevance of Nelson Goodman's work; in particular, the analysis of his book Ways of Worldmaking from a feminist and pragmatist perspective, based on Helen Longino's proposal. To this end, the first part reviews the context and objective of Ways of Worldmaking. Subsequently, theoretical elements in Helen Longino are presented, and possible criticisms and similarities with Goodman are pointed out, particularly the constitution of worlds and their plurality.
This paper offers a critical and general overview of scientific realism, exploring its debates and variants based on the selective acceptance of some of its components. Scientific realism, as a position in the realism and antirealism debate, is composed of various fundamental theses, although some proponents nuance or reinterpret certain elements. This has given rise to so-called selective realisms. It is argued that ontological and epistemological theses are essential to defining the realist stance. Furthermore, examining theses on scientific and common-sense objects allows us to analyze the relationship between common-sense realism and scientific realism. I will try to highlight that scientific realism is not a uniform stance, but that within it there are tensions and debates arising both from anti-realist criticisms and from disagreements among realists, which give rise to certain variants.
The extended mind theory holds that cognitive processes are not confined to the brain but can be extended to the environment and external artifacts, epistemic virtue refers to intellectual dispositions that promote the reliable acquisition of knowledge. This article explores the relationship between these two theories and argues that in a stable extended cognition system, the introduction of traditional epistemic virtues can paradoxically generate disutility by increasing cognitive load, compromising the effectiveness of the entire system. From this, it is proposed that the notion of extended epistemic virtue represents an ideal of dynamic equilibrium: an epistemological rethinking that values not only the accumulation of knowledge oriented towards truth but also the capacity of the system to sustain itself harmoniously in relation to its external conditions.
