Authoritarian legislatures are often portrayed as "rubber stamps" that merely formalize predetermined decisions. Yet growing evidence suggests that they can influence policy through deliberation and bill modification. This study investigates legislative modification in China's National People's Congress. Drawing on an original dataset of 133 bill-law pairs enacted between 2008 and 2023, we employ an improved minimum edit-distance algorithm to quantify textual change and identify conditions that generate more extensive modification. Results reveal that Congress has become proactive in shaping legislative outcomes. Party attention and public concern significantly amplify modification, whereas bureaucratic fragmentation constrains it. A qualitative case study of the Food Safety Law illustrates how bureaucratic competition creates drafting ambiguity, while public concern weakens departmental interests and facilitates consensus. These findings demonstrate that bill modification functions as a mechanism of controlled coordination that reconciles party priorities, societal pressures, and bureaucratic fragmentation within a centralized authoritarian policymaking system.

Sentencing disparity dominates in American scholarship and has been leading global research in past decades, however, few studies have addressed sentencing equilibrium across countries. Learning from the previous theories regarding court communities, organizational conformity, and so on, this paper develops a theory of jurisdictional uniformity to address sentencing equilibrium in embedded courts across different levels in China. With data on sentence length consisting of 15,142 rape offenders nationwide, this article conducts bivariate and multilevel multivariate analyses to demonstrate negligible sentencing differences across cities and provinces. Authors believe the sentencing rules under jurisdictional uniformity pave the way for balanced sentencing, while the political mechanism in the judicial system controls jurisdictional disparity. Given that the existence of sentencing disparity should be seriously rechecked in each jurisdiction due to the legal and political diversity across the country, attention should be given to sentencing equilibrium inside the embedded court.

Criminal sentencing in sexual assault cases exhibits systematic disparities based on victim-offender relationships, yet existing theoretical explanations remain inadequate for understanding the underlying cognitive mechanisms. This study reconceptualizes rape myth theory by distinguishing between two distinct cognitive structures: consent myths that operate through everyday cultural reinforcement, and norm violation responses that activate through moral boundary violations. Analyzing 7701 Chinese rape case judgments (2012-2020), we demonstrate that these mechanisms produce opposing sentencing effects. Consent myths lead to sentencing discounts of 5%-9% for acquaintance and intimate partner cases, while norm violation responses trigger 25% longer sentences for familial cases. This dual-structure framework explains previously puzzling cross-cultural patterns, including why Chinese courts impose harsher punishment on family members than strangers. We identify two critical moderating factors that interact differently with these myth types. Lay assessor participation produces "accidental equity" through generalized punitiveness, compressing relationship-based disparities via universal severity rather than bias correction. Provincial modernization demonstrates contradictory effects: reducing consent myth influence through changing gender norms while simultaneously amplifying norm violation responses through heightened moral sensitivity. Crucially, female educational advancement proves more effective than general economic growth in reducing rape myth influence.

Do active judicial reviews bring about better administrative performance? Most scholars argue that active judicial review creates animosity between the judiciary and administration, leading to bad administrative performance. Others advocate that the relationship is not so much hostile as it is constructive. However, the actual impact of and mechanisms enabling such a constructive relationship remain unclear. Employing an analysis of Public Interest Litigation against the Administration (PILA) in environmental protection cases in China, we present a theory of "bargaining in the shadow of judicial review." The threat of imminent judicial review forces the administration to negotiate with the prosecutor and enhance its performance in exchange for dropping charges. Additionally, the effect of PILA is stronger in regions with more public environmental concern and weaker in regions where the higher-level public administration pays greater attention to environmental protection. Furthermore, we identify the impact of PILA on local governments' enforcement efforts and its legitimacy. The present study sheds new light on the long-standing debate on managerialism versus legalism.

The Chief Officials' Appearance System (COAS), introduced in 2015, requires government leaders to appear in court and explain their actions. Unlike other post-2014 legal reforms aimed at reducing political influence in administrative litigation, the COAS uniquely actively involves political officials. This approach is based on the belief that increased participation will help officials to gain a better understanding of public concerns and improve administrative litigation quality. However, few studies have examined the system's effectiveness, and existing research relies on anecdotal evidence with limited analysis. To address this gap, we conducted a systematic empirical inquiry using 1,551 administrative litigation cases filed in a Beijing local court and extensive field research in 12 other provinces. Contrary to official expectations, we found the system reproduced the administrative grievances it was tasked with resolving. Moreover, when chief officials appear in court, administrative litigation is characterized by a renewed triad of apathetic state agencies, increasingly agitated plaintiffs and strategically empowered courts.

人民陪审员制度作为人民司法、司法民主的重要制度表达形式,是新时代实现人民民主权利的司法路径.本文从"全过程人民民主"的理论视角出发,以人民陪审员制度作为研究对象,基于司法大数据实证追踪公民参与司法的程度、组织、范围和效能.研究发现,人民陪审能够为"全过程人民民主"提供宽广的施行空间;人民陪审所包含的"全过程人民民主"能够深刻影响司法决策;人民陪审所生发的"全过程人民民主"活力有待进一步释放."全过程人民民主"之于人民司法,不仅拟合着"让人民群众在每一个司法案件中感受到公平正义"的本质要求,也预示着一种全新的司法治理技术的诞生.

人民陪审员制度作为我国一项重要的司法制度,一直以来备受国家和社会的关注和重视.然而,"陪而不审""审而不议"似乎长期支配着学界对于陪审员的想象.以36万份刑事司法裁判文书数据和一手田野调研资料为分析素材的实证研究发现,人民陪审员能够系统性地影响审判结果,陪审员的参与会使最终的判决结果更加"宽大";陪审员在合议庭中与法官的不同组合方式,也会给案件结果带来不同的影响.其背后的理论机制可被归结为:法官能够自利性地抵消陪审员的能力短板;陪审员能够能动性地发挥自身的能力优势;法官在组织合议庭时策略性地与陪审员结成"联盟".

The present study sets out to investigate the gender effects observed in of Confucian gender norms. While previous scholars have identified gender effects in both criminal and civil cases in China, the factors contributing to these effects and their underlying logic remain unclear. By analyzing a dataset comprising 41,252 criminal cases decided between 2014 and 2020, this study reveals the existence of gender effects specifically in cases related to gender issues. Female defendants receive significantly shorter sentences than male defendants in certain cases. Additionally, in regions with a strong Confucian influence, the gender effect appears to be more pronounced in certain cases. However, the impact of gender norms on sentencing is neutralized in areas associated with China's revolutionary past. Gender norms no longer impact gender effects in revolutionary base areas. The study contributes to the literature on law and courts by providing further evidence of gender effects in China, adding nuances to the social context of judging, and providing empirical evidence of social norms and norm changes.

基于公开裁判文书定量分析行政审判中法官对比例原则的适用行为发现,比例原则的各个子原则对判决结果的影响存在不均衡性,且子原则是否存在相关立法例对法官选择子原则进行适用有显著影响.同时,必要性原则与均衡性原则均在国家立法与判决结果的联系中发挥着一定程度的中介作用.这表明在行政审判中,法官对比例原则的适用存在选择性.推动比例原则适用的"中国化"有两种进路:针对适当性原则与必要性原则,可结合当下的行政法法典化热潮对其进行立法实定化操作;针对均衡性原则,应该正确认识和处理公益与私益的关系,可要求法官在裁判说理过程中对所涉及的有关利益衡量的标准作出明确说明,以增强利益衡量的客观化程度.

制度创新的扩散是国家治理的重要议题.既有文献主要从晋升激励、横纵关系和条块差异视角来解释创新扩散.然而,这些理论无法解释十八大以来政协系统制度创新的扩散.本文通过多案例比较,提出"倡导-选择"型创新扩散概念,探讨政协制度创新扩散的特点和机制.一方面,人民政协制度创新扩散是倡导型的,有别于"试点-推广型"纵向扩散或"自主学习型"横向扩散模式;另一方面,人民政协制度创新扩散是选择性的,学习者受到资源整合能力的约束,采取选择性学习策略,这使得人民政协制度创新的扩散呈现出不同的空间特性.在此过程中,制度创新与既有制度资源相辅相成,推动了人民政协在新时代的发展.

在我国的立法过程中,立法效率存在较大差异,有些列入全国人大常委会立法规划的法案在数月间即可通过,而有些却无法在当届落地,甚至绵延十几年.如何理解立法效率的差异化?本文基于1991-2019年全国人大常委会立法规划内法案的落实情况,探讨党和国家的关注、审议协商以及法案特征等多元因素对立法效率的影响.我们发现,全国人大立法对党和国家的工作重点有极强的回应性,党的领导在立法工作中发挥了至关重要的作用.法案审议中的利益分化和协商会增加立法延宕的可能,多方利益的协调和共识的凝聚则会提高立法效率.立法规划对立法过程有正面指导效用.此外,法案类别、议题、成熟度和复杂度都会作用于立法效率,内外部环境的变化和立法程序的修改也同样会对立法效率产生影响.最后,在拓宽公民参与立法工作渠道的同时,还应重视对民意的实质性吸纳.

人民陪审员制度作为司法治理的重要组成部分,是沟通民主化和专业化的重要制度性中介.民主化和专业化在司法治理中存在着一定的竞争博弈关系,如何探索两者间的均衡点,是司法改革长期关注的问题.本文从民主化和专业化的竞争关系视角出发,借助司法大数据分析陪审制度的时空分布差异、案件分配方式与审判组织逻辑,以此系统审视人民陪审在司法治理中的作用机制.研究发现,民主化是我国陪审制度发展的主线;民主化建制具有一定的策略性和地方性;民主化发展还有一定的"留白";民主化活跃发展的外观之下,专业化依旧占据优势地位.我国陪审制度发展结构,既有民主化的内核,亦有专业化的潜在冲动.在双向度博弈探索的过程中,我国正在试图找寻两者间的均衡点.

人民陪审活跃度不仅反映出普通公民参与司法活动的活跃程度,还关系着人民陪审员制度的实现程度和实施效果.人民陪审活跃度在全国范围内存在着明显的地方性差异,文章基于31个省份的跨案例比较,并辅以多家法院的访谈调研资料,系统识别了影响和制约陪审活跃度的体制性因素.研究发现,以司法公信力、陪审人力资源为代表的民主性资源,并不会带来高陪审活跃度;只有在法治水平、办案压力、财政资源供给等专业性资源的牵引和带动下,才能激发较高的陪审活跃度.民主化与专业化的交织关系构成了解释陪审活跃度差异的深层逻辑,也是理解人民陪审员制度的理论线索.在此意义上,我国人民陪审制度可以被视为是以专业化为底色的一种民主化实践.

Scholars of law, economics, and political science argue that collegiality matters. Considerable panel effects exist across jurisdictions, and judges compose panels strategically. In China, millions of cases are decided by collegial panels every year; however, little attention has been paid to the issue of collegiality. We offer one of the first empirical inquiries into collegial panels in China. Specifically, when and why do judges engage in collegiality? How does the presiding judge compose a judicial panel? What is the panel effect? Based on 23,564 cases decided by a local court in Beijing, China, from 2015 to 2017, we build a network of judges' collegial behaviors and examine the judges' strategy for panel composition and its potential impact. We argue for an external mechanism of panel effects and provide a strategic account of coalition-building in a vulnerable environment. For mundane cases, Chinese judges tend to compose panels with junior judges. To some extent, such panels are their comfort zone. When facing complex cases, they tend to step out of their comfort zone and form panels with more capable judges. When doing so, they are also more inclined to make tough decisions, such as ruling against the government in administrative litigation cases and repeated players in civil cases, among others. The study sheds light on judicial politics in China and has the potential to expand our understanding of collective judicial decision-making in transitional societies.

陪审制度是我国政法传统的重要组成部分,是党的群众路线在司法领域的延伸.陪审制度发源于革命时期,新中国成立以后得以延续,历经初创、发展、停滞、复兴诸多阶段,总体上呈现出周期性的循环反复,发展历程也时常往返于复兴与淡化之间.陪审制度变迁很大程度上深嵌于司法民主化和司法专业化之间的交互逻辑中,两者间的强弱交互塑造着不同时期制度运行的基本样貌.同时,陪审制度的变迁与嬗变,也在一定程度上折射着我国司法改革在民主化和专业化问题上的反思与取舍,反映着我国政法传统在新时代的探索与重塑.

The chapter begins by outlining three stages of China’s judicial reform journey. The first stage, marked by the Western-oriented reforms launched in the late 1970s, featured judicial activism within uncertain boundaries. The second stage is often depicted as constituting a U-turn. This relatively brief stage was characterised by the revival of the mediation system and redistribution of power within the political–legal system. Finally, the third stage comprises the grand changes introduced since the 4th Plenum of the 18th Party Congress. The chapter then turns to the major reform measures introduced in the current round of reforms and uses empirical data to evaluate the extent to which they constitute a deviation from the previous reform path. Although the greater judicial transparency, personnel reforms, soft-centralisation of the judicial organs and ongoing supervision reform seen during this round have effected a fundamental overhaul of judicial power, they remain influenced by deeply embedded political constraints. The final section of the chapter summarises the Chinese characteristics of the pursuit of rule of law in a one-party state, including the ongoing populist turn, selective adoption of Western experiences, development of a distinct dispute resolution system, cycles of decentralisation and centralisation, and persistent party leadership.

在大数据时代的开放结构中,计算法学延伸了实证法学研究的知性体系和学科范畴,使法学研究迈向了更为纵深、更为宽广的畛域.计算法学在方法论上的基本立场深嵌于法学与社会科学的交叉研究范式中,如司法政治学、法社会学、犯罪学等.在计算法学方兴未艾之际,对这些学科研究主题及其理念分殊进行梳理和总结也就尤有意义.从既有的域外研究成果来看,计算法学研究的方法运用逐渐趋向科学成熟,研究视域不断拓宽,数据驱动与算法驱动多维推进,研究模式呈现出跨学科合作趋向.计算法学研究虽然在中国尚处于起步阶段,但是法律实务界和各大高校追摹大数据前沿的脚步从未停歇,计算法学在中国未来的发展也是可期可盼的.

监察体制改革是事关全局的重大政治体制改革,旨在构建集中统一、权威高效的有中国特色的国家监察体系.本文立足监察体制改革试点以来的地方实践,从实证的角度探究地方监察体制改革的治理逻辑.研究发现,试点以来,地方监察委已建立起较为完备的组织体系,在人员转隶、留置、全覆盖、司法衔接等具体实践中也体现出积极的改革回应性与相当的地方差异性.中央的顶层设计与规训和不完全信息驱动下的地方遵从是其中隐含的治理逻辑.