We propose a behavioral signaling framework to explain the positive announcement effects of stock splits. (Retail) investors view stock splits as good news and are loss averse. Thus, a stock split can raise investors' expectations of the firm's growth potential and stock price but may also cause disproportionately larger price declines if the firm cannot meet investors' elevated expectations. In equilibrium, only managers with favorable information use stock splits to signal. Descriptive analyses of stock splits in China provide supportive evidence for this explanation: (1) Investors become more optimistic after stock splits; (2) higher split ratios are associated with stronger market reactions; (3) splitting firms have better future performance than non-splitting firms; and (4) they experience larger price declines when falling short of investors' expectations. These findings, combined with the unique institutional features of the Chinese market, help differentiate our behavioral explanation from alternative explanations within the rational framework.

We propose a behavioral signaling framework to explain the positive announcement effects of stock splits. (Retail) investors view stock splits as good news and are loss averse. Thus, a stock split can raise investors’ expectations of the firm's growth potential and stock price but may also cause disproportionately larger price declines if the firm cannot meet investors’ elevated expectations. In equilibrium, only managers with favorable information use stock splits to signal. Descriptive analyses of stock splits in China provide supportive evidence for this explanation: (1) Investors become more optimistic after stock splits; (2) higher split ratios are associated with stronger market reactions; (3) splitting firms have better future performance than non-splitting firms; and (4) they experience larger price declines when falling short of investors’ expectations. These findings, combined with the unique institutional features of the Chinese market, help differentiate our behavioral explanation from alternative explanations within the rational framework.

This study examines the impact of China’s one-size-fits-all mandatory deleveraging policy on the levels and quality of firms’ cash flow from operations (CFO). Using a difference-in-differences design and data on listed firms from 2012 to 2019, we examine how the policy influences CFO levels, persistence, and informativeness. We find that while mandatory deleveraging is associated with an average improvement in future CFO levels and informativeness among highly leveraged firms, this aggregate effect masks substantial heterogeneity in firm responses. For highly leveraged outperforming firms, the policy is associated with lower future CFO levels and a deterioration in both CFO persistence and informativeness. These firms appear to comply with deleveraging mandates primarily by reducing operating liabilities, particularly accounts payable and unearned revenue, which lengthens their cash conversion cycles. Cross-sectional analyses further show that the adverse effects are more pronounced among state-owned enterprises (SOEs), smaller firms, and firms without bank affiliations. These findings highlight the heterogeneous consequences of uniform deleveraging mandates and underscore the importance of considering liability composition and firm performance when designing macroprudential regulation.

This study investigates how brokerage firms’ involvement in share pledge transactions affects their competitiveness in underwriting seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). We find that brokerage firms acting as pledgees are more likely to serve as underwriters for issuers whose blockholders have established share pledge relationships with them. Consistent with the information advantage mechanism, we show that pledgee brokers’ underwriting advantage is more pronounced when they obtain richer issuer-specific information through share pledges, internal information flows face fewer frictions, such advantages are more valuable, and issuers are subject to higher information uncertainty. Moreover, compared with SEOs underwritten by non-pledgee brokers, those underwritten by pledgee brokers exhibit lower offer discounts and better post-issuance stock performance, suggesting that information advantages derived from share pledges help reduce equity financing cost. Overall, our findings indicate that pledgee brokers gain a competitive edge in SEO underwriting by leveraging information from share pledge transactions.

The emerging literature suggests that the accounting information disclosed by micro-enterprises is useful for macro forecasting.Previous studies have mainly analyzed the relevance of aggregate accounting information for predicting macroeconomic indicators,such as future GDP growth,job creation and destruction,monetary policy,and inflation(Konchitchki and Patatoukas,2014a;Crawley,2015;Luo et al.,2016;Shivakumar and Urcan,2017;Rouxelin et al.,2018;Ma and Zhang,2020;Ye et al.,2020;Hann et al.,2021).However,little is known about the usefulness of aggregate accounting information in predicting meso-level indicators,especially the credit risk of the regional banking industry. The non-performing loan ratio is a leading indicator of an impending banking crisis(Reinhart and Rogoff,2011)and can effectively reflect a bank's risk status(Fang,2015).Thus,this paper investigates the predictive value of changes in aggregate Ponzi Interests for the growth of non-performing loans in commercial banks.This study uses data from publicly listed companies to construct a measure of firm Ponzi Interests,considering the primary repayment source and subsequently aggregating this measure to the provincial level.We measure Ponzi Interests by tracking the financial sources of firms'interest payments over an extended period and separating the component of total cumulative interest payments covered by financing cash inflows. Consistent with our conjecture,we find that changes in aggregate Ponzi Interests effectively predict the subsequent growth of non-performing loans in commercial banks.We observe a significantly positive association between changes in aggregate Ponzi Interests and the subsequent growth of non-performing loans in commercial banks at the provincial level.This relationship is attributed to the fact that our Ponzi Interests indicator reflects the reliability of a firm's primary repayment source.Firms with a deepening degree of Ponzi Interests will have a higher operating risk and likelihood of experiencing financial distress.Furthermore,the increase in non-performing loans in commercial banks is primarily driven by firms experiencing a deterioration in their financing capacity and asset profitability as well as firms lacking affiliations with banks.Moreover,the findings of a cross-sectional analysis reveal that the forecasting power of the aggregate Ponzi Interests indicator is more pronounced in provinces where Ponzi financing sustainability is poorer and banks have less incentive and ability to conceal non-performing loans. Our paper contributes to the literature in three aspects.First,it introduces an innovative approach by constructing a regional aggregate Ponzi Interests indicator based on the primary repayment source of firms.In addition,this study establishes the relationship between changes in aggregate Ponzi Interests and the subsequent growth of non-performing loans in commercial banks.By delving into enterprise cash flow and the ability to pay interest,our paper extends the research on the meso and macro predictive value of accounting information(Konchitchki and Patatoukas,2014a;Crawley,2015;Luo et al.,2016;Shivakumar and Urcan,2017;Rouxelin et al.,2018;Ma and Zhang,2020;Ye et al.,2020;Hann et al.,2021). Second,this paper enhances the literature on the prediction of firms'financial distress and default risk.Previous studies in this field have mainly focused on the predictive value of financial indicators(Altman,1968),short-term cashflow(Aziz et al.,1988),and market return(Beaver,1966)information.Our study provides evidence that the Ponzi Interests indicator based on long-term cash flow information can be effectively used to predict corporate default risk. This paper complements the literature on bank risk-taking determinants.We examine how accounting information about the reliability of a firm's primary repayment source influences a bank's passive risk-taking,thereby affecting changes in non-performing loans.Given that the literature has mainly focused on the effects of macroeconomic conditions and bank characteristics on banks'passive risk-taking,this paper provides additional insights from the perspective of firms acting as loan demanders. This paper has crucial policy implications and practical relevance.Our results suggest that aggregate Ponzi Interests derived from micro-enterprises'accounting data contain valuable information regarding future credit risk and expected credit losses associated with bank credit assets.These findings imply that regulators should consider the Ponzi Interests indicator to enhance their credit supervision.In addition,commercial banks should incorporate the Ponzi Interests indicator in their specific loan approval procedures and expected credit loss models.

Does executive cash compensation in China's A-share listed companies truly correlate with reported accounting performance? While the prevailing literature suggests a resounding 'yes', our findings tell a different story: Executive pay-for-performance exists only in literature in China. By analyzing individual CEO time-series data from 2000 to 2019, we find little evidence to support a significant positive pay-for-performance relationship for A-share listed companies. This starkly contrasts with the positive, albeit small, pay-for-performance sensitivities (PPS) consistently reported in mainstream cross-sectional studies. Our results reveal that only 33 CEOs formally received economically meaningful PPS. However, due to their generally low level of cash compensation, even these CEOs experienced minimal pay increases despite improved firm performance. Similarly, their compensation remained relatively unchanged even when performance declined. This discrepancy highlights the need for a critical reassessment. Shareholders and regulators of A-share listed companies need to re-evaluate and potentially restructure managerial compensation incentive mechanisms, including both cash and equity-based incentives. Likewise, academia should critically reexamine the conclusions drawn from existing literature on this topic.

This paper investigates the free cash flow productivity of SOEs compared with non-SOEs and examines its possible determinants. We find that SOEs have slightly weak free cash flow productivity but significantly stronger than non-SOEs. Similar performance exists among commercial class I and II SOEs and public-benefit SOEs. Further analyses suggest that firm size, age, sales growth, ownership concentration, government subsidies, and industry monopoly factors cannot explain this phenomenon. The common driver for all types of SOEs to generate stronger free cash flows than non-SOEs is their stronger expense control capability.

We study whether investor voice affects firm policy. Using a novel dataset of the transcripts of online earnings communication conferences (OECC) of Chinese listed firms during 2006 and 2015, we show that firms do respond to investor complaints about dividend policy with increased future dividends. We find that the number of dividend-related questions raised by investors, the number of complaints (questions with negative attitudes), firm executive responsiveness, and CEO attendance in the OECC are positively associated with future dividend payouts. Moreover, positive responses are concentrated in firms facing greater pressure from peers, the market, and the regulator. Our additional analysis shows that the increase in payouts in response to investors' voice is not at the expense of cutting value-increasing investment. Overall, our results suggest that the online interactive platform empowers shareholders' voice and helps them to conduct a successful dialogue with firm managers in a cost-effective way.

本文以 2012-2018 年A 股非金融行业上市公司为样本,以瘦身健体改革为准自然实验构建多时点双重差分模型,系统考察了瘦身健体改革对于国有控股公司造血功能的影响及其作用机制.研究发现,瘦身健体改革显著改善了国有控股公司的造血功能,并且主要通过剥离国有控股公司的战略性政策负担,促使其聚焦主业经营、降低组织臃肿程度和减少过度投资三种机制发挥作用.异质性检验表明,瘦身健体改革的政策效果主要存在于改革意愿较高、公司内部和外部治理环境较差的国有控股公司当中.总之,本研究为国有企业瘦身健体改革的积极效果提供了实证证据,对持续推进和深化国企改革具有很好的政策含义.

本文采用自由现金流量创造力来度量企业捐赠能力,并基于A股公司数据研究了企业捐赠能力、捐赠动机与捐赠行为之间的关系.结果发现:(1)非国有企业的捐赠能力与捐赠水平负相关,且在其寻求政企关系和利益交换的动机更强时更显著;(2)在捐赠能力强劲的国有企业中,捐赠水平与捐赠能力正相关,且在其受到更严格的内外部监督时更显著;(3)非国企在缺乏捐赠能力下的捐赠行为具有资源交换效应,而国企的捐赠行为则没有类似效应.本文的发现意味着,非国有企业的捐赠行为更多受策略性利己动机而非捐赠能力的影响,而国有企业的捐赠行为则更加量力而行.

本文以上市公司面对投资者情绪时的股票送转为研究情境,通过捕捉公司择时管理名义股价以迎合低价股非理性偏好的现象,为公司迎合投资者非理性偏好的理论议题提供了充分的经验证据.本文得到了三个维度的发现:①基于名义股价构建的投资组合(买入低价股卖出高价股)的收益率显著正相关于投资者情绪,说明在投资者情绪的推动下,投资者对低价股的非理性偏好能够产生显著的价格效应.②公司迎合行为与投资者非理性偏好之间存在同步性,即当投资者情绪高涨时,公司进行股票送转的倾向性更高.而且股票的名义价格越高,投资者情绪与股票送转行为之间的正相关关系越强.③当内部人有强烈的股价诉求时,公司在投资者情绪高涨时通过股票送转管理名义股价的行为更为明显.总而言之,本文的发现表明公司在面对高涨的投资者情绪时,通过股票送转行为管理名义股价,以迎合投资者对低价股的非理性偏好.

本文尝试从人类活动的分工和专业化视角对会计本质、会计职能、会计目的与目标、会计对象等基础性理论问题展开分析.本文认为,会计是作为一种信息服务活动而予以分工和专业化发展出来的;会计目的就在于人类为得到更适当数量和更高质量的信息用于相关决策,以实现经济效益最大化,会计信息质量特征和会计信息的种类内容等是会计目的的自然延伸和具体化后形成的要求;会计目标则是指会计人员从事的会计工作的结果应是如何一幅图景,即应于何时以何种形式提供何种内容具有何种质量特征的会计信息,它是会计本质、职能与会计目的及其延伸共同影响的结果,它具体约束着会计活动的展开;会计对象是经济主体的经济活动的过程、结果,可以归结为价值运动;会计信息不是直接的管理决策信息,后者是在前者及其他非会计信息输入后加工输出且加入了组织权威性的信息;会计信息的真实合法性也不等于会计对象的真实合法性.

2021年10月30日,《A股上市公司自由现金流量创造力99强报告》发布后,引起了较大的社会反响.本文围绕入榜公司的自由现金流量创造进行多维度分析,结果发现:(1)从连续五年(2016～2020年)变化趋势来看,入榜公司的自由现金流量创造力水平整体呈现先降后升趋势,但入榜门槛在持续上升,且共有38家上市公司连续五年入榜.(2)从行业、地区、产权、上市板块等特征来看,医药、酒、饮料和精制茶业入榜公司数量最多,广东、上海、浙江、江苏、山东和北京等东部地区入榜公司数量最多,不同产权性质和上市板块的入榜公司数量分布总体较为均衡.(3)对比未入榜但自由现金流量创造相对较优秀的公司,入榜公司在净资产自由现金流量回报率、投入资本自由现金流量回报率、未来一年股票收益率方面都表现更强.(4)入榜公司之所以自由现金流量创造力更强,在一定程度上得益于其良好的产品与服务盈利能力、营运资本管理能力和投资规划能力.

我国证监会强制要求A股上市公司对外披露扣除非经常性损益后的净利润(以下简称"扣非后净利润"),通过将之与报表净利润进行比较研究,本文发现扣非后净利润比报表净利润更能反映上市公司的盈利能力.然而后续的实证检验一致说明,投资者在使用财务指标时表现出显著的弃优用劣非理性倾向:关注报表净利润而不是质量更高的扣非后净利润.在盈余公告日,我们发现股票价格伴随报表净利润而不是扣非后净利润的变动而变动,投资者也主要根据报表净利润而非扣非后净利润交易股票.进一步的研究表明,投资者容易在报表净利润与扣非后净利润的相异程度较大时对上市公司的未来盈利能力产生错误预期,利用投资者弃优用劣的行为偏误设计交易策略,可以获得1％左右的月度超额收益.

关于A股上市公司经理人现金薪酬与公司对外报告的会计业绩是否挂钩,已有的主流文献给出了"是"的答案.基于2000-2019年A股上市公司CEO个体时间序列数据逐个进行回归,研究发现A股上市公司CEO现金薪酬总体上并没有与其所在公司业绩挂钩,即不存在显著正向的薪酬—业绩敏感度,这与主流文献基于传统面板数据下所得到的显著为正、幅值较小的研究结论截然不同.经测算,3317位A股公司CEO中只有33位具有显著为正的薪酬—业绩敏感度,但由于这些CEO整体现金薪酬水平偏低,实际上,随着公司业绩的变动,他们的现金薪酬变动并不大,不具有明显的经济意义.因此,A股上市公司的股东和监管机构需要反思和重构包括现金薪酬与股权激励在内的经理人薪酬激励机制,学术界也应重新评估已有相关文献的结论.

本文基于我国上市公司股份回购预案的市场反应,研究2018年的股份回购新规能否更好地保护投资者利益.本文发现,与股份回购新规实施之前相比,股份回购新规实施后,确实有了更多公司宣布股份回购预案.这些预案也能获得市场的积极反应,但市场反应程度显著减弱.而且这一效应在市值管理型回购、现金持有规模相对股份回购规模上限的比例较低的公司、宣告回购预案后的未来六个月有限售股解禁的公司或者宣告回购预案时大股东有股权质押的公司中才存在.而在股份回购新规实施后,公司宣告首次实施回购所获得的市场反应更加积极.本文进一步研究还发现,整体来看,股份回购预案所伴随着的投资者长期股票收益率降低了,并且内部人减持增加了.因此,总体而言,股份回购新规可能未如监管层所预期的那样保护投资者利益,甚至实际上损害了投资者利益.

信息是投资决策的依据,也是影响投资收益的重要因素.本文认为在研究资源有限的情况下,分析师将更加重视信息的外部价值,并为信息外部价值高的股票分配更多研究资源.以股票基本面与同行业其他股票基本面的相关性衡量一支股票信息外部价值的大小,本文发现具有更高信息外部价值的股票获得了更多的研究资源:有更多分析师跟踪,被更多分析师发布研究报告,且更可能被分析师实地调研.在分析师个体层面,本文也得到了分析师根据信息外部价值对投资组合内的股票分配研究资源的经验证据.进一步的研究表明,由于市场参与者根据信息外部价值配置研究资源,信息外部价值更高的股票对信息的反映更加充分及时,具有更高的定价效率.

2018年财务报表格式修订将研发费用的列报方式由附注披露改为利润表内单独列报.我们从市场对研发费用信息含量反应的视角对这一修订的意义进行了研究,发现当研发费用只在报表附注中披露时,未预期研发费用的市场反应显著为负,且通过买入研发费用最高的投资组合并卖出研发费用最低的投资组合,在未来一年可获得正超额回报;但研发费用在利润表内单独列报后,未预期研发费用的市场反应显著为正且前述超额回报不再存在.机制分析表明研发费用单独列报促进了投资者更多关注研发费用,并抑制了公司的研发费用操纵行为,提高了研发费用的信息含量,缓解了市场对研发费用的错误定价.本文为会计制度改革服务于国家创新战略提供了来自财务报表列报方面的经验证据.

文章基于股东对公司承担的有限责任之价值边界分析资本公积金的性质,然后基于资本公积金的性质来研究资本公积金可否用于弥补公司亏损.主要结论如下:有限责任公司股东对公司承担的有限责任之价值边界就是其注册资本,故其资本公积金的性质是股东可自由合法行使的剩余索取权,资本公积金因此可以用于弥补公司亏损;股份有限公司股东对公司承担的有限责任之价值边界是不清晰的,故其资本公积金的性质也是不明晰的,不能确定其资本公积金可否用于弥补公司亏损;如果《公司法》关于有限责任公司和股份有限公司股东对公司承担的有限责任及其价值边界的立法逻辑是一致的,那么,股份有限公司股东对公司承担的有限责任之价值边界也是公司注册资本,其资本公积金在性质上也属于股东可自由合法行使的剩余索取权,亦可用于弥补公司亏损;如果资本公积金属于股东可自由合法行使的剩余索取权,那就直接规定股东可在符合相关条件时,基于资本公积金来自由合法行使剩余索取权,而不必通过弥补亏损来实现这一目的.基于这些结论,笔者建议,《公司法》应明确股份有限公司股东对公司承担的有限责任之价值边界,删除或者清晰界定资本公积金中所包含的"其他收入",厘清其和会计上"其他综合收益"账户的核算边界区隔,明确"其他综合收益"的性质及其对公司股东分红权利的影响,明确来自公允价值计量和未来现金流量现值计量的损益对股东分红权利的影响;会计准则制定者应进一步梳理"资本公积"账户和"其他综合收益"账户的核算内容与方法,使其与作为企业会计制度上位法之一的《公司法》保持一致.