It is noteworthy that as the Russia-Ukraine war enters its third year, China still maintains a firm position consistent with that of the previous year, endeavouring to promote peace talks and ceasefires. This paper employs the content analysis of 97 academic papers on the Ukraine Crisis in Chinese core journals (CSSCI) from February 22, 2022, to February 22, 2024. The research results suggest that Chinese scholars offer a multidimensional analysis of the development of the Russia-Ukraine war. The paper concludes through content analysis and comparison that Chinese scholars share the same stance on the Russia-Ukraine conflict as Chinese officials. First, Chinese scholars call for promoting the transformation of the global energy system, accelerating the development and use of new energy sources, and promoting the development of innovative capabilities to cope with the multiple crises caused by economic sanctions. Second, the Russia-Ukraine war has exacerbated multiple global security crises and traditional and non-traditional security issues, severely affected the global security system, and created a new security dilemma. Third, scholars advocate the concept of “a community with a shared future for mankind” and build a post-Russia-Ukraine war world security pattern.
欧盟战略自主已经成为欧盟长期追求的战略目标并已在防务、经济与技术等多领域取得了一系列的进展.俄乌冲突的爆发使欧盟对战略自主的追求更加困难.从欧盟层面来看,俄乌冲突冲击了地缘政治格局、国际经贸体系以及欧洲安全形势,对欧盟战略自主产生了深远影响.俄乌冲突造成的大国战略博弈复杂化使欧盟在保障自身安全的同时,还要从长远角度考虑如何在中美战略竞争大背景下维护自身利益.俄乌冲突造成欧洲地缘安全形势剧烈动荡,美国借机强化了在欧洲安全中的主导地位,牵制了欧盟战略自主.欧洲经济也遭受多重冲击,衰退风险加大.这一系列连锁反应加大了欧盟本身能力与战略自主目标之间的鸿沟.从成员国层面来看,法德之间以及新老欧洲国家之间的分歧也影响了欧盟战略自主的实现与发展.不过,俄乌冲突仍然加强了欧盟追求战略自主的决心,当前欧盟战略自主的政策重点聚焦于欧盟的防务安全与经济安全,主要关注欧盟在维护自身防务安全上应采取何种路径以及如何降低俄乌冲突对欧盟产业链和供应链的影响.欧盟继续将战略自主作为未来的战略方向,以此为基础制定内外政策,展开对外行动.
2022年俄罗斯对乌克兰发起的特别军事行动再一次唤起人们对欧陆战事的记忆.随着俄乌冲突加剧,作为冲突前沿的中东欧地区,其地缘政治格局进一步复杂化.作为中东欧地区的大国,波兰利用俄波中间地带国家制衡俄国的外交政策取向,即海间联邦构想,重新成为波兰当前外交战略的底色."海间联邦"是波兰外交史上重要的自主战略构想,作为波兰雅盖隆文化传统的组成部分,在两次世界大战期间成为波兰重要的外交战略规划.尽管几乎没有在政策上成为现实,但"海间联邦"构想对波兰的外交思想和战略文化产生了极为深远的影响."海间联邦"被广泛认为是对波兰-立陶宛大公国历史记忆的延续,是对波兰雅盖隆文化传统的继承和当下波兰外交政策中"三海倡议"的先声.从具体政策上看,东部伙伴关系、"三海倡议"、布加勒斯特九国机制和卢布林三角,继承了波兰"海间联邦"构建的传统外交思想.但"海间联邦"构想能够继续为波兰外交政策提供指引的程度,仍然取决于波兰的国家综合实力、欧洲的整体安全形势和欧俄美在中东欧地区的博弈态势.
在安全化倾向的影响下,科技领域的竞争与合作越来越多受到权力关系、利益关系和价值关系中的安全要素约束.在以人工智能为代表的新兴技术领导力的竞争中,美西方国家正试图以技术发展军事安全能力,并从规范、制度、权力多个方面保护人工智能技术价值链与产业链的安全,隐藏着一定的泛安全化风险.欧盟倾向于将中国视为长期竞争对手和安全风险对象,尽管在经济领域与技术全球治理领域双方具有合作共识,但对技术主权的保护仍是影响科技合作关系走向的重要变量.针对美西方通过泛安全化维护科技体系优势地位的行为,中国提出科技安全是总体安全观的重要组成,应尊重并关照各方合理安全关切,持续建设开放型世界经济,维护全球产业链供应链稳定.
Sustainable development on soft connectivity is a high degree of convergence between China and the EU in terms of philosophy and purpose. The vision of connectivity between China and Europe follows the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Sustainable development comes from a Chinese cultural tradition that is the union of heaven and human. China and Europe share similar sustainable development concepts and have more commons for cooperation. However, the EU’s Eurasian connectivity strategy stems from the successful experience of the EU internal market and is an externalization of the EU’s internal rules and standards. Meanwhile, external environmental factors bring pressure and challenges to the sustainable development of Eurasian connectivity. China should strengthen multilateral and bilateral cooperation with the EU, and find more common grounds while reserving differences. China should exert its diplomatic innovation and institutional creation capabilities to provide new opportunities for China and Europe to work together to uphold multilateralism and free trade to establish a large Asia–Europe market, adhere to multilateral principles, improve the multilateral framework, promote soft connectivity, and achieve sustainable development of Eurasian connectivity.
匈牙利政府自2010年起推出的"向东开放"外交政策是该国多元化务实性外交的重要一环,该政策不是欧尔班政府短期内的投机性政策,而是对全球"东升西降"发展态势的判断与行动选择."向东开放"外交政策动因具有普遍性和特殊性,其中前者与其他中东欧国家寻求新的市场和投资务实性考虑类似,后者则是因为"向东开放"政策具有东方民族性与"非自由民主"政治诉求背景.匈牙利积极开展与东亚、中亚、土耳其、外高加索和东南亚部分国家和地区的对外贸易和文化交流,并与中国建立了全面战略伙伴关系.鉴于"向东开放"外交政策同时具有政治和经济意义,匈牙利反对党将该政策作为欧尔班政府反对欧盟的代表性政策加以批评.虽然2022年匈牙利大选欧尔班政府取得压倒性优势,但是在俄乌武装冲突的影响和以美国为首的西方国家价值观同盟压力增强的态势下,匈牙利政府外交的有限自主性势必将进一步被压缩,"向东开放"外交政策可能会出现稍许波动与调整.
International public health cooperation has always been one of the typical issues of bilateral and multilateral diplomatic ties in the international community. As two important actors in the international community, China and the EU have worked on many transnational public health cooperation projects. The two-level division of the EU's foreign policy competence decided the Cooperation and Challenges on Public Health between China-EU. Cooperation with the EU member states is expanding, the cooperation with the level of the EU started to show up. Since the outbreak of COVID-19, both China and the EU have publicly expressed their support for WHO's anti-pandemic measures. China has actively provided public health aid to Central and Eastern European countries and shared the Anti-COVID-19 experience. In this article, the author reviewed the progress and mechanism of China-EU public health cooperation, discussed how China and the EU have jointly dealt with the pandemic by sharing experience, providing aids, strengthening multilateralism and international cooperation, and building a community with a healthy future for humankind since the outbreak of COVID-19. Facing the COVID-19,China-EU health cooperation should be further strengthened to show the importance of a community with a shared future for humanity.
欧盟东扩是欧盟整合欧洲大陆政治经济新秩序的重要途径,配合北约,欧盟通过2004年、2007年和2013年的三次东扩基本完成对苏联空间的整合.大规模东扩结束后,欧盟通过"东部伙伴关系"计划继续东进到独联体国家,独联体国家是俄罗斯外交战略的首要对象,也是它和西方最后的缓冲区.俄罗斯对欧盟东扩的态度是默许,但对欧盟"东部伙伴关系"计划的态度是公开反对.欧盟与俄罗斯在该地区开展了三种角力:一是世俗化的基督教文明与泛斯拉夫正统主义的文明的角力;二是后威斯特伐利亚的国际规范与国家主权规范的角力;三是欧盟代表的欧洲经济区域与俄罗斯主导的欧亚经济联盟的经济一体化模式的角力.以2014年乌克兰危机爆发为重要转折点,欧亚联盟与欧盟经济一体化兼容的地区一体化发展前景落空.俄欧双方都迫使欧盟东部伙伴对象国作出二者择一的决定.欧盟承认之前低估了俄罗斯的战略意志.但欧盟仍将"东部伙伴关系"计划作为稳定其东部边界的一个重要环节而持续推进.俄欧在欧盟东进问题上的激烈博弈还将持续.
加强中国与中东欧国家人文交流合作是夯实双方合作民意基础的重要保障.当前,双方人文交流合作已取得丰富成果,但成效依然有限.中国与中东欧国家文化传统的差异性以及在价值观和意识形态上的分歧、双方战略需求不对称、美欧国家对华态度变化,是影响双方人文交流合作的主要因素.鉴于此,要推动双方人文交流合作机制化建设,对接中东欧国家的个性化和差异化需求,将双方人文交流融入"一带一路"倡议和"全球文明对话倡议"框架,拓展双方既有合作成果,促进共同发展.
In recent years, Beijing has been actively setting up new regional multilateral mechanisms with China at their centre. This article examines 16+1, the multilateral framework for China's cooperation with Central and Eastern Europe, in the context of such a strategy of building China-led multilateral relations and institutions. We argue that the existing scholarship has not fully captured the multilayered nature of interactions within this, and possibly other, multilateral frameworks. We find that China seeks to establish a multilayered cooperation framework which aims to increase the gains for both China and participating countries and to aid China to more effectively manage the diversity within the region. Such approach encompasses three distinct levels of interactions-regional, sub-regional and bilateral. In the case of 16+1, these include an overarching regional 16+1 coordination platform; a tailored approach to sub-regional groups of countries identified according to their perceived similarities, and shared strengths and interests; and deepening of relations with individual countries, especially those regarded as pivot countries. As such, China's approach to Central and Eastern Europe suggests that China-led multilateralism is based on a flexible and multidimensional approach which blends diplomacy through multilateral and bilateral means. However, various internal and external factors-discussed in the latter part of the paper-present China with significant challenges for capitalizing on such an approach and cast shadows over the utility of multilayered multilateralism for both China and participating countries.
This article analysis the basic situation of 16 CEE Countries students to study in China from 2006- 2016 to examine how the“16+1” cooperation framework promotes China-CEECs educational cooperation? The main finds reveals that in 2006-2016, the total number of international students studying in China from 16 CEE Countries in Central and Eastern Europe has been increasing year by year. Especially since the formation of the “16+1" cooperation in 2012, the number of international students from 16 CEE Countries in Central and Eastern Europe has increased significantly, Meanwhile the category of countries and professionals of international students are more and more diversity and balance. The authors suggest that it’s should be more introduction to study in China to promote further cooperation.
2019年5月18日至19日,中国欧洲学会第十五届年会在同济大学成功举办.本届年会由中国欧洲学会主办,同济大学政治与国际关系学院、德国研究中心承办,年会的主题是“站在十字路口的欧洲”.来自外交部、商务部、中国社会科学院、北京大学、清华大学、中国人民大学、武汉大学、上海交通大学、四川大学、山东大学、同济大学、北京外国语大学、上海外国语大学、外交学院、上海社会科学院、中国国际问题研究院、中国现代国际关系研究院等数十家大学和科研机构的160余位专家学者与会.
- This article analysis the basic situation of 16 CEE Countries students to study in China from 2006-2016 to examine how the“16+1” cooperation framework promotes China-CEECs educational cooperation? The main finds reveals that in 2006-2016, the total number of international students studying in China from 16 CEE Countries in Central and Eastern Europe has been increasing year by year. Especially since the formation of the “16+1 cooperation in 2012, the number of international students from 16 CEE Countries in Central and Eastern Europe has increased significantly, Meanwhile the category of countries and professionals of international students are more and more diversity and balance. The authors suggest that it’s should be more introduction to study in China to promote further cooperation.
EU–Japan relations have developed into a fully-fledged strategic partnership encompassing economy and trade, security and shared values. Brussels and Tokyo concluded an ambitious Free Trade Agreement (FTA)/Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) in December 2017. The EU has also taken positive steps towards interacting with China and other Asian actors to promote stability in the Asia-Pacific region through various forms of dialogue on Asian security. This chapter will seek to answer two questions: first, to what extent do EU–Japan strategic relations have an impact on Asia and on Asian security? Second, what influence does the EU–China strategic partnership, announced in the early 2000s, have on EU–Japan security relations, including the envisaged EU–Japan Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) that Brussels and Tokyo are (as of February 2018) about to adopt? This chapter addresses both questions, and focuses on the role EU–China relations play in three dimensions of European–Japanese cooperation: security, economics and values.
特朗普秉持"美国第一"的理念对欧洲持明显的实用主义态度, 其主导下的美国对欧战略行动也体现出何谓"有原则的现实主义".具体而言, 特朗普政府正采取"稳英""重法""轻德"的思路调整跨大西洋关系, 并开始选择性地参与欧洲事务, 这给美欧关系带来一定的冲击.但考虑到美欧长期同盟关系的惯性与经济高度相互依存现状, 特朗普政府对欧洲政策做出大幅度调整的同时, 也可能给欧洲带来一次主动"改造"相互关系的契机.在美国与欧洲相互完成对防务、贸易等领域的责任和利益再平衡后, 会更从容地应对以中国为代表的新兴国家的崛起.