This study examines whether and how institutional investors play a corporate governance role in executive pay in China. Based on a sample of Chinese listed firms from 2005 to 2015, we find that higher institutional investor ownership is negatively related to excessive management compensation; this indicates that institutional investors play a governance role in listed firms' decisions on management payment. Institutional investors are more likely to have an influence on executive compensation through their representatives on the corporate board or by conducting site visits, especially when their ownership is high. They will also react, as in the US, by 'voting with their feet'; that is, holding fewer shares than they would otherwise, if firms pay excessive executive compensation, especially when their ownership is low. Cross-sectional analyses show that the negative impact of institutional ownership on excess management compensation is more evident when firms are not owned by the government, monitored by fewer analysts, and located in regions of China with weak legal investor protection. Our results indicate that institutional investors in China can play an important governance role, especially for firms with characteristics such as location and analyst coverage, for which outside monitoring mechanisms will be in high demand.

本研究以2009—2017年我国A股上市公司为样本,实证检验股价崩盘风险是否会对上市公司未来线上投资者关系管理产生影响.研究结果表明,当上市公司股价崩盘风险较高时,其后续在线上与投资者沟通互动的效率更高,说明公司通过加强线上投资者关系管理建立事后补救机制以进行危机公关.进一步分析表明,公司信息透明度和高管是否拥有金融会计类工作背景对上述关系具有调节作用,即当上市公司信息透明度较低和拥有较多金融会计类工作背景的高管时,股价崩盘风险对线上投资者关系管理的正向影响更显著,尤其体现在对线上投资者问答回复率的正向影响.本研究反映了测算股价崩盘风险在公司治理角度的信号作用与预测意义,并揭示了信息时代投资者关系管理来自资本市场的决定因素,具有重要的理论和现实意义.

本文揭示了多重信用评级的信息生产机制和信用认证机制,排除了“信用评级购买”假说对于多重评级动机的解释,研究发现:多重信用评级有利于降低债券融资成本;相对于不一致的多重信用评级,一致的多重信用评级更有利于降低债券融资成本.在多重信用评级中,相对于评级机构均为“发行人付费”模式,兼有“投资者付费”模式的信用评级更有利于降低债券融资成本.此外,当多重信用评级的评级意见不一致时,平均评级的信息含量最高,即综合不同信用评级所包含的多种信息比任何单一信用评级更加具有信息含量.本研究为我国债券市场双评级制度提供了理论和经验证据的支持,有助于完善多元化信用评级制度和债券市场监管制度,并提示发债企业可以通过多重信用评级向市场传递更多和更具效度的评级信息,以弥补单一信用评级的信息不足和评级结果失准,减少投资者决策的不确定性,从而降低债券融资成本.

<span id="ChDivSummary" name="ChDivSummary" class="abstract-text">利用A股上市公司2017年审计报告,对关键审计事项的首次全面披露进行了特征分析,并在此基础上检验了该政策的执行效果。研究发现:"收入""应收账款"等账户是关键审计事项中被关注最多的账户,而"收入确认"和"资产减值"是关键审计事项中最重要的两大事项。政策执行效果的检验显示,2017年审计报告的审计收费较之往年有所提高,但与此同时,审计质量也得到了提高,这说明关键审计事项的披露达到了政策制定的初衷。进一步检验发现,审计质量的提高主要来自于"非十大"所及高市场化指数地区,这在某种程度上说明了关键审计事项的披露增加了事务所的法律风险。研究结果表明关键审计事项的全面披露虽然耗费了一定的时间和精力,但在提升审计质量方面是具有一定成效的。</span>

资本市场开放能否提高中国A股资本市场效率一直是政府部门与学术界关注的重要问题.本文利用2014年沪港通交易制度实施这一资本市场开放事件,考察了资本市场开放对企业投资的影响.结果发现:沪港通交易制度会通过增强股价信息含量以及影响企业融资来作用于企业投资—股价敏感性,表明沪港通交易制度会增强股价对企业投资的引导作用.另外,沪港通交易制度提高企业投资—股价敏感性的效应只是显著地存在于国际化企业、信息透明度较低、代理成本较高的企业与国有企业中.本文的结果表明,沪港通交易制度通过优化投资者结构与提高股价信息含量,增强了股价的资源配置功能,并通过股价信息反馈与融资机制增强了资本市场对实体经济的引导作用,提高了资本市场效率.

非财务信息可以反映企业内在价值,反馈至股价中则有利于引导企业的投资行为,但其要求市场上拥有大量具备信息搜集、解读与分析能力优势与践行价值投资的投资者,而开放资本市场有利于将发达资本市场的成熟投资者引入新兴市场国家,实现市场合理定价与资源的有效配置.利用沪深港通交易制度实施的外生事件,本文考察了中国资本市场开放对非财务信息定价与企业投资关系的影响,结果发现沪深港通交易制度实施会提高企业投资与非财务信息定价的敏感性,表明该交易制度能够增强非财务信息定价并影响企业投资.这种效应产生的主要原因在于股价是企业融资的重要决定因素,沪深港通交易制度会提高长期债务融资与非财务信息定价的敏感性,从而影响企业投资的融资支持.本文研究表明,通过资本市场开放引入发达资本市场投资者有利于优化投资者结构,增强股价对实体经济的引导作用,提高资本市场效率.

This paper investigates the changes and dispersion of earnings signals as they proliferated through media coverage on stock liquidity. We determine that the earnings dispersion disseminated by the media will reduce stock liquidity during earnings announcement. By investigating the dissemination effects of earnings dispersion on trading activity, we find that individual investors refrain from providing liquidity to those stocks with highly media-exacerbated earnings dispersion. Institutional investors, however, do not reduce their trading on media-exacerbated earnings dispersion stocks. To identify the causal relation with media coverage, we exploit the variation in information dissemination stemming from actual investor accounts, which represent the ex-ante information breadth of a stock. The results demonstrate that stocks with a larger number of investor accounts have an amplified effect from earnings dispersion on stock illiquidity. These effects are significant for individual accounts, as opposed to institutional accounts. Overall, these results imply that the media create the real impact of earnings dispersion on stock liquidity by directing investors' attention.

以我国融资融券试点为准自然实验,从被审计方的行为选择视角,采用双重差分模型(DID)和倾向得分匹配法(PSM),考察了放松卖空限制对上市公司审计师选择的影响,发现放松卖空管制会促使上市公司选择审计质量较高的会计师事务所.该效应在非国有企业中更加显著,而且卖空标的公司更加倾向于变更为高质量的会计师事务所.进一步研究发现,卖空机制对高质量审计师选择的影响,并非是融资做多所致,而是主要源于融券做空的卖空压力.本文为我国在条件成熟时全面放开卖空机制以及会计师事务所做大做强并提高审计质量,提供了来自上市公司行为选择的经验证据支持,并提示学界在研究审计师选择时应该考虑卖空机制因素.

Compared with the audit markets in China and abroad, the disciplinary risks faced by the firms are different. In China, the Ministry of Finance and China Securities Regulatory Commission （hereinafter referred to as CSRC） as the government supervision and administration departments raise the auditors’ disciplinary risks. In recent years, CSRC has gradually stepped up the penalties for accounting firms that fail to provide fair audits due to the disclosure of low-quality audit reports; for instance, Shenzhen Pengcheng （the largest accounting firm in South China） was revoked securities business license because of the auditing failure of Green Globe IPO in May 2013. In 2017, Ruihua, the largest accounting firm with Chinese domestic equities, was judged sparing in its efforts to the business of Yatai Industrial Company and its business partners were required not to leave, step out or change the firm by CSRC. Xinyongzhonghe, another famous audit firm in China was punished for 4.4 million RMB for the lack of diligence in the audit of Dengyun Auto-Parts Co. Therefore, under the circumstance that the trend of supervision and punishment of CSRC is intensified, whether audit quality of accounting firms is improving or not is receiving more and more attention in China. In theory, penalties affect the reputation of accounting firms, resulting in reduced audit fees and the risk of loss of customers. However, penalties could be seen as a signal that leads to changes in audit quality including firms having been punished or not. Their choice could improve the audit quality or do nothing. The existing research only deals with the accounting firms that have been punished; however, the strategies of both punished and unpunished firms about how they react to punishment are worth considering. Therefore, this paper focuses on studying whether accounting firms choose to improve the audit quality or not after being punished by CSRC, and whether those unpunished firms choose to improve the audit quality or not due to the signal of penalty announcement, to probe deeply into the effectiveness of regulatory penalties in the audit industry. Based on the issuance of the Administrative Punishment Announcement of CSRC between 2002 and 2015, the public companies are classified into four types: companies whose punished audit firms are not changed before and after the announcement, companies whose punished audit firms are changed into unpunished one after the announcement, companies whose unpunished audit firms are changed into punished one after the announcement, and companies whose audit firms have never been punished. We match the first three types to the last type. This paper provides a detailed analysis of possible strategy choices made by different firms, and empirically shows that the punished firms may have a passive reputation reshaping behavior due to the increasing disciplinary risk after the announcement, thus improving the audit quality. Contrarily, the unpunished firms, whose audit quality has no significant change, are not affected by the punishment announcement. The ultimate audit qualities of the punished firms are not less than the unpunished ones, indicating the effective supervision of CSRC in improving the quality of the audit industry. Different from the paired sample studies conducted by previous scholars, this paper further analyzes the audit quality of the industry as a whole after a game analysis of the behavior strategies of the unpunished and the punished. The results bring more empirical evidence for the effectiveness of CSRC’s administrative punishment and confirm the restraint effect of the reputation mechanism on the CPA. It also has the policy reference to the regulatory authorities such as CSRC, China AICPA and the Ministry of Finance; moreover, signing an audit contract with an accounting firm also has a very important reference.

Using 231 pairs of matched firms from 2009 to 2012 in Chinese stock market, we find that the stock index adjustment significantly affects the analyst coverage, which in addition to the stock index leads to more analyst coverage, while deletion from the stock index has no significant effect, indicating that stock index adjustment can significantly change the information environments of firms that are added to the index. An index adjustment also affects institutional holdings in consideration of new information (e.g., changes in fundamentals and information environments). Changes in institutional holdings are partially due to changes in analyst coverage, and both index funds and other types can change their portfolios in response to changes in the target firms' informativeness.

ABSTRACTWe investigate the governance role of conservative accounting in mitigating the creditor–stockholder conflict by affecting firms’ dividend policies, and how the convergence to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) affects the governance role of conservative accounting as it relates to dividend policy. We analyze data on Chinese listed firms from 2000 through 2011. The use of conservative accounting reduced cash dividend payouts, thereby playing a governance role by mitigating the firm's creditor–stockholder agency conflict. However, China's convergence to IFRS reduced the governance role of conservative accounting on dividend policy by reducing the accounting conservatism of listed firms in China.

基于中国信用债券市场的违约事件,本文研究发现:涉事评级机构不仅没有因为涉及债券违约事件而收紧信用评级标准,反而更加高估企业的信用评级水平,并且涉及的债券违约事件越多,高估信用评级的程度越大。但投资者通过"用脚投票"方式惩罚了涉事评级机构,导致其市场份额相对于非涉事评级机构出现显著下降或者增长较低的态势,同时涉事评级机构的信用评级意见对于降低企业融资成本的作用显著降低。

本文以2007-2011年中国上市公司为样本,考察上市公司持股金融机构是否影响资本市场投资者对公司价值的预期.研究发现,整体而言,投资者对于上市公司持股金融机构这一行为的预期是正面的;然而,投资者对于不同所有制和处于不同竞争环境的上市公司持股金融机构的预期是不同的,对于中小企业持股金融机构有更积极的市场反应.研究结果显示,投资者是相对理性的,其对于相对弱势的群体持股金融机构反应较为积极.可以尝试因势利导,通过鼓励特定企业加强与融资机构的联系帮助其减轻融资难的问题.

采用2007年到2011年我国上市公司数据,就持有金融机构股份对投资现金流敏感度以及投资效率的影响进行分析,研究结果显示:持有金融机构股份会提高企业的投资现金流敏感度,会降低企业的投资效率,导致企业过度投资行为更加严重,而这种现象在民营企业中更加显著.

CSR in China is not a new concept. Chinese corporations always performed good works to benefit society. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) provided wider...

本文通过对工业化、城市化与环境污染相关文献的回顾、工业化与城市化进程中环境问题的国际经验比较、国内区域经验比较和城市经验比较,总结了我国工业化与城市化进程中的主要环境问题.研究发现,我国各地区由于工业化与城市化水平的不同步,面临的环境问题也不尽相同.现阶段以工业化发展为主的地区,其环境问题主要是大气污染;以城市化发展为主的地区,其显性环境问题主要表现为大气污染,潜在环境问题主要表现为水污染.

The relationship between economic growth and environmental quality is generally considered as linear, N-shaped or inverse-U-shaped curve. However, due to the effects of economic structure on economic growth and pollutant emission, this relationship may not be suitable in China. In this study, multivariate regression modeling was performed to identify relationships among pollutant emission, economic structure and economic growth in China. Estimates obtained from integrated multivariate regression results reveal that local provincial economic growth and pollutant emission demonstrate an inverse-N-shaped relationship that is different from that under the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) hypothesis. Further empirical results also indicate that particularly in China; pollutant emission has a negative effect on economic structure and economic growth; pollutant emission can reduce the positive contribution of economic structure to economic growth; and enforcement of emission reduction policies could stifle economic transformation and maintain sustainable economic growth.

以2005-2009年我国30个省市地区为研究样本,实证检验了工程减排、结构减排、管理减排等治污减排手段对城乡结构的影响.研究发现,工程减排、结构减排与管理减排均对城乡结构产生了正面的影响.因此,在实施治污减排手段的同时,要充分利用工程减排对城乡结构的促进作用,挖掘结构减排对城乡结构的红利效果,强化管理减排对城乡结构的积极影响.

通过对中国A股市场企业家能力的研究发现,企业家因拥有对各种不确定性因素进行处理的能力,因而,企业家能力越强,融资渠道越多元化,企业越有能力选择成本最低的融资方式,而不仅仅依赖长期负债;企业家若有相应的资源和能力,可能会优先选择股权融资、短期负债等融资方式.这表明企业家能力将直接影响企业的债务期限安排与选择,在企业发展中培养和提高企业家能力十分重要.