中介效应分析与调节效应分析是国内经济学因果推断经验研究中被广泛采用的两种研究手段,但是存在不同程度的误用.前者的主要问题在于过度使用中介效应逐步法检验,后者的主要问题是对其在因果识别中的作用阐发不足.为此,本文深入讨论了中介效应检验的偏误、如何正确开展中介效应分析,以及如何使用调节效应分析来强化因果关系论证,并针对当前的使用现状提出了相应的操作建议.

This paper studies the information efficiency of China's carbon markets using the fuzzy entropy method. The overall and time-varying results show that Hubei market has the highest information efficiency, followed by Guangdong, Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Chongqing and Tianjin market in turn. Moreover, the information efficiency of EU carbon market is higher than that of China's carbon markets. Further, the information efficiency of Chongqing and Hubei, Shenzhen and Tianjin, Beijing and Hubei, Beijing and Shanghai, Hubei and Shenzhen carbon markets is highly correlated.

<span id="ChDivSummary" name="ChDivSummary" class="abstract-text">本文从城市行政级别这一全新视角重新解释了城市的生产率水平和资源配置效率。我们发现,行政级别越高的城市,其制造业企业的全要素生产率（TFP）平均水平也越高,但城市级别对TFP的正面影响主要体现在国有企业和外资及港澳台企业,高级别城市民营企业的TFP反而更低;行政级别越高的城市,制造业企业的资源错配程度越严重,并且这一效应集中体现在国有企业和外资及港澳台企业,城市级别对民营企业的资源配置反而具有改善作用。城市级别发挥作用的渠道包括高级别城市的企业政府补贴更多、人才优势更大、融资便利更多、地方税负更小,其中前3个渠道主要体现在国有企业,地方税负主要体现在外资及港澳台企业。本文的研究推进了对城市生产效率的理解,并且从更一般的意义上揭示了行政手段作为资源配置方式的经济意义。</span>

It has been long debated whether corporate governance in China should be more structured toward meritocracy or nepotism in a market economy that is deeply embedded in the traditional culture.From a practical point of view, these two governance models have their respective pros and cons.Thus a more relevant question to ask is that under what circumstances an entrepreneur will recruit partners on their merit.In this paper we propose an analytical framework based on the theory of optimal delegation and put it to an empirical test using a unique survey data set on start-up enterprises.We find that entrepreneurs with former entrepreneurial experience or low education levels prefer to employ relatives (nepotism), while male entrepreneurs with an educational background in management who get loans from banks tend not to appoint relatives to management (meritocracy).These results have implications for the promotion of popular entrepreneurship and innovation.

This paper investigates how institutional environments, especially the contractual hazard and the political hazard, affect foreign investors’ share ratios in joint‐venture enterprises in China. We build a model combining Transaction Cost Economics and Property Rights Theory to describe the tradeoff that foreign investors face between choosing a larger share ratio and a smaller one. We argue that when the contractual hazard increases, foreign investors request larger shares to avoid being held up by their domestic partners, and when the political hazard increases, they hold smaller shares to circumvent the local government's grabbing hand. Moreover, the effect of the contractual hazard is channeled through enterprises’ asset specificity. These theoretical predictions are verified by studying the relationship between the ownership structure of Chinese manufacturing joint‐venture enterprises and the provincial‐level institutions they are embedded in.

总体上中国僵尸企业的比例是在逐渐下降的,更重要的是最严峻的时期已经过去,当前所谓的严峻形势其实远不如1998年的三年国企脱困时期. 供给侧结构性改革是当前经济改革和宏观调控的重要战略和主要抓手,其关键是加快淘汰僵尸企业.在此背景下,中国人民大学国家发展与战略研究院僵尸企业课题组使用1998-2013年中国工业企业数据库和1998-2015年上市公司数据库,对中国僵尸企业进行了全面研究.

2005年～2013年,我国工业部门僵尸企业比例约为7.5％.僵尸企业出现的主要原因包括:一些地方政府和企业之间的不当关系,地方政府之间和国企之间的恶性竞争,大规模刺激的后遗症,外部需求冲击,银行的信贷歧视.对此,应减少政府对企业的干预,尤其是慎用产业政策;完善对国企的考核指标,全面理解“做强做优做大国有企业”;加强对银行体系的监管;多渠道化解过剩产能,鼓励企业兼并重组和改制分流,加快建立和完善社会保障网;加快国企改革步伐,进一步对国企进行分类改革.

通过访谈确定各省的“大市”和“小市”的划分,采用1993-2012年间13个省份重要地级市市委书记的详细信息以及城市经济增长的数据,系统考察了这些市委书记在不那么重要的地级市的任职经历是否以及如何影响其职务晋升.本文建立一个简要的省委领导效用模型,把影响晋升因素分为“能力”和“关系”两部分,研究重要地级市市委书记职务晋升的逻辑,研究发现,这些市委书记的“小市经历”总体上对获得更好的晋升有促进作用,不受官员政治联系和政绩表现的影响;“能力”与“关系”都是职务调动的重要影响因素,但“小市经历”比政绩更能体现市委书记的能力.

Regional corruptness in China has a positive effect on the profitability of private firms, but not that of state-owned firms. A natural experiment of exogenous trade policy change suggests that corruption may help private firms circumvent government regulation.

This paper investigates the effect of corruption in Chinese local governments on firms’ total factor productivity using micro data on manufacturing firms during 1999-2007. Departing from existing literature, we find that there does not exist an unambiguous relationship between corruption and TFP. Corruption does not sand or grease the wheels of perform-ance of all firms uniformly, but has heterogeneous effects on firms with different types. Three specific channels are iden-tified. First, corruption does not affect state-owned firms, and affects private firms only positively. This observation im-plies that a moderate level of corruption helps non-stated-owned firms evade regulation. Second, Firms with higher fixed asset ratio suffers more from corruption. Third, sectors with more complex intermediate goods structure are more adverse-ly affected by corruption. Our findings promote a better understanding of corruption and have pertinent implications for anti-corruption policy design.

<span id="ChDivSummary" name="ChDivSummary" class="abstract-text">本文使用1999～2005年中国全部国有及规模以上工业企业数据库,第一次采取动态面板方法（系统GMM）估计了不同所有制企业的微观就业弹性。借鉴宏观就业弹性的概念,本文基于生产函数推导了微观就业弹性的测度方法。我们以销售额衡量产出水平,以职工人数衡量就业水平,并用工具变量集解决了内生性问题。我们发现,在短期就业弹性方面,港澳台和外资企业的就业弹性最高,私营和集体企业居中,国有和其他企业最低。在长期就业弹性方面,港澳台、外资和私营企业仍然高于国有和集体企业。本文的结论表明,从政策上鼓励对民营企业的投资,支持劳动密集型行业的发展,对于解决当前的就业难题具有十分重要的作用。</span>

As the core leaders,Yang Quyun and Sun Yat-sen all bear heavy responsibilities in the first armed uprising-Guangzhou Uprising of 1895,led by revolutionary party members.Yang failed to effectively control the Gang,which delayed the uprising.Sun should be responsible for the delay of Shantou and Xijiang team-the main force,which lead to the cancel of the uprising,and also for the arrest of the team of Hong Kong,which cause the unnecessary loss to the revolutionary.

行为宏观经济学是西方宏观经济学中的新思潮.作为行为主义方法在宏观经济学中的应用,行为宏观经济学为解释宏观经济问题提供了崭新的理论视角.但是,行为宏观经济学并没有从根本上背叛主流经济学传统,其实质是多样化的偏好假设,辅以经济当事人理性化的选择,为宏观经济提供更真实丰富的微观行为基础.因此,进一步扩展偏好-理性选择的分析框架是行为宏观经济学未来的发展方向,储蓄不足和短期总供给的两个理论案例证实了这一点.