Many games of interest in the real world are often intractably large, thereby necessitating the use of game abstraction to shrink them in size, typically by many magnitudes. Over the last two decades, there have been significant advances in game abstraction; however, the domain-specific nature (usually poker) of much of the prior work prevents those techniques from being easily generalized to other settings without extensively analyzing the game at hand. In this paper, we propose a domain-independent approach to game abstraction, which applies word embedding techniques from the field of natural language processing. Treating each action as a word and gameplay data as a corpus, word vectors can be trained to represent each action as a real-valued vector, which can then be clustered to facilitate game abstraction. We also explore the use of foundational embedding models and show that action embeddings obtained this way can capture a surprising amount of information about the underlying game. Experimental results demonstrate that our proposed game abstraction technique is effective, although it does not outperform specialized algorithms tailored to specific games.

The allocation of scarce donor organs constitutes one of the most consequential algorithmic challenges in healthcare. While the field is rapidly transitioning from rigid, rule-based systems to machine learning and data-driven optimization, we argue that current approaches often overlook a fundamental barrier: incentives. In this position paper, we highlight that organ allocation is not merely an optimization problem, but rather a complex game involving organ procurement organizations, transplant centers, clinicians, patients, and regulators. Focusing on US adult heart transplant allocation, we identify critical incentive misalignments across the decision-making pipeline, and present data showing that they are having adverse consequences today. Our main position is that the next generation of allocation policies should be incentive aware. We outline a research agenda for the machine learning community, calling for the integration of mechanism design, strategic classification, causal inference, and social choice to ensure robustness, efficiency, fairness, and trust in the face of strategic behavior from the various constituent groups.

Many real-world interactions among self-interested parties can be modeled by game theory, and the rapid advancements in AI have raised concerns about the possible misuse—accidental or deliberate—of superhuman or human-level game-playing agents by bad actors. While AI watermarking has mainly been applied to LLM-generated texts, a recent line of work proposes developing watermarking techniques for agents in game-theoretic settings. However, existing watermarking techniques for game-theoretic agents are not readily applicable due to their limited scope or capabilities—they are tailored to perfect-information games and are thus inapplicable to richer game types. We propose a new approach to watermarking game-playing agents, which a) can be applied to imperfect-information settings; b) is directly integrated into the learning process itself; and c) incurs only a bounded cost in exploitability. For this purpose, we introduce perturbed regret minimization, which adds perturbations to the utilities prior to observation so as to encourage the learning algorithm to embed the watermark. Our experiments show that the watermark incurs only a small exploitability cost and can be detected within just a couple of hours of gameplay at human speed.

Regret matching (RM)---and its modern variants---is a foundational online algorithm that has been at the heart of many AI breakthrough results in solving benchmark zero-sum games, such as poker. Yet, surprisingly little is known so far in theory about its convergence beyond two-player zero-sum games. For example, whether regret matching converges to Nash equilibria in potential games has been an open problem for two decades. Even beyond games, one could try to use RM variants for general constrained optimization problems. Recent empirical evidence suggests that they---particularly regret matching$^+$ (RM$^+$)---attain strong performance on benchmark constrained optimization problems, outperforming traditional gradient descent-type algorithms. We show that alternating RM$^+$ converges to an $\epsilon$-KKT point after $O_\epsilon(1/\epsilon^4)$ iterations, establishing for the first time that it is a sound and fast first-order optimizer. Our argument relates the KKT gap to the accumulated regret, two quantities that are entirely disparate in general but interact in an intriguing way in our setting, so much so that when regrets are bounded, our complexity bound improves all the way to $O_\epsilon(1/\epsilon^2)$. From a technical standpoint, while RM$^+$ does not have the usual one-step improvement property in general, we show that it does in a certain region that the algorithm will quickly reach and remain in thereafter. In sharp contrast, our second main result establishes a lower bound: RM, with or without alternation, can take an exponential number of iterations to reach a crude approximate solution even in two-player potential games. This represents the first worst-case separation between RM and RM$^+$. Our lower bound shows that convergence to coarse correlated equilibria in potential games is exponentially faster than convergence to Nash equilibria.

Subgame solving is a technique for scaling algorithms to large games by locally refining a precomputed blueprint strategy during gameplay. While straightforward in perfect-information games where search starts from the current state, subgame solving in imperfect-information games must account for hidden states and uncertainty about the opponent's past strategy. Gadget games were developed to ensure that the improved subgame strategy is robust against any possible opponent's strategy in a zero-sum game. Gadget games typically contain infinitely many Nash equilibria. We demonstrate that while these equilibria are equivalent in the gadget game, they yield vastly different performance in the full game, even when facing a rational opponent. We propose gadget game sequential equilibria as the preferred solution concept. We introduce modifications to the sequence-form linear program and counterfactual regret minimization that converge to these refined solutions with only mild additional computational cost. Additionally, we provide several new insights into the surprising superiority of the resolving gadget game over the max-margin gadget game. Our experiments compare different Nash equilibria of gadget games in several standard benchmark games, showing that our refined equilibria consistently outperform unrefined Nash equilibria, and can reduce the exploitability of the overall strategy by more than 50

The proper equilibrium, introduced by Myerson (1978), is a classic refinement of the Nash equilibrium that has been referred to as the "mother of all refinements." For normal-form games, computing a proper equilibrium is known to be PPAD-complete for two-player games and FIXP$_a$-complete for games with at least three players. However, the complexity beyond normal-form games -- in particular, for extensive-form games (EFGs) -- was a long-standing open problem first highlighted by Miltersen and Sørensen (SODA '08). In this paper, we resolve this problem by establishing PPAD- and FIXP$_a$-membership (and hence completeness) of normal-form proper equilibria in two-player and multi-player EFGs respectively. Our main ingredient is a technique for computing a perturbed (proper) best response that can be computed efficiently in EFGs. This is despite the fact that, as we show, computing a best response using the classic perturbation of Kohlberg and Mertens based on the permutahedron is #P-hard even in Bayesian games. In stark contrast, we show that computing a proper equilibrium in polytope games is NP-hard. This marks the first natural class in which the complexity of computing equilibrium refinements does not collapse to that of Nash equilibria, and the first problem in which equilibrium computation in polytope games is strictly harder -- unless there is a collapse in the complexity hierarchy -- relative to extensive-form games.

How should an agent's performance in a multiagent environment be evaluated when there is a limited sample size or a high cost of running a trial? The AIVAT family of variance reduction techniques was proposed to address this challenge by introducing unbiased low-variance estimators of agents' expected payoffs. An important component of AIVAT is a heuristic value function that discriminates between potentially low- and high-value counterfactual histories. A notable gap in the literature is that there is little to no constraint or guideline on how the heuristic value function should be chosen or how uncertainty in its output should be handled. In our first contribution, we parameterize the heuristic value function to highlight AIVAT's potential vulnerabilities: a) the sample variance can be set pathologically low by directly applying gradient descent on the sample variance, and b) one can p-hack to draw a desired statistical conclusion via gradient descent/ascent on the test statistic. The main takeaway is that the heuristic value function should be fixed prior to observing the evaluation data! In our second contribution, we show how the heuristic uncertainty can be propagated to quantify the uncertainty of AIVAT estimates. It is then possible to further reduce the variance using inverse-variance weighted averaging, but AIVAT's unbiasedness guarantee may have to be sacrificed. In our experiments, we use a dataset of 10,000 poker hands to demonstrate our heuristic pathology and uncertainty results, with the latter yielding a 43.0

We study the problem of learning the utility functions of no-regret learning agents in a repeated normal-form game. Differing from most prior literature, we introduce a principal with the power to observe the agents playing the game, send agents signals, and give agents *payments* as a function of their actions. We show that the principal can, using a number of rounds polynomial in the size of the game, learn the utility functions of all agents to any desired precision $\varepsilon > 0$, for any no-regret learning algorithms of the agents. Our main technique is to formulate a zero-sum game between the principal and the agents, where the principal's strategy space is the set of all payment functions. Finally, we discuss implications for the problem of *steering* agents to a desired equilibrium: in particular, we introduce, using our utility-learning algorithm as a subroutine, the first algorithm for steering arbitrary no-regret learning agents without prior knowledge of their utilities.

Distributed constraint optimization problems (DCOPs) provide a popular framework for distributed decision making under limited communication, but many real-world instances are too large to solve monolithically. We address this challenge from two complementary directions. We revisit the connection between DCOPs and potential games, and adapt modern online learning algorithms for equilibrium finding to DCOPs. We show that these algorithms are competitive with representative incomplete DCOP algorithms. We then turn to decomposition frameworks for large-scale DCOPs, motivated by large-scale decentralized satellite scheduling. We propose a new framework that separates a DCOP into two interacting subproblems: a high-level meta-DCOP for task allocation, and independent local optimization problems for scheduling. To couple the two levels, we develop a novel iterative pricing method that updates the meta-level utilities using feedback from the local optimizers. Combining our online learning methods with our iterative pricing framework, we obtain near-optimal performance on real-world decentralized satellite scheduling problem instances, fulfilling over 99

Machine learning predictors have become essential tools for guiding automated decision making. However, a major misalignment persists: predictive models are typically optimized in terms of standard statistical metrics in isolation from the algorithmic tasks they inform. We highlight this incongruity in the high-stakes domain of organ allocation by demonstrating that any algorithm relying on (even highly accurate) survival predictors optimized for standard metrics – such as the Concordance index (C-index) – can yield arbitrarily poor outcomes when used for allocation, failing to guarantee utility better than a uniform random selection. To bridge the gap between survival analysis and policy optimization, we introduce a decision-focused learning approach based on optimizing normalized discounted cumulative gain (NDCG), a mainstay metric in information retrieval. We establish the utility of NDCG in survival analysis by proving that it translates to guarantees on the performance of allocation. Empirically, we propose a bootstrapping approach to optimize the NDCG of existing survival models. Unlike prior work, we also address the challenge of right censorship when evaluating ranking. On historical heart transplant data from the US, our method dramatically boosts the NDCG of baseline models by 50-100

In game theory, imperfect-recall decision problems model situations in which an agent forgets information it held before. They encompass games such as the “absentminded driver” and team games with limited communication. In this paper, we introduce the first benchmark suite for imperfect-recall decision problems. Our benchmarks capture a variety of problem types, including ones concerning privacy in AI systems that elicit sensitive information, and AI safety via testing of agents in simulation. Across 61 problem instances generated using this suite, we evaluate the performance of different algorithms for finding first-order optimal strategies in such problems. In particular, we introduce the family of regret matching (RM) algorithms for nonlinear constrained optimization. This class of parameter-free algorithms has enjoyed tremendous success in solving large two-player zero-sum games, but, surprisingly, they were hitherto relatively unexplored beyond that setting. Our key finding is that RM algorithms consistently outperform commonly employed first-order optimizers such as projected gradient descent, often by orders of magnitude. This establishes, for the first time, the RM family as a formidable approach to large-scale constrained optimization problems.

Since the advent of AI, games have served as progress benchmarks. Meanwhile, imperfect-information variants of chess have existed for over a century, present extreme challenges, and have been the focus of decades of AI research. Beyond calculation needed in regular chess, they require reasoning about information gathering, the opponent’s knowledge, signaling, _etc_. The most popular variant, _Fog of War (FoW) chess_ (a.k.a. _dark chess_), has been a major challenge problem in imperfect-information game solving since superhuman performance was reached in no-limit Texas hold’em poker. We present _Obscuro_, the first superhuman AI for FoW chess. It introduces advances to search in imperfect-information games, enabling strong, scalable reasoning. Experiments against the prior state-of-the-art AI and human players---including the world's best---show that _Obscuro_ is significantly stronger. FoW chess is the largest (by amount of imperfect information) turn-based zero-sum game in which superhuman performance has been achieved and the largest game in which imperfect-information search has been successfully applied.

Equilibrium finding in two-player zero-sum games with perfect recall is a well-studied topic that has led to many breakthroughs in computational game theory. This paper aims to generalize such techniques to (timeable) two-player zero-sum games with imperfect recall, or equivalently to two-team zero-sum games. In this setting, the problem of computing a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (or, equivalently, a team maxmin equilibrium with correlation) is known to be NP-hard. We connect the imperfect-recall setting with its perfect-recall counterpart through a novel construction we call the belief game. This is a perfect-recall game equivalent to a given (timeable) two-player zero-sum game with imperfect recall. The belief game may be exponentially larger than the original game but can be solved using any standard method. We then show that the strategy spaces of the two players in the belief game can be directly represented as a DAG, leading to a possibly exponential speedup. We call this the team belief DAG (TB-DAG). The TB-DAG simultaneously enjoys essentially optimal parameterized complexity bounds and the advantages of efficient regret minimization techniques. Along the way, we show Δ2P-completeness and Σ2P-completeness of finding Nash equilibria in both mixed and behavioral strategies for the class of games we consider. Experimentally, we show that the TB-DAG, when paired with existing learning techniques, yields state-of-the-art performance on a wide variety of benchmark team games.

Counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) algorithms are a foundational class of methods for solving imperfect-information games, with the time average of their iterates converging to a Nash equilibrium in two-player zero-sum games. Prior state-of-the-art variants, Discounted CFR (DCFR) and Predictive CFR+ (PCFR+), achieved the fastest known practical performance by improving convergence rates over vanilla CFR through discounting early iterations with a fixed discounting scheme. More recently, Dynamic DCFR (DDCFR) introduced agent-learned dynamic discounting schemes to further accelerate convergence, at the cost of increased complexity. To address this, we propose Hyperparameter Schedules (HSs), a remarkably simple, training-free framework that dynamically adjusts CFR discounting over time. HSs aggressively downweight early updates and gradually transition to trusting late-stage strategies, leading to substantially faster convergence with only a few lines of code modifications. We show that HSs derived from just three small extensive-form games generalize effectively to 17 diverse games (including large-scale realistic poker) in both extensive-form and normal-form settings, without any game-specific tuning. Our method establishes a new state of the art for solving two-player zero-sum games.

Follow the regularized leader FTRL is the premier algorithm for online optimization. However, despite decades of research on its convergence in constrained optimization – and potential games in particular – its behavior remained hitherto poorly understood. In this paper, we establish that FTRL can take exponential time to converge to a Nash equilibrium in two-player potential games for any (permutation-invariant) regularizer and potentially vanishing learning rate. By known equivalences, this translates to an exponential lower bound for certain mirror descent counterparts, most notably multiplicative weights update. On the positive side, we establish the potential property for FTRL and obtain an exponential upper bound exp(O_ε(1/ε^2)) for any no-regret dynamics executed in a lazy, alternating fashion, matching our lower bound up to factors in the exponent. Finally, in multi-player potential games, we show that fictitious play – the extreme version of FTRL – can take doubly exponential time to reach a Nash equilibrium. This constitutes an exponentially stronger lower bound for the foundational learning algorithm in games.

Preference elicitation is essential for aligning AI systems with human values. Prior approaches (e.g., for organ allocation) often ask stakeholders to compare the decisions of an algorithm (e.g., patient A vs. patient B). Such a decision-level approach conflates the means with the ends. Instead, we elicit preferences directly over allocation outcomes to learn a utility function for policy optimization. We construct a novel preference elicitation algorithm for linear utilities that outperforms prior techniques in practice. Our algorithm has two phases. The first phase learns cutting planes through pairwise comparisons to rapidly shrink the space of possible attribute weights and warm-starts the second phase by eliminating dominated regions. The second phase then provably converges to the user's utility function. We apply our technique to heart transplant allocation where a policy must balance competing objectives such as post-transplant outcomes, waitlist mortality, geographic ease, and equity. Using our algorithm, we conduct a user study to learn and aggregate a community-aligned utility function, and use it to optimize heart transplant policies that are significantly better aligned with human values. Compared to the hindsight optimum, the status quo policy achieves a competitive ratio of just 0.54, while our method is near-optimal with a competitive ratio of 0.95.

Each year, thousands of patients in need of heart transplants face life-threatening wait times due to organ scarcity. While allocation policies aim to maximize population-level outcomes, current approaches often fail to account for the dynamic arrival of organs and the composition of waitlisted candidates, thereby hampering efficiency. The United States is transitioning from rigid, rule-based allocation to more flexible data-driven models. In this paper, we propose a novel framework for non-myopic policy optimization in general online matching relying on potentials, a concept originally introduced for kidney exchange. We develop scalable and accurate ways of learning potentials that are higher-dimensional and more expressive than prior approaches. Our approach is a form of self-supervised imitation learning: the potentials are trained to mimic an omniscient algorithm that has perfect foresight. We focus on the application of heart transplant allocation and demonstrate, using real historical data, that our policies significantly outperform prior approaches – including the current US status quo policy and the proposed continuous distribution framework – in optimizing for population-level outcomes. Our analysis and methods come at a pivotal moment in US policy, as the current heart transplant allocation system is under review. We propose a scalable and theoretically grounded path toward more effective organ allocation.

Performative prediction captures the phenomenon where deploying a predictive model shifts the underlying data distribution. While simple retraining dynamics are known to converge linearly when the performative effects are weak (ρ< 1), the complexity in the regime ρ> 1 was hitherto open. In this paper, we establish a sharp phase transition: computing an ε-performatively stable point is PPAD-complete – and thus polynomial-time equivalent to Nash equilibria in general-sum games – even when ρ= 1 + O(ε). This intractability persists even in the ostensibly simple setting with a quadratic loss function and linear distribution shifts. One of our key technical contributions is to extend this PPAD-hardness result to general convex domains, which is of broader interest in the complexity of variational inequalities. Finally, we address the special case of strategic classification, showing that computing a strategic local optimum is PLS-hard.

A celebrated consequence of the minimax theorem is that two-player zero-sum games admit a tractable equilibrium characterization. In many central applications, however, each side comprises multiple independent agents who share a common objective but cannot perfectly coordinate their actions. Such settings can be modeled as \emph{team zero-sum games}, a natural generalization of both two-player zero-sum games and potential games -- the two most well-studied classes of games in algorithmic game theory. In this paper, we settle the complexity of team zero-sum games by establishing that computing Nash equilibria is \PPAD-complete. As a result, despite the global adversarial structure, team zero-sum games are as hard as general-sum games. Our hardness result holds even when i) the precision is inverse polynomial, thereby ruling out a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme (unless $¶= \PPAD$); ii) each team consists of only two players; and iii) the underlying class of games is polymatrix. As a byproduct, we resolve the complexity of group-wise zero-sum polymatrix games, a class introduced and examined in the seminal work of Cai and Daskalakis (SODA '11), and more recently highlighted by Hollender, Maystre, and Nagarajan (ICLR '25). Moreover, we show that computing a first-order stationary point in min-max optimization is \PPAD-complete even for quadratic (multilinear) objectives. From a technical standpoint, we develop a series of team zero-sum game gadgets that allow us to simulate the breakthrough reduction of Bernasconi and Castiglioni (STOC '26). Moreover, to obtain hardness results for quadratic objectives, we make use of a general technique based on linear local approximation, which is of independent interest.

Correlated equilibria are a fundamental solution concept in game theory. However, despite decades of research, the complexity beyond games of polynomial type – such as extensive-form games, congestion or routing games, and more broadly concave games – has remained a major open problem, first highlighted by Papadimitriou and Roughgarden (JACM '08). In this paper, we resolve several long-standing questions concerning the complexity of correlated equilibria and swap regret minimization. First, we show that computing a correlated equilibrium in concave quadratic games is as hard as computing the fixed point of a contraction mapping (Contr), providing the first strong evidence of intractability. Moreover, we establish an unconditional, information-theoretic lower bound ruling out the existence of a strongly sublinear swap regret minimizer: any online learning algorithm requires exponentially many iterations in the dimension d to guarantee at most 1/poly(d) (average) swap regret. To circumvent these hardness results, we examine the complexity of Φ-equilibria – tractable relaxations of correlated equilibria. We obtain a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme (FPTAS) for computing poly-dimensional Φ-equilibria in general concave games. We complement this by showing that Contr-hardness persists even under poly-dimensional swap deviations in the regime where the precision ε is exponentially small. Finally, we show that Contr-hardness can be bypassed in the canonical setting of concave quadratic games, for which we provide a poly(d, log(1/ε))-time algorithm for computing poly-dimensional Φ-equilibria. As a byproduct, we obtain an algorithm for computing fixed points of a mapping that is contracting with respect to an unknown Mahalanobis norm, which could be of independent interest.