Empirical studies examining the impact of various aspects of digitalization on the socio-economic development of regional economies are relatively scarce in the Russian academic literature. Despite the growing role of digital technologies in regional economic development, their effects on key indicators of regional economic activity remain insufficiently explored. The aim of this study is to analyze the effect of one of the fastest-growing indicators of digitalization — e-commerce intensity — on the unemployment rate as well as on SME performance across Russia’s regions. Two indicators were employed to capture e-commerce intensity: the share of online sales in total retail turnover and the volume of online sales per capita in a region. By using panel data for Russian regions from 2014 to 2023 and applying econometric modeling techniques, statistically significant relationships were identified between the development of e-commerce and selected indicators of regional economic activity. First, there is a negative correlation between the share of online sales in total retail trade and the unemployment rate, which may indicate the potential of e-commerce to create jobs and expand employment. Second, a positive correlation emerged between per capita online sales and SME performance per capita and is indicative of an association between digital sales channels and SME activity. These findings should facilitate the formulation of regional economic policy by emphasizing the importance of developing digital infrastructure and supporting e-commerce as a significant factor in economic activity.
The article examines effects of the digitalization of trade procedures on the diversification of countries’ foreign trade. Country-level indices of trade digitalization are taken from the UN Global Survey on Digital and Sustainable Trade Facilitation for 2015–2021, while trade concentration indices (Herfindahl–Hirschman) are calculated using data from the BACI-CEPII international trade database. The econometric results indicate that higher levels of digitalization in exporting countries are associated with greater diversification of the product structure of bilateral trade, as well as with increased geographical diversification of exports within product groups. For importing countries, similar effects of digitalization are obtained; however, the corresponding estimates are less robust and statistically significant.
The article explores data as a key source of market power for digital platforms and as an independent object of antitrust analysis. It also examines the role of data as a factor in shaping the dominant position of digital platforms and their use in anti-competitive practices. Against the backdrop of Russia's Fifth Antimonopoly Package in 2023, which takes into account network effects, market share, and revenue, it is shown that control over data is not singled out as a separate criterion for dominance in Russia. In contrast, in the EU, the US, and China, control over data is recognized as a key element of market power. The theoretical framework relies on the concept of "data feedback loops": as the user base grows and more comprehensive data sets are collected, the quality of services, personalization, and monetization improve, thereby strengthening network effects and entry barriers. Competition policy in the digital economy is shifting from controlling prices and output to regulating the circulation of and access to data. Based on the analysis of antitrust authorities' decisions, the article examines the quantitative and qualitative characteristics of data - such as relevance, irreplaceability, timeliness, processability, and potential for commercial monetization. Special attention is given to the use of data in monopolistic practices, including the cross-merging of personal data for advertising, the use of business users closed commercial data, restrictions on access to one's own data and interoperability, as well as algorithmic and price discrimination. The article concludes that data have become a strategic resource determining competitiveness and market entry barriers in digital markets. Russian antitrust regulation, therefore, needs to adapt to new forms of market power based on control over information.
We estimate labor supply elasticities for men and women in Russia using a dynamic two-earner life-cycle model with wage shocks and intra-household consumption smoothing. A three-stage estimation procedure accounts for measurement error and distinguishes between permanent and transitory shocks. We find significant gender differences in wage volatility and labor supply responses. Intra-household insurance dominates individual responses, especially among low-income households. Labor supply is more elastic among high-income and highly educated individuals. The findings contribute to the labor supply literature in emerging markets and have implications for tax policy, suggesting that greater tax progressivity can enhance welfare with minimal efficiency losses.
Objective: to analyze the risks of restricting competition associated with the acquisition and consolidation of data arrays in transactions of economic concentration in digital markets; to assess how antimonopoly authorities take into account the characteristics of data when controlling such transactions, including the transition from traditional financial criteria for evaluating transactions to analyzing the qualitative characteristics of data as a source of future market power.Methods: comparative legal analysis of Russian and foreign regulation (USA, UK, Germany, etc.); analysis of judicial and law enforcement practice on data assessment in transactions of economic concentration in digital markets; elements of theoretical and economic analysis using categories of market power, network effects and theories of harm in competition.Results: in the digital economy, data act as an independent source of market power if they are unique or difficult to reproduce in the market, if competitors do not have comparable alternative data sources, and if the data can be combined with existing data arrays, algorithms, user base, and digital infrastructure of the buyer, creating economic value. In such conditions, the concentration of data as a result of an economic concentration transaction can cause competitive harm through the elimination of potential competitors, limiting competitors’ access to critical data, transferring market power to adjacent markets by forming closed digital ecosystems, and reducing the level of protection of users’ personal data. It was revealed that foreign jurisdictions are gradually moving from merely quantitative financial criteria for controlling concentrations in digital markets to a more flexible assessment of qualitative criteria for transactions, including access to data, innovation, etc.Scientific novelty: data were analyzed as an independent object of antimonopoly assessment in economic concentration transactions (murderous acquisitions, restriction of access, transfer of power to adjacent markets, deterioration of privacy). Criteria were developed for evaluating the qualitative characteristics of data (uniqueness, relevance, rate of update, reproducibility) and conditions for refusal to approve the transaction (data indispensability, dominance strengthening through the data concentration, the company’s ability to restrict access to data or transfer power to adjacent markets).Practical significance: proposals were formulated to improve the approaches of the Russian Federal Antimonopoly Agency to evaluating data in economic concentration transactions, including the need to address not only their cost, but also their qualitative characteristics: uniqueness, relevance, reproducibility, rate of updating, possibility of combining them with other data sets, etc.
