
The Fate of Nihilism. The European Linear Narrative and Spengler’s Cyclic Alternative - The trajectory of nihilism, when viewed through the lenses of Nietzsche and Heidegger, generally appears as a sequence of linearly ordered events. This understanding rests on the assumption that nihilism unfolds along an unbroken temporal line—from Socrates, Plato, and Descartes to the Enlightenment’s dissolution of metaphysical foundations, the death of God, and finally the ultimate dominance of metaphysics. Such a linear schema suggests that nihilism emerges as an internal product of European historical being and as the inevitable result of its own processes of enlightenment, secularization, and modernization. Although this perspective is the dominant one, it is also limited, for it reduces historical dynamics to a single direction of development and overlooks the complexity of other trajectories that do not follow the same linear logic of time. We therefore propose to call this strain of understanding the European linear nihilism. As its opposition, we introduce Spengler’s philosophy of history, from which we derive the concept of world-cyclical nihilism.
How is a Phenomenology of the State Possible? A Contribution to Political Phenomenology - The article addresses the critical-historical question of the possibility of a phenomenology of the state, drawing on factual contributions to political phenomenology, on the one hand, and the idea of phenomenology as a science, on the other. The aim of the study is to critically analyze and reassess previous answers to this question—particularly those of Karl Schuhmann and Thomas Szanto. The author argues that the logical starting point for any possible phenomenology of the state is the critical question regarding the object of political science. Accordingly, the main thesis of the article is that a phenomenology of the state is possible first and foremost as an ontology of the state. Such an ontology is dedicated to the constitutive analysis of the state and inquires into its essence—that is, into what the state actually is. Drawing on the works of Edith Stein, Adolf Reinach, and Roman Ingarden, the author also examines the possibility of a phenomenological inquiry into the (real or ideal) mode of being and the origin of the state. Finally, he discusses Klaus Held’s approach to the “phenomenology of the political world” as an indication of the possibility of a transition from a static to a genetic phenomenology of the state, which is intended to enable a radical critique of the modern, supposedly self-evident concept of the state.
The aim of the paper is to highlight some aspects of Scheler’s thoughts on the modern ethos and his conception of man, rooted in his notion of the person. In order to demonstrate this, the main part of this work presents the interpretation of Scheler by the Croatian philosopher Branka Brujić. By explicating the main points of her interpretation, it is argued that Scheler’s thought has relevance today. The other anchor of this paper is another Croatian philosopher, Željko Pavić, who has criticized Scheler’s philosophical anthropology and the notion of man. The aim is to show that this critique opens a way to understanding Scheler’s position more clearly, which can be done by Brujić’s reading of Scheler that links the entirety of Scheler’s thought with the critique of the modern ethos. The contribution wishes to show that Croatian philosophy has a worthwhile interpretation of Scheler’s philosophy.
In the article, we explore, from the perspective of genetic phenomenology, the embodied image consciousness in terms of two distinct cases, i.e.: surrealism as social and/or artistic movement as well as radiology as cognitive and/or social praxis. Both scientifically and socially, consciousness is still regarded as coextensive with language, which has its own logic and its own set of relations, and imposes its order that conceals the duration as well as the discontinuity of (lived) experiential states. Certain media are able to disclose the very logic of manifestation (movement as the ground of identity) better than direct perception. While analyzing these instances of mediation, we can, on the other hand, experience the true insistence of language and the symbolic order within embodied consciousness. Hence, individual identity can appear in many ways. These ways are also the correlates of modes of medical imaging and surrealist artistic techniques. Both, in turn, presuppose certain skills (adapted to the manifestation of environments) to stabilize the perceptual constancy of an object in its multimodal appearances.
Imperfection, Relations, and History. From Evolution to Quantum Physics and Contemporary Social Theory - The article examines a shared philosophical implication of evolutionary theory, quantum mechanics, and contemporary philosophy of science: the dissolution of an ontology grounded in enduring, self-sufficient substances. Darwin’s theory demonstrates that organisms are not realizations of a pre-given design but historically contingent compromises; quantum physics, through the problem of wave function collapse and the status of superposition, undermines the notion of particles as bearers of intrinsic, absolute properties. In dialogue with the relational interpretation of quantum mechanics (Rovelli) and the materialist account of collapse (Žižek), the article advances the thesis that relationality is not merely an epistemological limitation but an ontological feature of a world, in which properties exist only within relations. This shift is situated within the broader context of 20th-century philosophy of science, which emphasized the historical and discursive conditioning of scientific categories. Imperfection, contingency, and relationality thus emerge not as anomalies but as conditions of possibility for stability, history, and meaning—both in nature as well as in society.
“Becoming Cheerful.” On the Truth Process, Discussed from the Retrospect of Martin Heidegger’s Thinking of Enowning with Regard to Fundamental Ontology and from the Prospect of the Practice of Psychotherapeutic Proceedings - In Heidegger’s later writings, the concepts of cheerfulness and “Verheyterung” (“becoming cheerful”) appear frequently. When “it” becomes true, the world becomes cheerful, and then “enowning” prevails. Therefore, Heidegger’s spelling of truth as “Wahrheyt” is not a quirk or a literary “joke,” but rather an indication of the connection between cheerfulness and truth, and, at the same time, an acknowledgement of the depth of our experience of being as a moment of healing our being-in-the-world in the mode of fallenness. Could the terminology of “Verheyterung” be used to describe a fundamental event in the psychotherapeutic process?
Hold in the Leeway of Time and Space in Human Orientation. On Dealing with Time in Nihilism. An Impulse - Today, we no longer live in a world of final, fixed, absolute certainties, as traditional metaphysics once claimed. This nihilism can be experienced as a loss, but also as a liberation. We are now used to coming to terms with a highly complex world of unsurveyable, ever-expanding, and constantly changing networks of interrelationships and to finding new ways to live in a comfortable way under such circumstances. We know that all these networks have their time. The paper sketches the basic outline of how time and history are handled in human orientation. It shows that in human orientation spatialization of time, through which it finds stability, and temporalization of that stability, through which it does justice to life, which is ceaselessly changing, interact in diverse ways. In human orientation, leeway of time and space is opened up, within which it can both find a hold and move.
Hypernihilism. First Draft - The discussion surrounding nihilism has undergone a decisive turn in recent years: the statement “everything is meaningless” has itself become meaningless. This can by no means be salvaged by the fact that this very statement lays claim to meaning. Thus, nihilism reaches its completion by vanishing. We are facing the state of hypernihilism.
Conspiracy theories are frequently researched while trying to figure out, which conspiracy theories are false, and which might be possibly true, which means the concept of conspiracy theory itself gets lost and muddled. The phenomenological approach to conspiracy theories can solve this problem by focusing on the phenomenon itself. Since the phenomenon of a successful conspiracy cannot exist—because a successful conspiracy is held secret and can thus only be a kind of noumenon—, conspiracy theories can only be caused by intuitions and by experiences of discrepancies between one’s experiences. Accordingly, explanation by a conspiracy, while usually less practical than acquiring additional knowledge, still remains meaningful, both because of its simplicity, and because it allows one to explain something (a phenomenon) through a noumenon (conspiracy), instead of being caught in the infinite regression of explaining phenomena through phenomena.
Expressionist Phenomenology. Spinoza, Schelling, Schopenhauer - The concept of expression plays a central role in Spinoza’s doctrine of substance. With it, a new line of ontological thinking was opened—one that extends from Spinoza through Leibniz, Schelling, and Schopenhauer to Heidegger and Deleuze. From that innovation onward, substance came to be thought in relation to its expression, giving rise to a groundbreaking shift in the way the question of being is approached. Being expresses itself by revealing itself. This idea brings together the concepts of three thinkers—Spinoza, Schelling (in his philosophy of identity), and Schopenhauer—within a problematic that, although worked out with varying degrees of differentiation, remains unified in a certain respect. We may identify this as the point of departure for an expressionist phenomenology. The starting point here is the positing of appearance as expression, which prepares the ground for bringing together the phenomenological investigation of manifestation with the ontological expression of being. This expressionist understanding enriches the phenomenological standpoint in its engagement with the ontological question of the revelation of being. Phenomenality thus proves to be the expressive core of being, which—despite, or precisely because of, its apparent secondary status—remains irreducible for any thematization of being.
The paper offers a phenomenological clarification of how others first appear as warm, trustworthy, manipulative, or dangerous. I argue that the sense of the other as a certain kind of person emerges through a higher-order process of personality-oriented sense-making grounded in expressive, behavioral, narrative, symbolic, and interactional materials. The contribution identifies an intermediate layer between the expressive givenness of occurrent states and a stable personality model. I call this layer initial personality attribution: a pre-reflective, yet higher-order process, in which a small number of cues are organized around a focal bearer into an anticipatory, cross-situational construal. The ensuing interpretation formulates “the anchorability principle,” distinguishes initial personality attribution, initial personality impression, stable personality model, and higher-order personality judgment, and describes the triggering structure as the passive-associative activation of sedimented sense. Initial personality attribution supplements other discussed accounts by explaining the genesis, weighting, and anticipatory direction of personality-related content.
Drawing ability develops from childhood to adulthood and can be interpreted from two hermeneutic perspectives: traditional and modern theories of drawing development. Traditional theories are based on progression toward realism as a universal developmental characteristic, while modern theories emphasize the importance of cultural and societal influences, viewing realism as only one stylistic option. Although drawing expression has been thoroughly studied in children, there is little research on the drawing expression of adults. Our study, therefore, focused on the drawing ability of young to middle-aged adults in the context of the contrasting positions of traditional and modern theories of drawing development. We evaluated how realistic ability and the presence of schemas can be interpreted. Our conclusions do not exclusively support either of the theories, but highlight the hermeneutic potential for combining traditional and modern views regarding drawing development in the context of understanding adult drawing.
The Crisis of Our Global, Ecological Lifeworld and the Critique of Instrumental Reason. Eco-Ethical and Eco-Political Reflections from a Husserlian Standpoint - It can hardly be denied that we live in an age of intensifying ecological crises. Species extinction, overexploitation of resources, pollution, overpopulation, and climate change threaten the integrity of the biosphere and the long-term survival of humanity. Representatives of the phenomenological tradition already recognized these developments, and they mostly interpreted them as consequences of a onesided, instrumental rationality that suppresses the qualitative dimensions of life and aims at control, availability, and profitability. This paper takes up that diagnosis, but turns more strongly to Husserl’s reflections on universal life and its inherent value structure. According to Husserl, in every living being—whether conscious or not—the same immanent life is manifested. Husserl’s approach opens the possibility of a phenomenologically grounded bio-centric ethics and eco-politics. Such a framework can not only deepen our understanding of the ecological crisis, but also provide orientation as to how individual and collective action may be shaped responsibly and in a manner worthy of human dignity.
Contemplation and Testimony of Nihilism in Ivan Urbančič - The article examines key aspects and orientation of Ivan Urbančič’s (1930–2016) contemplation on nihilism, which he developed over the course of fifty years. On the one hand, this contemplation was closely linked to Urbančič’s understanding of philosophy as a whole; on the other hand, it was connected to his critique of the political situation in the former Yugoslavia, particularly with regard to the defense of democratic values and the confrontation with Slovenia’s cultural and political position. Following Slovenia’s independence, Urbančič continued to provide his critical social analyses. More importantly, in several extensive studies, he conducted a comprehensive examination of the testimony of nihilism, which defines the destiny of contemporary humanity and thus particularly commits philosophical thought to contemplating what we are witnessing today.
Non-Contemporaneity of Philosophy in the Epoch of Nihilism - The article focuses on the consideration of the situation of philosophy in the epoch of nihilism, which challenges philosophy by compelling it to examine its ultimate range. This particularly sharpens the question of the origin of thinking. To reach this origin “in our time,” we must first distinguish between actuality and contemporaneity of philosophy. In the total dominance of nihilistic actualization, philosophy emerges as being non-contemporary. However, philosophy’s astonishment at not being suitable for present time also marks its sole epochal opportunity to measure out its own condition and disposition within the actual all-disposability.
The article reconsiders Leopold Blaustein's philosophy by focusing on his critical stance toward metaphysics. While Witold P & lstrok;otka interprets Blaustein as a philosopher of metaphysical neutrality, I argue that Blaustein should rather be seen as a critic of metaphysical idealism who nonetheless develops a minimal and functional form of metaphysical reflection. This reflection is grounded not in ontological assumptions, but in the implicit meaningfulness of anthropological experience. The article examines four domains-intentionality, humanistic psychology, aesthetics, and education-and includes a final boundary-case analysis of religious spirituality, in order to clarify the scope and limits of Blaustein's functional metaphysics. Drawing on his critique of Ingarden and his own educational writings, I argue that Blaustein's philosophy ultimately points toward a non-speculative, yet normatively rich conception of culture and value. His project, although critical of traditional metaphysics, remains open to a constructive transformation of metaphysical thinking rooted in human experience and practical reason.
The article focuses on several selected aspects of Leopold Blaustein's philosophical and psychological thought, which have a unique significance in the context of the Lvov-Warsaw School and could be an essential voice in the contemporary discourse on mental phenomena. This concerns: firstly, Blaustein's proposal to combine descriptive psychology with phenomenology; secondly, humanistic psychology as a unique proposal encompassing an originally understood subject matter of research and a comprehensive methodology; thirdly, the underestimated role of perception in shaping various types of experiences and attitudes (aesthetic, religious, etc.). Although Blaustein was primarily a philosopher, his works were also directly concerned with psychology, and from this perspective, I try to understand the selected aspects of his thought. Despite the passage of time, these are achievements of great importance for philosophy and potentially for contemporary psychology.
The article presents Husserl’s conception of imaginative variation and intentional consciousness while considering the philosophy of Leopold Blaustein. The Polish philosopher’s critical analyses regarding the validity and feasibility of the operation of variation as well as Husserl’s account of consciousness, on the one hand, reveal shortcomings in Blaustein’s philosophical reflections, and, on the other hand, nonetheless lead us to points of convergence between their concepts. What emerges in Blaustein’s thought is, alongside his philosophical maturity and independent scholarly approach, an interesting application of Husserlian categories.
The article explores the idea of psychology and phenomenology in Blaustein’s writings as well as its relation to two conceptions of phenomenology: Husserl’s and Stumpf ’s, respectively. The article is divided into five sections. In section 1, a historical background of the reception of Husserl’s and Stumpf ’s ideas in Blaustein is discussed. Section 2 concerns the conception of phenomenology in Husserl and in Stumpf regarding its subject matter. Section 3 discusses the ambivalent status of phenomenology in Blaustein’s theoretical project. Section 4 confronts Blaustein’s understanding of phenomenology with that of Husserl and of Stumpf. Section 5 summarizes the discussion of the similarities and differences between Blaustein, on the one hand, and Husserl and Stumpf, on the other hand. I argue that with regard to the question of the subject matter of phenomenology, Blaustein is closer to Husserl’s phenomenology rather than Stumpf ’s.