The term mitigation plays a central role in both climate change and pandemic debates, yet it is used with markedly different-and often conflated-meanings across these domains. This article offers a systematic conceptual analysis of mitigation by distinguishing between ante-factum mitigation and post-factum mitigation. Ante-factum mitigation refers to measures aimed at reducing the likelihood that a harmful event will occur, whereas post-factum mitigation concerns efforts to prevent the worst consequences of an event that has already materialized. Drawing on the history of climate ethics, the article shows how early ambiguities surrounding mitigation, adaptation, and prevention re-emerged in pandemic ethics, particularly before and during the COVID-19 pandemic. The analysis demonstrates that much confusion in policy and ethical debates stems from shifting objects of mitigation rather than from substantive disagreement about goals. Clarifying these distinctions is essential for evaluating preparedness, response, and responsibility in the governance of global risks. The article concludes that conceptual precision regarding mitigation is indispensable for coherent ethical analysis and effective policymaking in both climate and pandemic contexts.
This article constitutes the first of two works that proceed to the rational reconstruction of the Popperian conception of science, identifying it as one of the theories in the series that makes up the rationalist program of knowledge. As a late theory of this program, the quantity and scope of problems left as a legacy to it is considerable, which, however, are resolved within a somewhat elaborate conceptual matrix, in which commitments of various orders converge. In the present work, we highlight how theses of an axiological nature connect and inspire theses of an ontological order to build an epistemology without resorting to any form of scientific or philosophical dogmatism, which leads, apparently in a contradictory way, to a normative view on scientific praxis . To this end, a methodological tool-the methodology of the theory of science-proves to be of great value in defining and tracking the dynamics of these commitments. Subsidiarily, we will show how the Popperian proposal involves, on the one hand, a radicalization of modern trends, such as the ontologization of epistemology, without falling, on the other, into the emptying of truth as consistency.
According to Van Rensselaer Potter, the birth of bioethics occurred within the limits of a moral tradition centered on immediate human interests, neglecting the interdependence between humanity and nature. Expanding this ethical dimension to ensure the continuity of life and the health of the future biosphere thus becomes one of the central challenges of our time. This study aims to understand how Potter's conception of global bioethics, understood as a new ethics grounded in biology, can guide the formulation of sustainable public policies aimed at planetary health. The research adopts a bibliographic and analytical-reflective approach. First, the main characteristics of Potter's proposed ethics are examined; then, the study analyzes how its foundations may contribute to the development of environmentally responsible public policies. It is concluded that global bioethics provides relevant conceptual foundations for building public policies focused on planetary sustainability. Among these foundations are: concern with the long-term consequences of human actions; the redefinition of the human being's place in the biosphere as a member of a biotic community in a relationship of interdependence - rather than as a conqueror of nature; the intergenerational responsibility regarding the quality of life of future generations; and the integration of science, ethics, and sustainability aimed at preserving life on the planet.
In her brief treatise Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy, British philosopher Anne Conway presents an ontological proposal that aims to deal with the problem of dualism between spirit and matter. Criticizing the philosophy of Descartes, Hobbes and, in part, Scholastic philosophy, Conway introduces an ontology composed of three elements: God, Mediation and Creature. In her thesis, the three elements are part of the same substance, differentiated as modes of being. Generally referred to as a monist and/or vitalist philosopher, Conway attempts to overcome the separation between body and spirit by attributing equality between the terms of this duality. In general, the attributions of monism consider above all the part of creatures and do not seek to encompass the whole of her ontology. This article aims to indicate that, if the entire philosophical system presented by Conway is considered, then her ontology can be taken as that of a transcendentalist monism.
This article aims to delve deeperinto the phenomenon ofaporophobia. First, I present the neuroethic foundations that support Adela Cortina's approach to this concept and that clarify the true meaning of aporophobia. Next, I outline a series of theses that derive from the phenomenon of aporophobia: 1) aporophobia obscures the inherent value of the person; 2) we are all aporophobic; 3) we can all be poor; and 4) aporophobia has a dialectical nature. These derivatives reveal the radical nature of this social pathology and its implications for human nature. On this basis, I then develop an interpretation of aporophobia from the perspective of status psychology that opens this phenomenon to the perspective of the poor. The poor, in situations of aporophobia, protect their status. Finally, I will explain how this protection of status by the poor can be explained from the perspective of Rousseau and is reflected in an evangelical passage and in the work by Pirandello.
We intend to show how medical triage models for prioritizing patients during a pandemic cannot be limited to the evaluation and prediction of total results associated only with risk and the prospect of benefits, both for reasons of predictive uncertainty and for equity reasons. It begins by distinguishing two uses of ex ante and ex post triage, then shows how these terms are associated with a pluralism of values in the claims of equal treatment, how the importance of reducing inequality is associated with that of reducing uncertainty and, finally, how these values are framed and not reduced to evaluations centered on expected ex ante or ex post values.
The article intends to support the idea that Wittgenstein, despite reservations, still considers that there is a kind of truth in skepticism. For this purpose, it is assumed that looking at the text of On Certainty will be instructive in order to elucidate what exactly it consists of and what is the meaning of this alleged truth.
The claim that scientific knowledge cannot be exhaustively analyzed as an individual mental state has gained prominence in recent social epistemology. This paper advances that claim by examining empirical cases and engaging critically with a recent proposal to reconcile the two dominant contemporary accounts of epistemic justification-reliabilism and evidentialism. I argue for a conception of knowledge as a socially embedded epistemic state, one that aligns with ordinary intuitions in cases where individuals lack the justificatory access demanded by the classical account of knowledge as justified true belief. Drawing on Ludwik Fleck's theory of thought collectives, I examine shifting positions regarding the effectiveness of cloth masks during the COVID-19 pandemic to illustrate how scientific knowledge is historically situated, dynamically maintained, and circulates bidirectionally between esoteric and exoteric communities. The discussion concludes with exploratory remarks on the metaphysical dependence of individual knowledge states on their collective counterparts.
On August 2nd and 3rd, 2023, as part of the 19th Congress "Feminisms Today..." organized by the Faculty of Philosophy and Letters (University of Buenos Aires) and the IAWPh, two plenary sessions were held under the title "Rethinking the Philosophical Canon and the Practice of Philosophy." Six distinguished philosophers (Mary Ellen Waithe, Virginia L & oacute;pez Dominguez, Nastassja Pugliese, Ruth Hagengruber, Carolina Ara & uacute;jo, and Silvia Manzo) were invited to reflect on the transformation of the philosophical canon, its challenges, and its impact on philosophical practice, in connection with their own personal and professional trajectories. The contributions of the panelists, presented here for the first time translated into Spanish, constitute a document we consider fundamental to promoting more just, democratic, and unbiased academic spaces, and to highlighting the political and historiographical significance of integrating women into the history of thought.
The article sets out to trace Dilthey's influence on Hegel-Forschung. After showing how Dilthey's conceptions, especially the notion of "archive", were central in the formation of research on Hegel and even in the institution of the Hegel Archive, the text evaluates Dilthey's conceptions on three points, namely, the developmental approach, interdisciplinarity and the notion of context. Finally, a critical note is made.
The aim of this study is to analyze transhumanism, considering the possible contributions arising from Ortega y Gasset's philosophy of technique. It is assumed that, at the core of Ortega y Gasset's thinking on the relationship between man and technology, lies the genesis of transhumanism as a philosophical current that emerged in our time. In other words, the purpose of this study is to demonstrate how the philosophy of technology, present in Ortega y Gasset's thinking in the 20th century, can contribute to the philosophical foundation of transhumanism of the present time, especially technological transhumanism. To this end, Ortega y Gasset's conceptions on the meaning of technology will be presented, considering their implications and overlaps in the configuration of transhumanism, which culminates in the main thesis presented in this study: technological transhumanism, in its historical sense, would therefore be the very fatality of the human condition in the world in the Orteguian way. Even though this close approximation is observed, the article concludes by identifying what distances Ortega from certain trends in contemporary transhumanism.
This essay discusses elements of Deleuzism, understood as a language shaped by a reductionist appropriation of Gilles Deleuze's conceptual apparatus, whether written in collaboration with F & eacute;lix Guattari or not. This language, in attempting to render Deleuzian and/or Deleuzo-Guattarian concepts operable, tends to transmute dynamic concepts into static slogans, thereby neutralizing their creative and critical power. The essay thus aims to explore ways of engaging with Deleuzian and Deleuzo-Guattarian concepts that avoid the stylistic captures of Deleuzism. To this end, it presents a discussion on the problematic dimension of the concept in Deleuze and Deleuze-Guattari, in connection with the demand for a reading in intensity. This is not intended as a reading guide or methodological manual, but rather as an invitation to a mode of thought marked by critical suspicion towards caricatured appropriations and fashionable trends-ultimately seeking to restore the inventive and political potency of Deleuzian thought.
In this paper, I argue for the inclusion of women's names in the history of philosophy, emphasizing naming as a crucial step in recovering and acknowledging the contributions of historically marginalized women philosophers. Drawing on Sarah Hutton's 'add and stir' strategy, I suggest that the simple act of naming women philosophers is essential for their recovery, even when their works have been lost or forgotten. I introduce the concept of 'antionomastics' to study the deliberate erasure of names, contrasting it with a 'philosophical onomastics', which focuses on recovering and preserving these names.Using this framework, I examine the omission of women philosophers in Mexican history of philosophy, arguing that recognizing and preserving women's names is not only an act ofrecoverybut also a necessary precursor to their inclusion in historical narratives. Through a case study on Laureana Wright, a XIX century Mexican feminist, thinker, and journalist, I show the importance of biographical records in philosophical onomastics. Wright's biographical work on remarkable Mexican women, along with her own biography and essays, exemplifies how this strategy can be effectively applied in the Mexican context to ensure the visibility and acknowledgment of women's contributions to philosophy.
The philosopher G & uuml;nther Anders warned about the anthropological consequences of a technique with increasing autonomy and an individual increasingly inhibited from imposing their moral and political orientations on the historical course. This work investigates the existence in Anders' work of an understanding that equates the relationship between the subject and current technology with the interaction between the idolater and the idol of pagan religiosity. Starting from a definition of idolatry, the presence of the defining characteristics of the idolatrous relationship in the philosopher's description of contemporary humanity interacting with its world of devices is explored. The working hypothesis is that Anders indeed has an understanding of technology as a continuation, in some way, of idolatrous religiosity. Additionally, the Andersian technical idol would demand from its devotees special forms of sacrifice that lead towards a total immolation of the subject. Finally, the possible moral alternatives that, according to the philosopher, humanity still possesses in this scenario will be presented.
This text offers a critique of traditional conceptions of justice, which tend to frame the injustices experienced by migrants primarily in terms of their exclusion from the political communities they seek to enter. It challenges the foundational assumption underlying the discourse of exclusion, namely, that a clear and definitive distinction can be drawn between "insiders" and "outsiders." In contrast, the notion of adverse incorporation is defended as a more suitable analytical tool, revealing how migrants, rather than being simply excluded, are incorporated into transnational economic and political structures in subordinated, exploited, and precarious ways. The text proposes a reinterpretation of how political communities are delimited, encouraging a move away from the idea of borders as fixed lines at the edges of states and toward an understanding of borders as complex systems embedded throughout the social fabric, systems that are fundamental to the construction of our current global capitalist world. It is argued that achieving this conceptual shift requires incorporating multiple notions of space and time into our analyses of the territorial boundaries of political communities.
One of the issues about the Aristotle's defence of the Principle of Non-Contradiction (PNC) in Metaphysics Gamma 4 is the localization of the basic condition from which he refutes the opponent of this principle. The expected result of the accomplishment of this basic condition is the obtainment of something determined (omega rho iota sigma mu epsilon v omicron v), the minimal evidence of the validity of the PNC(1006a24-26). Thus, the objective of this article is to present the basic ideas of a group of authors (Aubenque, Cassin, Zingano and Zillig) who, rightly, place the answer to this problem in the perspectives of the Aristotelian understanding of meaningful language-saying something (mu v omicron v tau iota lambda epsilon gamma eta) (1006a12-13). We will try to show that they all tend to provide such an answer based on the analysis of the external aspect of reciprocal discourse-saying something to someone else (alpha lambda lambda omega) (1006a23-24;1006b10). However, we will present the limits of this interpretation and some reasons for the defense of an answer on the fundamental of the Aristotelian demonstration of the PNC from an analysis of the internal discourse-saying something for oneself (alpha upsilon tau(omega) over tilde) (1006a23;1006b11).
In this paper, I argue that Evidence Based Medicine (EBM) and Patient Centred Medicine (PCM) are normally seen as incompatible, but if we avoid the philosophical problems of both sides (e.g., EBM’s reductionism and PCM’s inflationism), they can then be regarded as complementary. After scrutinizing the main components of EBM and PCM, I proposed a new philosophy of medicine capable of showing that medicine is a tridimensional social practice composed of scientific knowledge (epistemē), professional skills (technē) and objective values (ethikē). I call this approach “Integral Philosophy of Medicine” (IPMed), and I will here sort out some of its tenets.
Recently, there were several attempts (Rabin & Rabern (2016), Litland (2018), Berker (2018)) to prove that there are some cases in which the fact of the form [P grounds Q] could be itself a ground for Q. In the paper, I will consider the idea that we can prove that the fact that P grounds Q can be a ground for Q by giving up (Amalgamation) (if P grounds Q, and R grounds Q, then (P & R) grounds Q). I will provide the argument that if P and R are different facts such that P is a full ground for R, then grounding is amalgamating; I will also show that there are some cases in which we have that [P grounds Q] grounds Q, yet this fact fails to validate the popular view that P is a ground for [P grounds Q].
Climate change is one of the most pressing global challenges, demanding strong ethical commitments to address its interconnected environmental and health risks. In Brazil, the leading source of greenhouse gas emissions is the land use, land-use change, and forestry (LULUCF) sector, particularly deforestation in the Amazon rainforest. This not only accelerates global warming but also increases the risk of epidemics and infectious disease spillovers, as highlighted by the IPCC in 2023. As the global carbon budget rapidly shrinks, the need for urgent and equitable climate action becomes increasingly evident, especially in countries like Brazil. This paper proposes a hybrid responsibility model that incorporates three key considerations: historical emissions (polluter pays), national capacity to act (ability to pay), and the ethical imperative to protect biodiversity, particularly due to its role in preventing future pandemic risks. While grounded in the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC), this model offers a more just and practical framework to guide both mitigation and adaptation efforts. Brazil’s dual role as a major emitter due to deforestation and as a crucial steward of global biodiversity requires climate policies that are ethically robust and ecologically informed. In alignment with the One Health approach, which emphasizes the interdependence of human, animal, and ecosystem health, this paper examines Brazil’s ongoing deforestation crisis in the Amazon as a case study in the fair distribution of global climate responsibilities.
This paper focuses on the pivotal question concerning the human eîdos in Aristotle’s natural and political philosophy: whether the human eîdos is divisible or indivisible for Aristotle? If the human eîdos is divisible, why does Aristotle claim that human being is an éschaton eîdos which admits of no differentiation? But if it is indivisible, why does Aristotle claim that the city is composed of human beings who “differ in eîdos”? I answer the question by distinguishing between two kinds of human eîdos as actuality in Aristotle: the human eîdos as first actuality (human eîdosA1) and the human eîdos as second actuality (human eîdosA2). I argue that human eîdos in the sense of human eîdosA1 is indivisible for Aristotle, but in the sense of human eîdosA2, it can be divided into multiple eidē which are manifested in various human functions and ways of life.
