The transformation of the foreign policy of the Republic of Uzbekistan during the presidency of Shavkat Mirziyoyev represents one of the most significant processes of political modernization in Central Asia. Since 2017, the country’s foreign policy has undergone substantial changes, marked by a transition from a relatively cautious and limited model of international engagement to a proactive, open, and integration-oriented approach. These transformations have been driven by comprehensive domestic reforms aimed at economic liberalization, improving public administration, strengthening the rule of law, and enhancing the effectiveness of state institutions. This article examines the key directions of Uzbekistan’s foreign policy evolution in the context of the implementation of the Action Strategy for the Five Priority Areas of Development of the Republic of Uzbekistan for 2017–2021, the reform of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the adoption of the Development Strategy of the New Uzbekistan for 2022–2026, and the constitutional reforms of 2023. Particular attention is paid to the relationship between domestic transformations and foreign policy priorities, which has facilitated the emergence of a comprehensive development-oriented diplomacy focused on expanding international cooperation, attracting foreign investment, strengthening external economic relations, and enhancing the country’s international standing. Special emphasis is placed on the Central Asian dimension of Uzbekistan’s foreign policy, which has become the country’s primary regional priority. The study analyzes the mechanisms underlying a new model of regional interaction based on the principles of good-neighborliness, constructive dialogue, economic interdependence, transport connectivity, and humanitarian cooperation. Particular attention is also devoted to the Afghan dimension of Uzbekistan’s regional strategy, which seeks to integrate Afghanistan into regional transport, energy, and infrastructure projects as a means of promoting long-term security, stability, and sustainable development in Central Asia. The article concludes that contemporary Uzbek foreign policy has evolved into a coherent framework in which diplomacy, economic modernization, and regional integration function as interconnected instruments for advancing national development and strengthening Uzbekistan’s role in international affairs.
In the rapidly evolving medical technology market, fierce competition is underway among the leaders in this process. Among developed economies, the United States demonstrates the highest level of financial investment in healthcare, but due to the high cost of medical services, this system cannot be considered effective. This necessitates identifying necessary policy measures for the financing and management of the healthcare system, as well as their impact on the cost, quality, and accessibility of medical care in the country. This study analyzes the conceptual differences in the positions of the main political forces regarding the financial support of the healthcare sector. Based on a wide range of sources reflecting the activities of successive presidential administrations, it is shown that the question of the permissible expansion of government participation in the management of the national healthcare system remains a key issue in partisan battles. Since Donald Trump’s return to office in 2025, the battle over the Affordable Care Act (ACA) has resumed. It has been shown that the Republicans’ adopted course is effectively aimed at the gradual repeal of Obamacare. The measures taken in this direction are causing significant tension not only within the medical community but also in society at large. At this stage, it is difficult to avoid serious upheavals in the governance of the national healthcare system by achieving bipartisan unity. Therefore, the author concludes that the reforms initiated in the country will continue amid intense competition from all stakeholders.
Facing the growing uncertainty of the current global business environment leading multinationals are increasingly turning to strategic foresight (SF) which becomes the integral component of their corporate strategic management systems. The distinctive feature of SF is related to the recognition of multiple futures and the abilities of major market players to influence the occurrence of one or another future option. This approach fits perfectly into the logic of strategic behavior of major MNCs dominating many global industry markets. Recent empirical research has shown that SF instruments are regularly used by the vast majority of the largest multinationals. However, the maturity levels of their corporate foresight functions vary greatly. The leading MNCs in this area stand out for their higher financial performance and demonstrate superior readiness for change, adaptability and proactive approach to innovation. The analysis revealed a number of best practices characteristic of the SF leaders. One of these relates to a systematic scanning of business environment across three time horizons (short-term, mid-term and long-term) allowing to pick up barely noticeable weak signals of future changes and simultaneously to maintain due focus on the current operations. Another best practice consists in combining quantitative and qualitative information, including unstructured data, coming from various sources and being processed by means of latest digital technologies, notably big data and AI instruments. The third distinctive best-practice element is specific approach to scenario planning. Leading MNCs develop at least 4-5 scenarios of the future necessarily including strategic surprises which could bring fundamental changes in competitive landscape. The fourth best practice of multinational SF leaders is connected with their clearly visible orientation to take advantage of the future opportunities. While most companies use their foresight function predominantly as an early warning system on future risk identification, leading MNCs moved further. They guide foresight activities above all to search and seize new opportunities for business.
The article examines the impact of C5+ formats on the regional subjectivity of Central Asia. It argues that, in 2019–2025, the interaction of the Central Asian states with external partners evolved from relatively flexible dialogue arrangements into more structured summit-level platforms. The study proceeds from the assumption that these formats should be assessed not only in terms of their diplomatic visibility, but also through their capacity to shape patterns of coordination within the region itself. The analysis shows that C5+ mechanisms expand opportunities for Central Asia by enhancing the region’s international visibility, encouraging the coordination of positions, widening the room for multivector foreign-policy maneuver, and contributing to the accumulation of collective action practices. At the same time, their effects remain uneven and constrained. The potential of these formats is limited by asymmetries of financial, political, and institutional resources between the region and external actors, by differences in the national interests and foreign-policy priorities of the Central Asian states, and by the persistence of a sovereignty-sensitive model of regionalization that restrains deeper institutional commitments. The article therefore interprets C5+ formats as an important, yet not universal, mechanism for strengthening Central Asia’s regional subjectivity. Their significance lies less in producing rapid institutional integration than in creating conditions for incremental coordination, practical learning, and the gradual consolidation of the region as a recognizable participant in international relations. The article also emphasizes that these mechanisms do not replace internal regionalization, but rather interact with it in a selective and ambivalent manner shaped by broader geopolitical competition. This is especially important for a region avoiding supranational integration.
This article presents a comparative analysis of the approaches adopted by the Trump and Biden administrations toward countering foreign influence in the scientific and educational domain. Based on an examination of policy decisions, official documents, and public statements spanning the period 2016–2024, the study identifies both the commonalities and distinctive features of the two U.S. presidents’ policies pertaining to the safeguarding of “scientific security”. The author concludes that there exists a considerable degree of continuity between the Trump and Biden administrations at the level of practical implementation, notwithstanding notable divergences in rhetoric and the public framing of their respective policies. The analysis indicates that while the Biden administration moderated its rhetorical approach and undertook a rebranding of several of the most controversial initiatives from the Trump era, many of these measures were subject to only superficial revisions or were revisited only after their substantive implementation. Concurrently, the administration introduced more stringent regulatory and legislative measures, resulting in a more systematized approach to the policy of limiting foreign influence. In the foreseeable future, the scale and depth of measures are likely to increase. There has been an expansion of restrictive measures, ranging from the expulsion of Confucius Institutes from campuses to the tightening of controls over any foreign funding received by U.S. universities. This trend is confirmed by new presidential and legislative initiatives introduced during Trump’s second term, and aimes at overcoming bureaucratic inertia in the implementation of stricter oversight over foreign funding and international collaboration involving American universities – institutions that have been nourishing by and capitalizing on their “global” status for decades.
The authors of the article oppose the expert mainstream, which is based on methodological individualism and reduces social well-being to the standard of living, education, and freedom of individuals. Mainstream measurements do not consider historically established communities as subjects of development, and therefore do not notice the obvious paradox: maximizing what is commonly considered to be well-being exacerbates the anthropological crisis by destroying the basic forms of sociality – religion, family, and nation – and depopulating the most “well-being” communities. The authors propose a change in the methodological paradigm and formulate a substantive understanding of social well-being as the social production of life and such institutional organization, that makes it possible to reduce human suffering. The Community Social Well-Being Index is calculated as the arithmetic mean of seven private indices of the following indicators: fertility, family size, infant mortality, longevity, mortality from external causes, poverty level, and children’s access to secondary education. The article traces the dynamics of social well-being in the constituent entities of the Russian Federation since 2014 and analyzes current trends and the geography of social well-being. The study showed that the dynamics of social well-being in Russia are contradictory. Increased life expectancy, a significant decrease in infant mortality, and a decrease in intentional homicides and overall mortality from external causes provide grounds for optimism. However, the stagnant poverty of a significant portion of our fellow citizens, coupled with an exemplary liberal income gap between the rich and the poor, undermines civic solidarity and confidence in the future. The main threats to social well-being in Russia are the destruction of the family institution and a critical decline in the birth rate. There is a radical discrepancy between social realities and public discourse about adherence to traditional values: in fact, these values are shared by a minority that is steadily declining.
This article analyzes the transformation of the US insurance market during the two presidential terms of D. Trump in the context of shifting macroeconomic and institutional conditions. The study applies institutional analysis and comparative policy assessment, drawing on key market indicators to evaluate structural changes in risk distribution across the two administrations. Particular attention is given to the interaction between federal economic policy and the predominantly state-based regulatory framework of the US insurance sector. The first term was characterized by deregulation and favorable investment conditions, which supported relatively stable insurance performance, higher investment returns, and intensified competition, while partly masking accumulating structural vulnerabilities. In contrast, the second term has unfolded amid stronger inflationary pressures, rising reinstatement costs, increasing climate-related losses, and heightened geopolitical uncertainty. These factors have significantly affected underwriting conditions, pricing strategies, and capital management across major insurance segments. The analysis focuses on the impact of tariff policy, tax reform, healthcare initiatives, and sanctions regimes on property and casualty insurance, auto insurance, unemployment insurance, and health coverage. It shows that the shift from a deregulation-driven environment to a more complex risk landscape has altered the balance between market-based mechanisms and state-supported insurance solutions, including the expansion of residual-market arrangements. The article argues that the US insurance market is entering a new phase marked by an inflation-geopolitical risk environment, increasing institutional fragmentation, and the growing significance of state-level regulation. While Trump-era policies were not the sole drivers of structural change, they accelerated existing imbalances and reshaped the allocation of risks within the insurance system in both the medium and long term.
The protection of property rights is one of the key factors for the sustainable development of an economic system based on voluntary mutually beneficial exchanges. This applies to the international economic system in the era of globalization: in the case of international assets, the protection of rights is ensured by the fundamental principles of international law and is largely de facto based on trust in a number of jurisdictions that have historically developed a reputation as reliable harbors for asset allocation. However, the current geopolitical tensions and related international economic sanctions are exacerbating the problem of asset ownership protection at the international level. Using the example of an analysis of the situation with the freezing (and possible confiscation) of Russian international reserves in the EU, the problem of property rights erosion in international law is investigated. It is shown how, while retaining the formal title of ownership, there is a forced transfer of particular rights, which de facto leads to the confiscation of the asset, although de jure the formal title of ownership remains with the previous owner. This situation becomes possible due to the discrepancy between property regimes and formal property titles – if formal titles are not supported by real mechanisms for their protection, then they de facto cease to operate. Actions aimed at such dilution of powers undermine the institutional foundations of healthy international economic relations – their effects are long-term and may require greater efforts to restore confidence in the system of international law in the future. Based on the case considered, the issue of the universality of the application of neoclassical assumptions to the methodology of law and economics is also discussed: the analysis of current benefits and costs for stakeholders can serve as a justification for such asset confiscation, and the long-term consequences of the decision usually go beyond the scope of the analysis. The study can be useful in shaping foreign economic policy regarding the protection of ownership rights to foreign assets – in particular, it offers such protection tools as the exchange of collateral.
The OECD global tax reform has long been considered as one of the most successful areas of international financial cooperation. The current phase of this reform is devoted mostly to the digital economy and the largest multinational corporations. The analysis of key actors’ policy (i. e., the United States, the European Union and its member states, the United Kingdom, and major developing economies) indicates that the implementation of the main principles of the reform is held in complex conditions. The field of taxation, like other areas of the world economy and finance, has a fragmentation trend, when the countries’ national interests are more significant than adherence to international standards. National tax systems have always differed, and their specifics still take place, especially concerning direct taxes, that are affected by the global tax reform. A significant shift in the U.S. approach to the reform occurred during the D. Trump’s second presidential cadence, that seriously changed the attitude and the actions of member counties of the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS. The United States both officially withdrew from the 2021 global tax reform Agreement and issued a series of executive orders that contain direct threats toward countries acting in accordance with Global tax reform rules (Pillar I and Pillar II). As the United States’ leadership in international finance is still evident, there has been a shift in other countries’ policy concerning tax reform. The OECD, as the key institution responsible for development and coordination of the reform, tries to find a compromise between the position of countries. Last Pillar II changes allow on a legal basis to exclude US technological companies from the scope of these rules. The situation in Europe differs but is nevertheless complicated. Although EU member states have traditionally supported OECD-led initiatives, the implementation of the tax reform is difficult due to the peculiarities of national tax systems. And the main difficulty here for EU is the lack of power in taxation, that is important to increase the effectiveness of the reform. At the moment the real actions in the field of direct taxation are held only at national level. Any expansion of the EU’s mandate in direct taxation is only possible in case of unanimous support for such a decision and changes in the Lisbon Treaty that makes it highly unlikely to happen. As a result, significant delays in the implementation of the reform across several EU countries are obvious. The opinion of the European business community that considers the tax burden to be high should also be taken into consideration. Large developing countries could support global tax reform, but China, India and Brazil haven’t completely implemented the provisions of the reform yet. Such selectivity in the implementation of its rules demonstrates the primacy of national interests, while international tax cooperation is not an absolute priority for developing economies. In the short term, global financial reform will evolve in a challenging environment of fragmentation and weakening incentives for global cooperation. The situation with Pillar I is particularly unfavorable, as its implementation is delayed for several years and its prospects remain uncertain. As for Pillar II (GloBE), its implementation will continue to be selective, taking into account national interests and in different dimensions: national, regional and trans-regional. Nevertheless, it is obvious that the demand for unified principles in taxation of large digital and other technological companies, that play an increasingly important role in the economy and with activities beyond national borders, will keep its relevance in the medium- and long-term.
The article analyzes the attempts of the government alliance led by Chancellor F. Merz to carry out reforms in the country’s domestic and foreign policy. The factors that have a significant impact on the domestic political situation and the international agenda of Berlin, as well as German content in preparation for a possible direct clash between Euro-Atlantic globalists and Russia, are summarized. The academic community in Germany is losing its former research creativity. Competition between different expert centers is encouraged by decision-making bodies with set guidelines; alternative views are censored. As a result, the projects suffer from a monotony; doubts about the reliability of contradictory and often one-sided conclusions, recommendations and prognoses grow. The refusal of German analysts to take a comprehensive approach to the study of global transformations is one of the conceptual reasons for the impasse that has arisen in the modern theory and practice of political thought in Germany, including the Moscow direction. In line with such scientific research, Berlin is strengthening its policy of militarizing Germany and supporting the neo-Banderovites regime. In this context, one should understand the decision of the FRG leadership in April 2026 on a comprehensive defense strategy regarding the responsibility of Germany and its Armed Forces for Europe. The document’s statement that Russia poses the greatest and most immediate threat to the security of Germany, Europe, and the transatlantic alliance is striking. For the first time since 1945, the Bundeswehr is being given the role of the most powerful army in Europe, with plans for independent action and, of course, within the framework of NATO. The implementation of Germany’s comprehensive military strategy and the repurposing of former civilian German enterprises for the needs of the German and Ukrainian armies testify to the preparation of Berlin and Kyiv for a direct military confrontation with Russia. The American factor continues to play a significant role in Berlin’s foreign and domestic policies. Despite all the misunderstandings and contradictions caused by Trump’s policies, the transatlantic link remains the supporting pillar of Chancellor Merz’s foreign policy and the guarantor of Germany’s security. Berlin’s public opposition to Trump, including Chancellor Merz’s criticism of the American for educating and re-educating Germans, controlling political, military, financial, business circles, intelligence services, and the media. The realistically thinking part of the socio-political forces and scientific circles of Germany rightly asks the question: does F. Merz’s team understand that the government’s “black-red” alliance is leading the country to a dead end?
The first part of the article presents the scientific development of the topic in international scholarship and examines the views of international experts on the status, role, and significance of BRICS. The second part analyzes the results of the five BRICS summits, exploring in more detail the significance of the last, XVII summit in Rio de Janeiro. BRICS’ priority areas of interest and activity in the political sphere include global governance reform; UN reform to enhance the representation of developing countries; support for the Sustainable Development Goals; strengthening peace, security, and international stability; and the formation of a more just, democratic, and multipolar world order. In the economic sphere, priority topics for discussion are the creation of an alternative financial system and reducing dependence on the US dollar. The content of the Declarations of these BRICS summits demonstrates that the group maintains continuity in its goals and priorities. It has been revealed that BRICS is moving from political rhetoric and coordination of member States’ approaches to the to the issues under discussion to consolidation of their positions and goals and to practical measures to strengthen the economic, financial and political autonomy. The group is developing as the main platform on which interaction between countries of the Global South based of consensus, equality, and justice. BRICS is emerging as an alternative economic and political pole, but without radical confrontation with the West. The author concluded that BRICS is being formed as a non-American zone of cooperation and a Global Non-Western network project.
The article is devoted to the contemporary crisis of the consociational democracy model in Northern Ireland in 2020s. The study is conducted using qualitative logic, statistical and sociological data. The research subject is the crisis of consociational model of power sharing in contemporary Northern Ireland. By means of qualitative analytical techniques, the author demonstrates the key institutional contradictions and limitations of the regional political system. Firstly, weak adaptation and reception of the institutional system (power-sharing model) to structural and demographical changes in the regional community is characterized. The region is witnessing the formation and development of a plural and fragmented community that does not fit into binomial patterns (Catholic/Republican and Protestant/Unionist). Northern Ireland today is broader and more diverse than its traditional communities are, and the political system is proving unsuitable for this new configuration. Pluralism in the public and cultural space thus clashes with exclusivity and discrimination in the political sphere. Secondly, institutional limits of the consociational democracy model are underlined: the dysfunctional nature of the mutual veto system; restrictions on the democratic participation of the broader population in the political process in Northern Ireland. The expression of uncontrolled (albeit institutionalized) veto undermines the democratic process and the stability of the regional political system. Thirdly, the author demonstrates the features of the bipolar party system erosion in the region and the formation of third party groups, which means political fragmentation trend in recent electoral cycles. Parallel to the consolidation of the Sinn Fein’s dominant role (and the political stagnation of the Unionists), third parties are gaining electoral and political strength, the most prominent of which is the Northern Ireland Alliance Party. This gives arguments for speaking, at a minimum, of a diffuse bipolar party system that will never be the same again, and, at a maximum, of a stable three-party system or a system of moderate pluralism. The article is structured as follows. First, a description of the research problem is presented. Main content consists of three parts: demographic changes and structural challenges, fragmentation of regional party system, and limits to the regional political management. The conclusion contains analytical proposals on the future of the power-sharing system in Northern Ireland.
The Labour government has shifted the UK defence policy. In 2025, it released new National Security Strategy, Defence Review and Defence Industrial Strategy. The outlined documents and statements by the government set tasks for developing the defence industry, the defence procurement system, and public-private partnerships. They state the need to ensure the economic efficiency of the defence sector in order to strengthen the country's defence capabilities and prepare for a major war, primarily against Russia. It includes boosting defence exports and expanding multilateral defence projects with partners. At the same time, economic protectionism is growing in the U.S., and the country continues its foreign policy shift towards Asia-a trend that the Trump administration significantly accelerated. Changes in the U.S. policy towards Europe and Ukraine fuel increased contradictions among European countries. Washington's actions create objective limitations for multilateral defence cooperation in Europe. Alteration in NATO industrial planning and increases in defence spending targets lead to a growing U.S. share in European defence imports. This article employs a system approach, using qualitative content analysis, statistical analysis, and document analysis to examine long-term trends in British defence policy, statistical data, and official documents. It investigates long-term reductions in defence funding as well as in the number of personnel and military equipment in the armed forces since 1948. The study also examines government strategic documents, reports, and statements. The first conclusion: past long-term reductions in defence potential, current socio-economic problems, and shifts in the U.S. policy towards Europe mean that the British government will likely fail to implement its outlined plans fully, and the UK will not achieve the declared level of defence capability. The second conclusion: the task of increasing defence exports will drive greater assertiveness in British foreign policy and lead to deeper involvement in military conflicts worldwide.
In the last decade, there has been a dynamic interaction between Russia and African states in the military sphere. Given the commitment of Sub-Saharan African leaders to strengthening their countries’ defense capabilities, reforming their armies, and rearming them, it is likely that demand for Russian military equipment will increase. The article presents the results of Russia’s relations with African states. It focuses on the establishment of the African Corps within the Russian Ministry of Defense and describes its key areas. The report reflects the picture of cooperation with the countries of the Saharo-Sahel zone, including Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, where there have been positive changes in the political sphere and a course towards independence and withdrawal from the control of former metropolises. The article demonstrates the competition on the continent with Western countries and shows the comparative characteristics of arms supplies to Africa from Russia and Western countries based on SIPRI data. It reflects the features of Russia’s confrontation with France and the United States. The article proves that the presence of Russian military forces in Sub-Saharan Africa is necessary to strengthen Russia’s strategic position in relation to Western Europe. The article suggests that, given the high demand for Russian military equipment and specialists in Africa, military cooperation will continue to grow. Russia’s stable military ties with African states have been further strengthened following the Russia-Africa summits in 2019 and 2023. The Ministerial Conference of the Russia-Africa Partnership Forum in Cairo in December 2025 paved the way for the third summit in 2026, which will undoubtedly showcase new opportunities for Russia to pursue its national interests and further establish its presence on the African continent.
The article explores the phenomenon of the pragmatisation of right-wing populist movements through the case study of the "Patriots for Europe" (PfE) group in the European Parliament. Based on discourse analysis, parliamentary materials, and official communications of national parties, the research conceptualizes the Group as a new stage in the institutional evolution of European right-wing populism. Unlike earlier Eurosceptic coalitions, which were often short-lived and leader-centric, PfE operates as a structured and networked alliance that merges ideological sovereignty with pragmatic participation in the EU's political and legislative mechanisms. The analysis highlights several key dimensions of the Group's activity. In the sphere of migration and border control, "Patriots for Europe" advocate a model of "sovereign responsibility", emphasizing the restoration of member-state competences and a coordinated but non-hierarchical role for European Union agencies such as Frontex. In environmental and industrial policy, the Group frames its opposition to the European Green Deal not as climate denialism but as a defense of economic fairness, energy autonomy, and the competitiveness of European agriculture and manufacturing. Institutionally, PfE has developed flexible internal coordination procedures that combine consensus-based decision-making with selective opt-outs for national delegations, reducing intra-group tension and reinforcing its image as a "coalition of equals". The findings demonstrate that "Patriots for Europe" function as a hybrid political actor - both oppositional and institutional - embedding populist discourse into the formal routines of EU governance. This hybridization marks a qualitative shift in the evolution of right-wing populism: from protest-based contestation to managerial engagement. The article concludes that the Group embodies a pragmatic model of right-wing Europeanism, reframing integration through the principle of "Europe of nations and pragmatism", and signalling the growing normalization of populist participation within the EU's political architecture.
The article is devoted to the changing balance of power in the South Caucasus in the context of the settlement between Azerbaijan and Armenia and its impact on regional and geopolitical changes. The author identifies two main periods of status quo change in Armenian-Azerbaijani relations. Their milestones were the First (1992-1994) and Second/Third (2020/2023) Karabakh wars, which resulted in a change of the existing order and the establishment of a new balance. Within the systemic analysis framework, the main elements of each equilibrium are highlighted: the military-political situation, the evolution of national identity, the development of the economy and infrastructure, the role of external powers and mediators, as well as the transformation of the status of Karabakh and the Armenian-Azerbaijani negotiations. The dynamics of the change of these components are considered in a broad comparative-historical perspective-from the collapse ofthe USSR to the beginning of 2026. It is concluded that despite the significant reconfiguration of relations, both status-quos are distinguished by an unstable nature and diverging trends. The ongoing contradictions between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which go beyond the Karabakh conflict, continue to persist in many ways, hindering the conflict settlement and transition to regional integration. A new, more sustainable equilibrium in the South Caucasus can be achieved after a peace treaty is adopted and implemented, but this will require serious work to fix the imbalances that were accumulated during the confrontation.
This article is analyzing the relations between two regional organizations - the Gulf Cooperation Council, which unified huge exporters of oil and gas on the world market and the European Union - importers of these products. They have interacted for over folly years. Their contacts were established in the 1980s, when European Union named European Community, and gained significant increase in the 2020s. The article examines the reasons for both organizations' interest in establishing cooperation and its gradual strengthening. The author identifies several stages of their interaction, highlighting the qualitative changes in each of them. The first was marked by establishing trade relations and conclusion of the cooperation agreement in 1988. The second began after the Gulf crisis of 1990-1991, when the Gulf States started to develop military relations with European countries. In this period trade relations were intensified and a new agreement of cooperation was concluded. The article highlights its main directions, determined by the current regional and global situation. The author examines the reasons for the organizations' transition to establish a strategic partnership between them in 2022, as well as further steps to strengthen it, indicating augmented importance of security cooperation, especially in maritime sphere. A new phase of interactions between the Cooperation Council and the European Union gives opportunity to put accent on problems which are the most important for both sides such as security situation in Europe, Palestinian-Israeli crisis and energy security.
The main purpose of this work is to substantiate the neopatrimonial paradigm as a scientific alternative to the development theories on the basis of which the modernization strategies of African countries in the postcolonial period were built. The theoretical basis of this paradigm is the ideas of the German scientist Max Weber and, in particular, the concept of patrimonialism developed by him as one of the forms of traditional domination. Based on this, in the 60-70s of the XX century, a number of modernization theorists developed the concept of neopatrimonialism, designed to explain the reasons for the socio- economic and political backwardness of the new states, freed from colonial dependence. At the same time, two different interpretations of neopatrimonialism emerged: 1) negative, in which it is considered synonymous with authoritarianism and backwardness; 2) positive, according to which neopatrimonial practices can contribute to social progress. In this regard, the concepts of "regulated neopatrimonialism", "neopatrimonialism of development" and even "neopatrimonial democracy", grounded in the works of a number of modern scientists, attract attention. According to the author, it is from these positions that it is possible to overcome the chronic crisis of African statehood and form effective strategies that help resolve the difficulties of political and economic development of African countries and strengthen their national and state sovereignty. In general, it is concluded that the economic and political backwardness of African countries was caused not by internal factors, but by the development strategies imposed on them by international donors. In this context, the formation of neopatrimonial systems in African countries can be considered as a way of adapting these societies to the challenges of the post-industrial era and the processes of globalization
Unprecedented demographic changes are expected throughout this century. The population growth rate slows down and even becomes negative. The share of the older population is increasing rapidly, while the share of the working-age individuals is decreasing as a result of declining fertility and rising life expectancy. These processes have already affected all advanced and many developing economies. The aging process is an important driver of several key macroeconomic trends in the world. Economies around the world are progressively crossing their "demographic turning point"- the year when the share of the working-age population in their total population begins to decline. This becomes the reason that the "demographic dividend" is being replaced by the "demographic drag" that will depress the output growth, although healthy aging can partly offset this negative effect. The supply of savings may increase and demand for them may decrease, which is projected to exert downward pressure on both real interest rates and the level of investment activity. The increased financial integration shifts the sensitivity of a country's real interest rate away from its own demographic developments towards global determinants. Changes in the economic growth rates and in the level of real interest rates can worsen interest-growth differential which plays a crucial role for public debt dynamics, and this will have important implications for public finances: many advanced economies will need sizable efforts to stabilize their public debt to GDP ratios. The uneven pace of the demographic trends across countries will largely shape their net foreign asset positions, and this can explain the rise of global imbalances. The serious macroeconomic implications of global demographic shifts put on the agenda the development and implementation of appropriate economic and social policy. The main goal of such a policy should be to transform the population aging from a drag on economic growth into additional source of economic development.
Increasing global competition for natural resources among some states has become one of the main reasons for Greenland’s growing importance. Primarily, it is related to the United States, China, Japan, as well as to some countries of the European Union that have been demonstrating different types of involvement in the projects handled on the island. Potentially, Trump’s intention to “buy” the island could extend the U.S. continental shelf, expand its right for the development of Greenland’s mineral resources and strengthen its constant presence in the Arctic, as a whole. All of these factors have brought Greenland to the forefront of the global politics. Today it is obvious that the island’s value lies not only in its huge fish stocks, as it was previously considered, but also in its deposits of several types of minerals on the continental shelf. According to the 2023 European Commission report, Greenland possesses significant untapped potential for critical raw materials, including rare earth metals, and has a long geological history comparable to Canada and Australia, where active mineral extraction has been carried out. Importantly, the island as an autonomous territory of the Kingdom of Denmark enjoys broad range of rights in the sphere of the development of the continental shelf, as revenues from such activities are transferred to Greenland’s authorities. At the same time, the island does not have the ability to protect its interests on the Arctic shelf without Denmark’s economic and military aid. It could probably “smooth out” the separatist tendency that still exists in Greenlandic society.
