Donald Trump’s second term in office has been marked by dramatic shifts in US foreign policy. One of the key changes has been a renewed focus on relations with neighbours in the Western Hemisphere, primarily Latin America. For decades, Washington had not paid the same level of attention to the Latin American region as it did during Trump 2.0. Inter-American relations have returned to the starting point of Washington’s strong-arm approach to its southern neighbours, which was characteristic of the Republican president’s first term. However, this time, events have unfolded on a different geoeconomic and geopolitical scale, as the current situation is characterized by a distinct diversification of Latin American countries’ foreign economic and political ties, a significant strengthening of their cooperation with China and other states of the Global South, and a weakening of US influence. This has become the main geostrategic challenge for Donald Trump, who intends to reverse the transformation of the political and economic landscape in Latin America and restore the United States’ dominant position in this region. Trump 2.0 has adopted the so-called “Wrecking Ball Politics” toward Latin American countries. His first year in the White House has already demonstrated that drastic actions (primarily the armed seizure of President Nicolas Maduro) can largely determine the development of geostrategic processes in the region. Washington, figuratively speaking, has dug out of the closet of history those skeletons of the inter-American system that had been almost forgotten and used them in the changed international environment. At the same time, the geopolitical significance of events in Latin America, particularly in the Caribbean, extends beyond inter-American relations, as, firstly, they affect the interests of extra-continental powers, primarily China, and, secondly, they create a dangerous precedent for global politics in the second quarter of the 21st century. Specifically, Operation “Absolute Resolve” in Venezuela has exacerbated the systemic crisis facing the international community and paved the way for a much larger and far more dangerous armed attack by the USA and Israel on Iran.
The “Epstein files” scandal concerning former Prince Andrew, the UK international trade representative (2001–2011), and P. Mandelson, the former UK ambassador to the U.S. (holding various official posts under Prime Ministers T. Blair and G. Brown and in the EU) have discredited the government and the monarchy. Leaking UK confidential government information to the U.S. financier brought to the limelight the process of security vetting. Several cabinet officials, the chief of staff, Cabinet Secretary and Head of the Civil Service responsible for the appointment, had to resign. The scandal undermined the position of the already unpopular Prime Minister K. Starmer. The support given to the appointment of A. Mountbatten-Windsor and P. Mandelson by Cabinet officials draws attention to the conflict of interests between the government and the civil service in general as well as to the procedure of evicting from the line of succession to the throne, the House of Lords and the Privy Council. The conflict between the government and the civil service exacerbated in recent times since the Johnson Tory government that interpreted its mandate as allowing to breach the law in its narrow party and personal interests. The Cabinet put the blame for its failures on the civil service. The attempts of the Starmer Labour government to introduce recurrent civil service reforms seem to end in nowhere due to its own U-turns. Permanent problems such as staff turnover in the government and civil service, lack of professionals, giving preference to party politics instead of to public good are constant problems in both – the government and civil service as the “Mandelson affair” has revealed.
Sanctions on import of Russian oil, petroleum products and natural gas and Europe’s determination to completely eliminate Russian hydrocarbons import, periodic attacks on pipelines exporting Kazakh oil to world market through Russia’s territory as well as the crisis with hydrocarbon transit through the Strait of Hormuz have created conditions for Turkey to increase its role as a transit hub through which oil and gas, including from Central Asia and the South Caucasus are transported to European markets. Situated at the crossroads of Eurasia and the Middle East to Europe Turkey seeks to take full advantage of the redistribution of the European market and the growing importance of energy security imperatives in the policies of hydrocarbon-importing countries and establish itself as a full-fledged hub ensuring European energy security. As Turkey’s own oil and natural gas production is insignificant this goal can only be achieved through the transit or re-export of hydrocarbons. The Azerbaijan–Turkey relationship are firmly cemented by several decades of the beneficial cooperation and the mutual participation of Azerbaijani and Turkish energy companies in oil and gas assets in the partner country. Through pipelines running through Turkey Azerbaijan has access to the global oil market and the European gas market. However, amid the ongoing decline in oil production in Azerbaijan maintaining the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) export pipeline requires the inclusion of oil from Kazakhstan and also Turkmenistan. Central Asian oil exporters, for their part, are interested in diversifying their export routes. In terms of costs oil exports from Kazakhstan to Europe via the Caspian Pipeline Consortium which runs via Russia are more cost-effective than transit via the BTC. The costs of oil exports from Kazakhstan via the BTC are even higher than those from Turkmenistan, while the modest absolute volumes of oil production and potential exports prevent Turkmenistan from benefiting from economies of scale. However, as global and regional instability increases, the choice of export routes is beginning to be influenced not only by market logic, but also by energy security considerations.
After the terrorist attack at Crocus City Hall on March 22, 2024, Russia was forced to tighten its migration policy due to the growing threats to internal security related to migration. The three Central Asian countries that generate the main flows of labor migration to Russia – Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan – were most affected by the new migration regime. At the initial stage, which followed shortly after the terrorist attack, restrictive measures, including stricter border controls, primarily affected Tajikistan, whose citizens were suspected of terrorist activities. All this forced the Central Asian countries to start diversifying the flows of external labor migration. They began searching for new foreign labor markets back in the late 2010s in an effort to ease their migration dependence on Russia. Uzbekistan has achieved the greatest success in this area, with significant numbers of its citizens working in South Korea and Turkey. Tajikistan, which began to pursue a similar policy later, has not yet achieved much success in terms of diversifying external labor migration. Kyrgyzstan, which is a member of the Eurasian Economic Union, does not experience such a significant need for new labor markets due to the fact that its citizens can work in Russia without obtaining patents. Russia remains the main external labor market for all three Central Asian countries. However, further tightening of its migration policy, which looks inevitable in the context of increasing threats to internal security due to the military conflict in Ukraine and confrontation with the West, will lead to a reduction in the volume of illegal labor migration from Central Asia, and consequently its total volume. As a result, the countries of the region, experiencing the consequences of the demographic explosion, will be forced to step up efforts to find new foreign labor markets. Apparently, one of the main ones among them will be Poland and the Baltic States, which are experiencing a critical shortage of workers due to the outflow of the working-age population to more developed EU countries.
The article analyses the trend towards the UK Parliament’s greater involvement in foreign affairs focusing on its right to vote on deployment of armed forces overseas. The more prominent role the Parliament plays in the development of British foreign policy is consistent with global trends and was prompted by parliamentary reforms of the late 20th – early 21st century. The Parliament’s role in deployment decisions is guaranteed by a constitutional convention, which is based on the precedent set by Tony Blair, who sought to legitimise Britain’s involvement in the Iraq war. The convention emerged during the premiership of David Cameron who believed the government was obliged to give the Parliament a vote over deployment of troops overseas. This convention gradually developed into a powerful tool that could be used by Members of Parliament if they had doubts about the effectiveness, goals or legitimacy of prospective military action. Despite continuous calls to place the Parliament’s role in legislation this was not done. The article concludes that the absence of entrenchment benefits both the Parliament and the Government. The Government is not constrained by legislation and can deploy armed forces overseas without recourse to the Parliament in case of an emergency whereas the Parliament can “veto” a military intervention that is not supported by the British public.
