Amid the rapid diffusion of artificial intelligence and the growing politicization of emerging technologies, global AI governance is increasingly shaped by strategic competition among major powers. This paper analyzes the emerging triadic contest among the United States, China, and the European Union over AI governance and argues that it is reshaping global order through a fusion of technological rivalry, institutional competition, and normative contestation. It compares three governance paradigms — U.S. “innovation-first”, China’s sovereignty-centered, state-guided model, and the EU’s rules-based, rights-oriented approach — and traces how they collide across four battlegrounds: technological supremacy, global rulemaking and standards, Global South markets and infrastructure, and military AI. The paper shows that this rivalry is accelerating digital fragmentation (“splinternet”), raising duplication and compliance costs, weakening a shared innovation commons, and heightening systemic and security risks. It concludes by proposing “managed contest”: bounded competition coupled with minimal cooperative guardrails and interoperable frameworks to contain shared AI risks.

While major powers such as the United States, China, and Russia are rapidly advancing military AI, with initiatives like NATO’s AI Strategy shaping a new competitive landscape, this study examines a critical yet underexplored question: How do third-party states acquire strategic autonomy in the military AI era, and how their behavior reshapes strategic stability? Using a qualitative case study approach, this research employs a two-dimensional analytical framework characterized by technological capability foundation and strategic positioning choice to analyze strategic decisions across multiple third-party states. The study finds that four traits of military AI reshape their strategic options: its general-purpose nature lowers entry barriers across domains; dual-use ambiguity expands acquisition pathways; low marginal cost enables rapid capability diffusion; and data-dependency turns local datasets into critical absorptive assets. Together, these properties erode traditional great-power technology monopolies. Based on these features, five patterns of third-party behavior are emerging. The US allies, such as Japan and Australia, build interdependence through co-development and data sharing. Transfer recipients like Pakistan and the UAE localize AI by exploiting its general-purpose character. Hedgers such as Singapore and India diversify through flexible procurement of software-layer services. Chokepoint controllers, including the Netherlands and South Korea, gain influence via critical supply-chain roles. Autonomous developers like France pursue strategic independence. Overall, regarding strategic stability, third-party behavior creates dual effects: power decentralization enhances constraint mechanisms through supply chain interdependence, yet simultaneously introduces destabilizing forces such as compressed decision-making timelines. Military AI diffusion is facilitating a technology-driven, quasi-multipolar security order.

The growing rivalry between the United States (US) and China has made the global semiconductor supply chain a central arena for economic statecraft, with US export controls restricting China’s access to advanced chips. This paper examines why some governments and semiconductor firms cooperate with these measures, while others resist. It argues that security alignment with the US is the primary factor driving cooperation, surpassing economic power or market interests. Through case studies of South Korea, Chinese Taiwan, Germany, and the Netherlands, the analysis demonstrates that governments with stronger security ties to the US –such as Chinese Taiwan and South Korea– show higher cooperation, while Germany and the Netherlands, with weaker security alignment, show lower adherence. The article challenges arguments that emphasize the role of high-value businesses within the dominant power or firms' indirect dependence on the targeted state as the main determinants of cooperation. Instead, by extending the concept of the security dilemma in alliance politics to corporations, the paper argues that security alignment is more decisive in shaping the outcomes of economic statecraft. In doing so, it introduces the Business Security Dilemma as a tool for understanding how firms respond to the pressures of great power competition.

Esta investigación examina los fundamentos culturales y éticos que subyacen a las diferencias en la gobernanza de la inteligencia artificial (IA) entre China y Occidente, destacando la influencia de la ética confuciana y el liberalismo en los marcos de gobernanza. Al contrastar las prioridades, métodos y visiones que guían la gobernanza, este estudio demuestra que el modelo chino, de influencia confuciana, da prioridad al bienestar colectivo y a la gobernanza basada en el rendimiento y dirigida por el gobierno, mientras que los valores liberales que impulsan los enfoques occidentales se centran en los derechos individuales y en un modelo de gobernanza contractual con múltiples partes interesadas. El análisis de estos enfoques a través de la lente de la teoría de la trayectoria weberiana revela su impacto no sólo en políticas y prácticas de gobernanza concretas, sino también en la configuración de los marcos de gobernanza mundial de la IA. Los resultados indican que el ethos colectivista del confucianismo ofrece una perspectiva a nivel macro que favorece la cooperación y el desarrollo en la gobernanza mundial, mientras que el énfasis en los derechos individuales del liberalismo proporciona una base teórica para los mecanismos de protección de derechos. El estudio sugiere que la comprensión y la integración de estas dimensiones culturales y éticas pueden fomentar un marco equilibrado de gobernanza mundial de la IA que promueva tanto el desarrollo como la gestión de riesgos.

In recent years, the contradiction between the need for collaborative global cybersecurity governance and the fragmentation of the cybersecurity governance system has become particularly prominent. How can we understand the fragmentation of the global cybersecurity governance structure? Based on the assumption that international cybersecurity is a quasi-public good, this article attempts to analyse the fragmentation of cybersecurity governance and its causes from the perspectives of supply and consumption of cybersecurity products by drawing on theories about quasi-public goods and using comparative analysis and case studies. From the supply perspective, the two main cybersecurity supply models, mainly sovereign states and international organisations, are fragmented to a certain extent in terms of governance concepts, governance models, governance rules and governance institutions, respectively. From the perspective of consumers, in the process of global cybersecurity supply, the unreasonable price structure, distribution structure and the disproportion between the distribution structure and price are the main reasons for the emergence of the fragmentation problem, which is manifested in the variability of interests and demands of multiple cybersecurity governance subjects, the insufficient effectiveness of the global cyber governance mechanism, the high participation cost brought about by cyber hegemony, and the deficiency of democratic legitimacy and representation in the current global cybersecurity governance. The fragmentation of global cyber governance is precisely a response to global governance failure triggered by the imbalance between supply and demand of international cybersecurity as a quasi-public good.

The rapid development of artificial intelligence (AI) has become integral to the defense strategies of major military powers, particularly the U.S. and China, heralding a new era of military innovation. This technological advancement has driven both countries to significantly accelerate their development of intelligent weapon systems, fundamentally reshaping strategic capabilities and defense architectures and profoundly affecting Sino-U.S. strategic relations. The U.S. defense policy explicitly identifies China as a strategic competitor, emphasizing the necessity to maintain a leading position in critical and emerging technologies such as AI. Conversely, China views the U.S. advancements in AI weaponry as efforts to contain its rise and destabilize the international strategic balance. This article examines the transformation of the traditional arms race model in the AI era, highlighting how the new features of AI, such as increased information transfer speed and reassessment of cost-benefit analyses, are reshaping military interactions among great powers. The inability to adapt to these changes could entrap the U.S. and China into a new AI arms competition model, leading to a strategic dilemma. The article concludes with strategies for the U.S. and China to break down traditional tactical choices in the arms race and bypass the five mutually reinforcing traps, enabling competition and cooperation to coexist. This approach aims to rebuild strategic stability, minimize the negative impacts of the AI arms race, and maintain regional and global peace and security.

随着大国战略竞争加剧和全球政治多极化发展,海湾阿拉伯国家在全球网络安全治理格局中的地位逐渐不容忽视.本文考察了六个海湾阿拉伯国家在国际网络安全规范之争中的定位及其网络安全治理实践,认为海湾阿拉伯国家选择了一条符合中间地带利益的网络安全治理道路.在国际网络安全治理平台,海湾阿拉伯国家呈现出介于网络大国之间的混合性立场.在国内层面,海湾阿拉伯各国的制度框架为本国国家权力的行使保留了较大灵活性;在区域层面,非正式合作和次国家层面的对话协调机制正成为海湾阿拉伯国家区域网络安全合作的主要形式.对政治、文化和社会安全的考虑,地区竞争和冲突新形式的出现,经济和数字化转型催生的安全漏洞及对网络安全的巨大需求,以及国际层面的联盟关系及其变化,是影响海湾阿拉伯国家在国际网络安全规范之争中立场的重要因素.

The advantage of digital economy has become one of the focal points of strategic competition among great powers under the background of “changes of a magnitude not seen in a century”. The reach and scope of the US Indo-Pacific Strategy has been steadily expanding since its inception. Because of the strategic significance in terms of geopolitical weight and digital economic potential, ASEAN has become a key region in the digital competition between US and China. System renewal, institutional inertia, subject demand and object endogeneity have been the constant driving forces behind the remarkable results and gradual expansion of China-ASEAN digital economy cooperation. However, at present, in order to reduce China’s influence on Southeast Asian digital economy, the United States, relying on QUAD+ and IPEF, is strengthening and supplementing its policies and measures for the ASEAN digital economy under its Indo-Pacific strategy, which brings three challenges of industry, system and power, and causes harm at four levels of enterprise, country, region and world. In the face of challenges, China needs to take appropriate countermeasures to hedge the risks brought by the US Indo-Pacific strategy to the China-ASEAN digital economy cooperation, pursue “Tech for Good”, promote economic recovery, build a digital community with a shared future, and jointly shape a new future of mankind in the digital era.

Annals of Social Sciences & Management studies are an international journal which focuses to spread a vast knowledge to the readers. ASM includes various topics which cover every part of Sociology and management studies like Philosophy & Public Affairs

数据是数字时代重要的生产要素,在硬实力方面影响世界经济格局和国家战略实力,在软实力方面影响国际规则和秩序,从而对国际政治产生影响.跨境数据流动的国际规则已经成为中美竞争的焦点之一,两国都希望在国际上拓展本国政策的影响范围.本文通过归纳演绎的方法,着重梳理了两国跨境数据流动政策的演进历程和特征,认为中美两国对国家安全和商业利益的不同侧重、数据本地化措施背后的数据主权原则与数据自由流动政策背后的数字霸权是中美两国跨境数据流动政策的主要分歧.这种分歧是两国各自数字实力、认知理念和地缘政治共同作用的结果.在美国放弃霸权之前,中美在此议题上的竞争只会加剧.因此中国要在国内加强科技和产业体系建设,完善跨境数据法律法规制度建设,在国际上培育国际动员能力,推动建设数字空间命运共同体.

随着数字领域国际格局变化以及欧盟的安全、发展和权力诉求日益迫切,"数字化转型"成为欧盟提升国际竞争力、实现可持续发展和战略自主的重要手段.在"技术主权"和"数字主权"等话语的支持下,欧盟推出了一系列数字化转型的相关战略和政策.这些话语是欧盟战略自主等思想在数字领域的延伸,它们通过强调数字政策的不同侧重点,助力欧盟通过完善监管和规则体系、加强数字技术能力建设和宣传其数字治理理念等方式进行数字化转型.其数字化转型战略以保护人权为抓手,具有对内对外双重目标指向,重视以产业政策助推数字技术发展,并在模式上强化了国家在数字治理中的作用.在此战略下,欧盟将强化在中美之间的机会主义倾向,在处理中欧关系时优先遵从政治逻辑,加深对华经济合作与加速在部分数字领域对华经贸"脱钩"将同步进行.因此,中国应针对欧盟数字化转型发展态势制定长远预案.

拜登总统上台后,美国网络空间国际战略逐渐成型,特点 日益明晰.该战略聚焦于意识形态和网络安全领域的竞争态势,以国际机制和盟友为抓手打造新兴技术与全球规范层面的美式霸权,以国内网络安全和新兴技术政策助推国际政策实践.然而,拜登政府的网络空间国际战略有其内在缺陷,有违历史潮流.意识形态攻势在数字时代已成冬箑夏裘,美国江河日下的国际规则制定权与其网络霸权之间的落差一时难以弥合,美国国内政治的掣肘与过度安全化和地缘政治化的理念更使得其网络空间政策进退失据,但是拜登政府的网络空间政策对中国技术、经济和政治发展环境的负面影响不容小觑,必须审慎应对.

随着社交媒体平台的蓬勃发展和算法越来越广泛的应用,"算法认知战"在公共外交中得到广泛应用,"数字化公共外交"逐步向"智慧型公共外交"转变.算法对公共外交发挥作用的流程大致分为分组分析、定制信息、塑造认知三个步骤.算法技术加持下的公共外交具有显著的新特点,即精准性、受体的认知固化倾向性、隐匿性以及能力的技术依赖性.面对"算法认知战"带来的公共外交挑战,应从国内舆论场、国际公共外交能力和算法治理等多角度加以应对.

半导体是指常温下导电能力介于导体和绝缘体之间的材料,其产品主要分为集成电路、光电子器件、分立器件和传感器四类.作为数字时代的底层支撑,芯片半导体在国际竞争的背景下越来越具有战略性质.在数字经济、新冠肺炎疫情和地缘政治三重因素叠加作用下,实现芯片半导体产业的安全和弹性成为各方竞争的焦点,全球芯片半导体产业正面临新一轮挑战与调整.中国要有意识地对芯片半导体产业加以扶持和引导,树立战略思维,强化顶层设计,提升中国在芯片半导体领域的战略自主性.

This chapter focuses on the international cybersecurity cooperation dilemma. Cybersecurity is a common concern within the international community. With the breakneck development of the Internet, countries have gradually formed cooperation mainly involving models of international conferences, international organizations, and international treaties. Despite this, international cybersecurity cooperation is still insufficient, mainly due to fragmented mechanisms, poor effectiveness, and camp-based confrontations. From a realist point of view, these problems arise from objective factors such as differences in willingness, interests, and demands, amplified by gaps in strength, cost sharing, benefit distribution, and technical uncertainties. From the perspective of constructivism, there are also contributing factors such as misperceptions caused by stereotypes and misperceptions inherent to the characteristics of cyberspace. EU-South Korea cybersecurity cooperation should be open and inclusive to eliminate misperceptions, develop a tailor-made framework for cybersecurity cooperation, establish a dedicated cybersecurity cooperation mechanism, and pursue greater autonomy in the cyberspace of confrontation between camps. In their cooperation there is room for the EU and South Korea to play a greater role in cybersecurity.

How has the governance of platforms evolved between the United States and China in recent years? There is already an abundance of literature written about the governance of platforms pertaining to each country respectively. Despite this, a dual-track accounting of the governance of platforms in the United States and China in tandem is still lacking. This paper argues that with the historic turbulence of the United States-China relationship and the escalating challenges that governance activities have encountered, the governance of platforms of these two countries are actually more similar than they seem, and have been moving towards a "middle ground," characterized by multiple governance subjects, more pragmatic and balanced goals, as well as a full range and tit-for-tat governance measures. To prove this trend, this paper uses documentary research and a comparative approach to analyze changes in the subjects, objectives and means of governance of platforms for the United States and China. Following that, this paper explains the motivation behind the trend towards the "middle ground" governance of platforms in the context of United States-China relations.

技术进步与时代变迁促使战略稳定的体系框架发生了重大变化.战略稳定理论的研究视角也经历了从核战略稳定、军事战略稳定到复合战略稳定的转变.一个新时期的复合战略稳定模型为探求上述理论与现实之间的互动提供了支撑,即通过战略能力、战略行为和战略意愿等三大链条,分析复合战略稳定的要素构成与互动关系,并且选取最有代表性的颠覆性技术——人工智能作为案例,分析其在复合战略稳定模型中的作用路径.人工智能的优势在于能够打破国家战略能力、战略行为和战略意愿三者的间隔,通过对战略能力的全面渗透效应、对战略意愿的双向引导效应、对战略行为的动态介入效应,从正负两个方面影响复合战略稳定.但是,人工智能对战略稳定的影响在多数情况下是负面的.这一发现,对于更好地认识人工智能对战略稳定的影响,以及维护战略稳定和提升人工智能治理能力,都具有重要的启示意义.

技术变革是促使国际体系变迁的重要因素,以数字化、网络化、智能化为标志的第四次工业革命浪潮促进了人工智能等现代信息技术的发展,也推动着外交的变革.第四次工业革命在技术发展和扩散速度等方面存在着区别于前三次工业革命的特点,并对外交产生了变革性影响.本文将外交活动的进程解剖为实施外交政策之前对外交环境的判断、外交主体在外交平台进行外交行为的过程以及经过互动之后所形成的外交模式,并由此建立了技术革命影响外交的分析模型.与前三次工业革命时期的传统外交相比,第四次工业革命正是通过公开透明化、决策理性化、社交网络化、平台多样化、主体多元化、制度议题分散化等路径对外交环境、外交工具、外交模式产生影响,从而影响到整个外交活动的进程,同时也给外交变革带来了机遇和挑战.最后,文章着眼未来,从多角度提出第四次工业革命时代的外交发展建议.