本文以企业金融资产配置动机的争论为切入点,采用2007-2018年沪深两市A股上市公司年度数据,考察了不同产权性质下异质性股东参股对企业金融化的影响.研究发现,民营股东参股降低了国有企业金融化,并且在代理成本高的样本组中更为显著.国有股东参股提高了民营企业金融化,并且在融资约束低的样本组中更显著.这说明,国有企业金融化表现为"替代性动机",民营企业金融化表现为"预防性动机".进一步研究发现,国有股东参股民营企业主要提高了企业的短期金融资产配置水平,而民营股东参股国有企业主要降低了企业的长期金融资产配置水平.同时,异质性股东参股引发的金融资产配置水平变化有利于企业价值的提升.本文研究不仅有利于正确理解实体经济与虚拟经济之间的关系,也为引导实体经济"脱虚向实"提供了政策启示.

本文搜集并整理了2013-2018年A股上市公司年报中披露的关于"互联网+"的相关信息,研究了夸大其词的"互联网+"信息披露是否会影响银行信贷决策.实证研究发现,上市公司夸大其词的"互联网+"信息披露能够影响银行信贷决策.企业夸大其词程度越高,下一年度获取的银行借款越多,但增加的主要是短期贷款.同时,企业夸大其词的资源获取效应有一定的约束条件,只有在企业盈利能力较强、偿债能力较强、大股东掏空风险较小或环境不确定性较小的情况下,上述效应才成立.进一步研究发现,信贷资源配置过程中,银行并未识别出企业夸大其词的信号效应和机会主义,信贷决策效率较低.最后,治理机制的研究发现,随着企业信息环境的改善和信贷机构信息甄别能力的提高,夸大其词的"互联网+"信息披露的资源获取效应将难以奏效.

It is an important strategic measure for China’s economic transformation and upgrading to give full play to the value of different property rights capital, activate the vitality of enterprises and realize high-quality development. At present, introducing non-state capital into state-owned enterprises, and state-owned capital sharing in non-state enterprises are two main ideas for developing mixed ownership economy. The mixed ownership reform of enterprises is mainly manifested as “governance effect” and “resource effect”. Does the mixed ownership reform of Chinese enterprises play a governance effect, a resource effect, or both? For the study of the above problems, this paper takes Chinese A-share listed companies in 2010 and 2016 as research samples, and manually collects the detailed information of the top ten shareholders. Based on the unique dual ownership structure in China and the characteristics of mixed ownership reform of enterprises with different property properties, the index system of mixed ownership reform of enterprises with different property properties is constructed, and the relationship between mixed ownership reform and investment efficiency of enterprises with different property properties is studied.The empirical study finds that the mixed ownership reform significantly improves the investment efficiency of enterprises. For state-owned enterprises, the introduction of non-state capital reduces the over-investment of enterprises. For private enterprises, the participation of state-owned capital alleviates the lack of enterprise investment. The study of transmission mechanism finds that the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises reduces the agency cost between shareholders and managers, showing the “governance effect” of mixed ownership reform. However, the mixed ownership reform of private enterprises reduces the financing constraints of enterprises and shows the “resource effect” of mixed ownership reform. Further research shows that the improvement effect of mixed ownership reform on investment efficiency of state-owned enterprises is more obvious in the samples with lower quality of internal control. The effect of mixed ownership reform on the investment efficiency of private enterprises is more obvious in regions with strong government intervention, which further confirms the “governance effect” of mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises and the “resource effect” of mixed ownership reform of private enterprises. This study not only enriches the relevant research on the economic consequences of mixed ownership reform in Chinese enterprises, but also provides some policy inspiration for the government to promote the reform of mixed ownership and develop mixed ownership economy.

In recent years, the reform of mixed ownership has become an important breakthrough in the reform of state-owned enterprises. However, the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises has encountered some resistances. These resistances include not only the obstruction of vested interests, the solidification of ideology, public concern, but also the outdated incentive model and institutional design. At present, there are relatively few studies on the influencing factors of how to effectively promote the reform of mixed ownership and the empirical evidence of large samples is lacking. As the executor of the mixed ownership reform, local governments’ behavior and willingness will have a profound influence on the effect of the mixed ownership reform. So this paper selects performance pressure which has the greatest influence on local government policy behavior as the breakthrough point, manually collecting and organizing the property right information of the top ten shareholders. Taking A-share local state-owned listed companies in China from 2007 to 2016 as research samples, using mixed subject depth and hybrid equity balance degree to measure the level of mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises, this paper studies the influence of local government performance pressure on the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises. The study finds that the greater the local government performance pressure, the lower the degree of mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises. At the same time, the influence of performance pressure on the mixed ownership reform of local state-owned enterprises is different in object selection. Based on the balance between intervention costs and intervention benefits, local governments are more inclined to hinder the process of mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises with fewer levels of the pyramid and heavier policy burden. As the decision-making process of the government is completed by officials, the motivation of officials is not only derived from the external performance pressure, but also related to the internal individual heterogeneity. Therefore, this paper further combines the heterogeneity of local officials and finds that the restraining effect of local government performance pressure on the mixed ownership reform is more obvious in the samples with young age, long tenure or enterprise service experience. Finally, this paper systematically studies how to promote the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises.

现有关于股价崩盘成因的研究主要基于信息操纵理论,该理论认为企业对负面消息的隐藏是导致股价崩盘的重要原因.本文延续信息操纵与股价崩盘的理论分析框架,从隐藏负面消息的对立面——夸大正面消息出发,提出夸大正面消息同样会导致股价崩盘.具体来讲,本文使用上市公司年报中披露的“互联网+”相关信息,研究了“互联网+”信息披露对股价崩盘风险的影响.研究发现,企业披露的“互联网+”信息越多,股价崩盘风险越高,支持了“互联网+”信息披露的策略性炒作假说.同时,企业的资源获取动机、市值管理动机及宏观层面的炒作环境强化了“互联网+”信息披露的股价崩盘效应.进一步研究发现,“互联网+”信息披露的股价崩盘效应仅存在于夸大披露的情况下,但企业信息环境的改善会弱化上述效应.本文的实证结果支持了夸大正面消息也是导致股价崩盘的理论推断.

本文以2008-2017年中国A股主板地方国有上市公司为研究样本,结合新任地方主政官员个体异质性特征,研究了官员更替对高管变更的影响.研究发现,新官员会导致地方国有企业高管变更概率增加,并且这种现象仅存在于新官员上任年龄大、预期任期短和政绩压力大的样本组中.样本分组检验结果表明,内升官员更倾向于从企业外部选拔继任高管,空降官员更喜欢从企业内部选拔继任高管;官员更替所导致的国有企业高管变更,更有可能发生在经营业绩好、能够承担政府负担的企业中.新官员干预下的国有企业高管变更,会抑制官员更替中的企业投资效率上升和税负承担下降现象.同时,地方政府"政绩观"的转变和混合所有制改革会正向调节官员更替引发高管变更所带来的负面影响.本文拓展了经济政策不确定性和高管变更方面的相关研究,并在理顺政企关系和优化国有企业改革方面提供政策参考.

In recent years, all sectors of society have achieved good results in promoting the supply-side structural reform. Significant progress was made in real estate destocking, excess capacity in coal and steel was cut, and the macro leverage ratio was basically stable. But it is slightly insufficient in “reducing costs and improving weak links”. Especially in “reducing costs”, there is still a huge room for improvement.Only by combining the macro-level “reducing costs” reform with the demand-side reform of micro market entities, can the optimal allocation of resources be realized and the purpose of lowering costs be achieved. In the practice of enterprise cost control, the phenomenon of “cost stickiness” is a manifestation of high cost. The existence of cost stickiness not only means that when the business volume increases, the input of enterprise production factors may be greater than its actual demand, resulting in excessive cost expenditure, but also means that when the business volume decreases, the input of human, material and financial resources does not decrease correspondingly, resulting in resource waste. Therefore, the analysis of the resource consumption ratio in the production and marketing process of Chinese enterprises, and the analysis of the key factors to reduce corporate costs, have practical value and theoretical significance for solving effective supply and releasing corporate vitality.In this paper, we use A-share listed companies from 2013 to 2016 as the research samples, and explore the impact of “Internet Plus” on the cost stickiness of enterprises and the channels of their action. The empirical study finds that, in general, “Internet Plus” has a restraining effect on the cost stickiness of enterprises. This restraining effect is more significant in the sample group with higher asset specificity, greater environmental uncertainty and lower management discretion. The above regression results show that “Internet Plus” will affect the cost stickiness of enterprises by reducing the adjustment cost of enterprises and alleviating the optimistic expectations of management. Further research finds that: （1） The restraining effect of “Internet Plus” on cost stickiness has a certain continuity. （2） To distinguish the different cost elements, “Internet Plus” restraining the cost stickiness of material resources is greater than the cost stickiness of human resources. （3） In the sample with lower asset specificity and less environmental uncertainty, “Internet Plus” aggravates the cost stickiness, and this kind of aggravating effect only exists in the sample group with low internal control quality. The findings of this study mean that the aggravating effect of “Internet Plus” on cost stickiness exists at the present stage, but the aggravating effect of “Internet Plus” on cost stickiness will be weakened with the improvement of various constraint mechanisms and governance systems of enterprises.The conclusions not only provide a new understanding of how “Internet Plus” affects the cost stickiness of enterprises, but also help to provide policy recommendations for promoting the supply-side structural reform from the perspective of “reducing costs”.

以中国2007-2016年沪深两市A股制造业上市公司为研究样本,实证检验企业客户关系集中程度对企业创新产出的影响及其作用机理,并从市场势力的视角对两者之间的因果关系作进一步的探讨.研究发现,客户关系过度集中会抑制企业的创新产出,并且这种抑制作用具有一定的持续性.其作用机理在于,客户关系过度集中增加了企业的经营风险,管理层出于平衡企业整体风险承受水平的考虑,会降低研发创新这类大风险项目的投入力度,进而对企业的创新产出产生挤出效应.进一步研究发现,随着企业市场势力的提升,客户关系过度集中对企业创新产出的抑制作用得以减弱.该研究不仅丰富和扩展了客户关系经济后果方面的相关研究,而且从客户关系的视角为企业提高创新水平提供了参考.

文章以企业创新绩效为切入点,以2008-2016年中国A股主板上市公司为样本,考察供应链关系变动的经济后果、作用路径以及企业的应对机制.研究结果表明:(1)供应链关系变动会降低企业创新绩效;(2)作用路径检验发现,供应链关系变动通过提高企业经营风险抑制企业创新绩效,但未发现供应链关系变动通过融资约束和关系维护成本这两条渠道影响企业创新绩效的证据;(3)进一步研究发现,企业适当引入多元化股权结构和实施“互联网+”战略,会弱化供应链关系变动对企业创新绩效的抑制作用.文章拓展了供应链关系对企业创新的相关研究,为企业适当进行混合所有制改革、主动实施“互联网+”战略提供了经验证据.

金融抑制背景下,我国企业总体上还是处在一个资本供不应求的准垄断信贷市场中,企业为获取信贷资源的寻租行为成为企业的隐性资本成本.本文利用2008-2013年中国A股上市公司相关数据,实证分析了银行信贷决策中的隐性资本成本与资源配置效率.结果发现:企业的寻租活动是银行贷款配置过程中的一项隐性资本成本,不管是国有企业还是民营企业,企业的寻租活动均有助于获得更多银行贷款,但其使用效率却存在很大差异.具体而言,受制于企业自身的资源禀赋状况,国有企业通过寻租获得的银行贷款降低了投资效率,而民营企业通过寻租获得的银行贷款提高了投资效率.研究结论表明,金融抑制阻碍了通过显性契约方式的交易,企业寻租成为银行信贷决策中的一项隐性契约,这一隐性契约并不是显性契约的有效补充,甚至导致某些企业杠杆率居高不下,有损资源的有效配置.

本文首先以中共中央“八项规定”出台为天然的实验平台,研究了不同产权性质下寻租与企业绩效之间的因果关系.实证研究发现,针对民营企业,投资者对“八项规定”的出台做出了负面市场反应,而针对国有企业,投资者对“八项规定”的出台做出了正面市场反应,并且上述市场反应均在高寻租企业中更为明显.这说明,民营企业的寻租活动发挥了“润滑剂”功能,有助于企业绩效的提高,而国有企业的寻租行为则主要体现出“绊脚石”的逻辑,不利于企业绩效的提高.进一步,以政府补贴为切入点,对不同产权性质下寻租与企业绩效之间的作用机理进行了系统研究.本文的实证研究发现,无论是国有企业还是民营企业,寻租活动均有助于获得更多政府补贴.民营企业通过寻租获得的政府补贴对企业绩效具有一定的促进作用;而国有企业通过寻租获得的政府补贴不利于企业绩效的提高.这是因为民营企业通过寻租获得的政府补贴可以弥补资源的短缺,起到缓解融资约束的作用;而国有企业通过寻租获得的政府补贴将进一步造成资源冗余,引发过度投资.

Making use of the data of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2012,this paper studies the impact of local political power transition on investment cycle of corporate social capital from the perspective of the reconstruction of government-enterprise relations.It arrives at the conclusions as follows:firstly,enterprises significant-ly improve the social capital investment in the year of local political power transition,and with the increase in the tenure of chief officials,corporate social capital investment shows a decreasing trend;that is to say,corporate social capital investment has a cyclical charac-teristic of increasing first and then decreasing during the tenure of chief officials;and this cyclical characteristic exists only in private enterprises;secondly,the cyclical characteristic of social capital investment in private enterprises is more significant in the sample groups of local officials coming from a different city,longer expected tenure of successor officials, regulatory industries,firms with high financial constraints,and firms without political connections;thirdly,in the year of local political power transition,the increase in corpo-rate social capital investment provides private firms with the advantage of gaining govern-ment subsidies,but this advantage cannot be exerted at once;meantime,the increase in corporate social capital investment also leads to a crowding-out effect on their own R&D investment,and this crowding-out effect lasts during the whole tenure of successor offi-cials.It provides a new perspective for the understanding of means,process and effective-ness of establishing government-enterprise relations.

以往的一些研究发现超额雇员会导致公司价值降低等一系列的负面经济后果，但并未系统研究超额雇员导致负面经济后果的机制。借助2008年版《劳动合同法》颁布实施这个外生事件，本文研究发现，超额雇员显著降低了公司价值，伴随着该法案的颁布实施，超额雇员与公司价值的负相关关系有所强化。这应当与《劳动合同法》导致企业用工成本提高有关，这说明超额雇员导致公司价值降低的主要机制是超额雇员导致企业劳动力成本提高，而不是超额雇员导致企业生产效率的降低。进一步的研究发现，媒体曝光率显著降低了超额雇员这种负面因素对公司价值的不利影响，这从另一个角度扩展了媒体的信息中介理论。

在将国有企业高管腐败分成违规腐败与隐性腐败的基础上,本文研究了高管政治晋升与腐败的关系.研究结果表明,政治晋升预期越高,发生违规腐败的可能性越小;但却更容易发生公款消费、跑官寻租等隐性腐败.这是因为,晋升预期较高的高管,更关注晋升能否实现.为了提高政治晋升的概率,他们会尽可能地避免违法违规的腐败行为.但同时他们更倾向于采取公款消费、跑官等寻租手段,来打点、维持、提升各种关系,尽可能为政治升迁铺平道路.而晋升机会较小的高管更关注权力“过期作废”的问题.在相关制度不太健全的环境下,这类高管更容易利用手中权力谋取私人利益,更容易发生违规腐败.唯有在完善内部治理机制和外部治理机制的基础上,才能使政治晋升成为国有企业中真正的、切实可行的激励手段.

本文研究发现,地方政府换届当期,与国有企业相比,民营企业会显著提高企业的纳税程度;与内升官员相比,外地调任官员会显著提高企业的纳税程度.进一步研究发现,民营企业在地方政府换届当期提高纳税程度能够为其在换届次年获得更多的政府补贴,但是这种行为弱化了政府补贴的经济效应.实证结果表明,民营企业会利用地方政府换届之机,主动调整纳税行为以迎合新任官员的政绩诉求,从而有利于民营企业在新一轮政治周期中获得资源支持.本文从企业税收层面为地方政府换届对企业行为的影响提供了微观证据,其结论有助于理解企业改变纳税行为的动机及效果.

不久前，由中国企业营运资金管理研究中心、中国混合所有制与资本管理研究院主办的2015营运资金管理高峰论坛暨混合所有制与资本管理高峰论坛在青岛举行。来自政府部门、企业、科研院所等130余名专家学者围绕“企业改革与资金管理--?关注新常态”的主题进行了深入交流和研讨。

完善国家治理是重要的战略性研究话题,国家审计是完善国家治理的重要机制.研究完善国家治理的其他路径具有一定的现实意义,社会审计可能是促进国家治理完善的一个选择.基于国有上市公司过度“吃喝”腐败视角,本文研究了注册会计师审计在国家治理中的作用.研究发现,注册会计师在国家治理中发挥了积极的作用.具体表现为,注册会计师审计能监督国有上市公司过度“吃喝”现象,过度“吃喝”程度越高的上市公司越容易收到非标准审计意见.注册会计师也能抑制国有上市公司过度“吃喝”程度.被出示非标准审计意见的国有上市公司,其过度“吃喝”程度在下一年度下降幅度更大.研究意味着,与国家审计类似,注册会计师审计也在国家治理中发挥重要作用.

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<span id="ChDivSummary" name="ChDivSummary" class="abstract-text">利用我国民营上市公司的数据研究发现:具有政治关系的公司更容易获得长期贷款,其债务期限也相对更长;而没有政治关系的公司由于无法获得银行贷款,则会利用私人关系,获得更多的商业信用。这说明民营企业利用各种关系进行债务融资的行为确实比较普遍。进一步的研究发现:在货币政策紧缩期,民营企业利用各种关系进行债务融资的行为更为普遍;随着媒体监督的加强,利用各种关系进行债务融资的行为显著减少。本文的研究发现,我国媒体监督阻碍了关系型契约的实施,在一定程度上抑制腐败。因此,政府应通过媒体之间的竞争,提高和完善媒体的监督职能,鼓励媒体来监督、治理腐败。</span>

本文利用中国上市公司2008-2013年相关数据,研究了不同盈利状况下的企业为争取政府补贴会采取何种行为及这些行为的经济后果,从地方政府晋升压力角度对企业行为进行了深层次研究.研究发现:企业为争取政府补贴会采取迎合行为,且这种迎合行为不利于政府补贴绩效的发挥.具体而言,盈利状况较差的企业倾向于通过负向盈余操纵的方式获得政府补贴,这种行为弱化了补贴的企业绩效和社会绩效;而盈利状况较好的企业倾向于通过寻租的方式获得政府补贴,这种行为同样弱化了补贴的企业绩效,但由于地方政府与企业之间的双向寻租活动,使得该行为强化了补贴的社会绩效.进一步研究发现,只有在地方政府晋升压力较大的地区,企业的这种迎合行为才能发挥作用.实证研究表明,地方政府之间的“晋升锦标赛”及其对政府补贴的自由裁量权使得政府补贴容易成为地方政府服务于自身绩效考核和政治晋升的工具,最终导致政府补贴的浪费与错配.