The Security Service of Ukraine (Ukrainian: Служба безпеки України, romanized: Sluzhba bezpeky Ukrayiny) or SBU (Ukrainian: СБУ) is the law enforcement authority and main intelligence and security agency of the Ukrainian government, in the areas of counter-intelligence activity and combating terrorism. The SBU also operates its own special forces unit, the Alpha Group.The SBU is the successor of the Ukrainian branch of the Soviet KGB, created after the Declaration of Independence of Ukraine in 1991. The agency was badly seen by the Ukrainian public, as they were widely regarded as corrupt and for conducting arrests of political dissidents. After the Revolution of Dignity, the SBU went through a restructuring with the transition to the new government, as the agency was rife with corruption and infiltration by the Russian intelligence services, almost 50% of the agents defected to Russia after the Annexation of Crimea. The SBU has since been involved in operations against Russia and pro-Russian separatists in Donbas after the start of the War in Donbas and the wider Russo-Ukrainian War.
російська федерація продовжує здійснювати послідовні кроки з адаптації власної економіки та оборонно-промислового комплексу до війни на виснаження, проведення мобілізації економіки росії та її переходу на військові рейки з нарощуванням обсягів військового виробництва для поповнення втрат у бойових діях. Актуальність статті обумовлена потребою аналізу основних напрямів розвитку озброєння та військової техніки збройних сил російської федерації та можливостей оборонно-промислового комплексу росії щодо його розроблення, модернізації та виробництва на поточному етапі російсько-української війни та на найближчу перспективу. Метою статті та її спрямованістю є аналіз напрямів створення озброєння та військової техніки збройних сил російської федерації та визначення основних тенденцій його розвитку на нинішньому етапі війни. Основним результатом статті є аналіз напрямів розвитку засобів збройної боротьби збройних сил росії на поточному етапі російсько-української війни та визначення їхніх основних тенденцій. Практична значущість результатів статті полягає у можливості використання основних тенденцій розвитку засобів збройної боротьби російської федерації на поточному етапі програмно-цільового планування для своєчасного обґрунтування основних напрямів подальшого розвитку озброєння та військової техніки сил оборони України.
The article identifies the organizational and legal problems of implementing financial control as a tool for detecting corrupt persons infiltrated into government structures. It is substantiated that the current legislation of Ukraine contains normatively formalized financial control procedures, in particular the control and verification of declarations, selective lifestyle monitoring of declaration subjects, additional financial control measures, and cooperation between the Asset Recovery and Management Agency and the National Agency on Corruption Prevention regarding the detection of unjustified assets. It has been established that the effectiveness of these procedures is limited by the fragmentation of interagency information exchange, the complexity of access to certain types of information, problems in establishing the actual ownership of assets concealed through third parties, corporate structures, foreign jurisdictions, or financial transactions protected by banking secrecy and financial monitoring confidentiality regimes. It is concluded that financial control may serve as an effective preventive and detection instrument provided that the procedures of the National Agency on Corruption Prevention are combined with properly regulated interaction between the National Agency on Corruption Prevention, the Asset Recovery and Management Agency, the State Financial Monitoring Service, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau, the State Bureau of Investigation, the Security Service of Ukraine, and prosecution authorities. Directions for improving the financial control mechanism are proposed through the development of risk-oriented analytics, electronic information exchange, procedural safeguards for the use of restricted-access information, and normative regulation of interagency coordination.
The article examines the systemic disproportion between the accelerated evolution of hybrid (subthreshold) threats and the conservative vertical-hierarchical model of governance of Ukraine’s security and defence sector (SDS). Drawing on CSIS data (2025), ENISA Threat Landscape 2025, RAND “From Policy to Victory” (2025), NATO StratCom COE “The Collage of the Kremlin’s Communication Strategy” (2025), and WEF Global Cybersecurity Outlook 2025, the authors demonstrate that traditional inter-agency “silos” have become the primary vulnerability of the state. The aggressor operates non-linearly and networked, exploiting the “seams” between the RNBO, MoD, SBU, State Special Communications Service, and private critical infrastructure operators (over 80 % of objects). The existing normative framework (Law on National Security 2018, Cybersecurity Strategy 2021, CMU Order No. 853-r 2025) lacks effective mechanisms for horizontal coordination and real-time data exchange. This results in a chronic institutional lag, whereby intelligence information fails to translate into preventive action. The central proposal is the establishment of a Joint Analytical Centre for Hybrid Threats (JACHT) – a compact hub (55–65 specialists) directly subordinated to the RNBO. The Centre integrates three functional blocks: AI-driven predictive monitoring, legal-attribution assessment, and a public-private interface based on Data Sharing Agreements. Implementation requires targeted amendments to Article 12 of the Law on National Security and updates to the Cybersecurity Strategy incorporating Active Defence elements. The practical value of the study lies in substantiating the transition from a reactive to a predictive SDS governance model and providing concrete recommendations for the pilot launch of JACHT in 2027.
The object of the research is the process of ensuring the protection of data transmission in communication channels of critical infrastructure objects based on mobile and smart technologies. The development of quantum computing technologies based on Grover and Shor algorithms provides practical cracking of symmetric and asymmetric cryptosystems in polynomial time. The emergence of systems based on artificial intelligence allows creating hybrid systems for detecting weaknesses (critical points) in security systems not only on critical infrastructure objects. In addition, a full-scale quantum computer will open a new era of implementing post-quantum cryptography algorithms. Among the winners of post-quantum algorithms, the crypto-code constructions (CCC) of McEliece and Niederreiter are separately highlighted, which allow to provide the required level of protection and the required level of reliability of information transmission in an integrated manner. But a significant drawback is the possibility of cracking such systems on linear codes, as well as the need to build them on the Galois field 210–213, which significantly reduces their use in low-capacity systems based on smart and mobile technologies. To solve this drawback, the work proposes the use of a symmetric CCC based on the Rao-Nam scheme on algebrogeometric and flawed codes, which provides the possibility of significantly reducing the volume of key data (construction of CCC over the Galois field 24–26). When using the Rao-Nam CCC, a quantum symmetric algorithm is formed, which ensures the preservation of the level of stability and reliability of information transmission (safe time 1025–1035). This approach provides the possibility of forming intelligent information protection systems (IIPS). The given structural scheme of the IIPS construction ensures timely detection of threats with an assessment of the computational and financial and human capabilities of attackers, as well as the use of the necessary CCC/algebraic (flawed) codes to ensure the required level of security
